Continuity and Change in the New Zealand Parliament by Halligan, John
Continuity and Change in the
New Zealand Parliament
John HaIIigan
Presented for the Deqree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
School of Political Science and
Public Administration of the
Victoria University of Wellington, 19B0
ACIWOWLETEGIvIENTs
,|Ihe ]-ist of dbbts aeicutrru'lated si:nce this study con-
menc'ed is too long to permiL proper acknowledgments to be
rnade. Many ,members Of Farliament have f,reeL1r' given of their
tirne to ans:wer ques:t.ions,. The Sgeaker apprsved speeial
pgi\rileges f.of the FnrrFoae.s of obqenvj.ng and res,earc,hing
Parli-ament. The staff o,f the Clerkrs- Departme,nt,r G€neraX'
Asse4rbl.y Lib.rary and the partg nesearch units have assiSted
the gatheririg of info-r-matj,on,. fhe late Dr Alan Robinson
contributed in a va.riety of ways 'to the eariy stages of
this reEearsh. Frof'essor ,fohn Roberts provided vaLuable
aetvice on the development of the study during the laLer
stages. Janye Bedggoodcomtr)etently typed the early drafts
of the chapters, whi.le Linda Sloan p.nOv.i.ded her usual servi.ce
in typing the final eropy!
VICTORIA UN.{VERSITY OF WELLINGTgTI
TAB.LII OF CoNTENTS
L. Introduction
2, Evolution sf Parliament
3. Parliarnentary Partie,s: Cohesi.on and Conf,lict
4. Provisi.on of Leaders:hip
5. Farliameatary Business
5. Le,gislation
7. Conunittee ;SysBem
8. Memhers of, FarLiarne'rrt and their Resources
9. Conclusions
Aptle-ndi.x
23
55
97
119
150
L92
235
264
280
Bibliography 283
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Few legislatures in the world can claim a continuous
existence as long as that of the New Zealand House of Rep-
resentatives. The basic forms and procedures inherited
from the House of Commons in the rniddle of last century
have persisted until the present. Formal changes to the
rules have occurred intermittently during its history aI-
though the content of its work has altered. Because of the
centrality of the House to the parliamentary system of
government and its adaptability to the needs of successive
generatj.ons of politicians, it has continued to play an
important role in the political system.
During the period of its most extensive institutional
change since the nineteenth century, parliament has been
subject to mounting public criticism. Because the con-
tinuity in the parliamentary framework is more striking
than the changes which have occurred within it, the extent
of these latter developments is frequently overlooked. At
this point in Parliamentrs history, it is appropriate to
provide an account of institutional developments in its
recent hi-story in order to illuminate its functioning and
to clarify some of the issues.
Parliament and the public
New Zealand is a
with a simple political
ment consisting of one
country small in area and population
structure a unitary form of govern-
small legislature and a concentration
of power in the central government. Few rival sources of
povirer exist; local government (even the largest city
councils) provides no real basis for competing with the
central government. And there are not the regional tiers
of a federal state to provide contenders for power and re-
sources within a complex system of government. Associated
with its size and the si-mple political structure is a homo-
geneous population and a lack of cultural and political
diversity.
There are no other institutions at the national level
that have been formally endowed with quite the same general
authority and status as the House of Representatives. It is
neither a key decision-making body nor is it intrinsically
powerful. But the exercise of influence and the making of
decisions are associated in one way or another with the House.
rt is the major arena in which politicians pubricly contend
for attention and for power- Amongst the membership of
Parliament is the entire personnel of cabinet and their
"selectorate" is constituted by the same membership. When
in session the issues of the day are inevitably debated
within its chamber and policy channelled through its pro-
cedures. Although it may not possess the autonomous capacity
to act in opposition to or in conjunction with, the executive,
the work of gTovernment is focused in and around parliament.
A second reason for the unique position of Parliament
within the New Zealand system of government relates to its
constitutional status. A critical feature of the Westminster
form is the idea of ministerial responsibility. This can
only be realised in an elected assembly which selects and
holds responsible ministers of a government. parliament
lends legitimacy to the actions of a government by giving
the regar imprimatur to iLs most important actions and in
fact providing the basis for its existence. The concept of
parliamentary sovereignty extends absolute and exclusive
control to Parliament for legislation.
For these reasons parriament has always been the subject
of considerable public interest in New zealand, but there may
never have been great satisfaction with parliament for as
Wheare reminds us:
Pub1ic esteem and public interest do not neces-
sarily go together. The activities of a legis-lature may provide a great deal of news:Iegislatures may often be in the public eye;their proceedings may be notorigus. eut they
may stand 1ow in public esteem.r
The observations of visitors to New zealand in the past
have generally been unfavourable. The webbs, siegfried and
Bryce found the standard of debate to be low and neither
edifying nor instructional.2 Lipson berieved that ,,the
general public do not regard their parliament highly and
tend to look upon it as a kind of nationar bore effort,,.3
More recent commentaries by political scientists have tended
to be less critical.4
1. K C ltltreare, Iegislatures, 2rd ed. (Lorxlon: O>cford Universitlz press,
1968), p.148f-
Sidrrey Webb, quoted by Andre Siegrfried,(Iordon: Bell, 1914) , p.75; Siegfried,P.76i J B Bryce, lbdern Darocracies,I92L), p.360.
Ieslie Lipson, Ttre Folitics of EquaIiW. Neur Zealand's Mventr.:resirrDenpcraqrr(@F
Fbr example, R G l{ulgan, "rhe Need for l"bre Graduate Mps: A sceptical
lrlote", Political Scierce, 29 (July,L977), pp.66-Zl.
2.
3.
Defirrsaq/ in Nerr,r Zea'lard,
,
4.
The impressions of transient or academic observers may
not correspond with public opinion, but the full extent of
public attitudes to Parliament is stilt unclear for they do
not appear to have been properry surveyed. The resurts of a
1975 Heylen poll indicated that "only 32 per cent of New
Zealanders expressed fulI trust and confidence in Parliament
compared with over twice as many who trusted the medical pro-
fession, 63 per cent who trusted the police and even 44 per
cent who trusted the legal profession,,.5 Technological
developments in the transmission of information of Parliamentrs
proceedings have permitted immediate access to its debates,
but two-thirds of the respondents to a 1966 survey had not
listened to the broadcast in the preceding three months. The
"real listeners" amounted to only I0 per cent of the s.*p1".6
In recent years there has been widespread discussion
about the functionj-ng of the institution. The main issues
have involved either relations between the executive and the
legislature deriving from actions of the government, the work
of Parliament or the conduct of members during its proceedings.
It is necessary to review briefly the main respects in which
it is felt by observers that the status of parliament has
been recently undermined.
First, certain types of behaviour in parliament have
been unprecedented (certainly within the memories of New
Zealanders). The general tenor of the proceedings has been
5. W K Jackson, "A Po1itical Scientist Iooks at Parlianent" in Sir
John l4arshaIl, (ed) @e Reform of parlianent (Wetling-ton: NssZealard Institute of 978), p.23.
Awtin Mj-tctrell, "ltle People ard t}re System: Sone Basic Attitrdes",6.
New Zealand Journal of Publicf,rinj-nistration3l (Septsnber, 1968) ,p.29.
affected by particular incidents and the style of some politi-
cians. Two indications of this that reflect most directly upon
the standing of the institution are the number of cases referred
to the Privileges Committee and the extent to which the authority
of the Speaker has been disputed. During the last two parlia-
mentary terms the business of the House has been frequently
overshadowed by an exceptj-onal degree of rancorous conflict
and personal vilification. To many observers Parliamentrs
reputation appeared to have reached a nadir in recent history.
The sovereignty of Parliament has been more blatantly
and more frequently challenged and derided than in the past.
It is the extension of executive authority in particular areas
that has provoked particular concern. There have been previous
instances of executive action that overlooked the necessity
fmformal endorsement by Parliament. There is, however, €lD
important distinction between oversight and detiberate ex-
hortations to disregard the decisions of the legislature.
Before Parliament met in 1976 for the first session of the
new National government, ministers advocated that the community
should ignore a statute of Parliament until the government was
able to repeal it. Since then the executive has disbanded
statutory bodies created by acts of Parliament and then
sanctioned this action by retrospective legislation. The
examples of executive behaviour which subvert the sovereignty
of Parliament suggests that these precedents may become the
accepted practice of governments in New Zea1and.
The publicity accorded these events has increased the
attention given to trends in the making of l-egislation and
regulations. The claim that New zearand is over-legislated
and over-regulated has become a significant issue with the
steady rise in the volume of statutes and regulations. AI-
though the government is responsible for initiating regis-
lation, Parliament is where the major rules are publicry
considered and legitimated. Responsibility has therefore
been attri-buted to the House for both the vorume of regis-
lation and the rate at which it is passed.
Other features of the parliamentary system have also
been subjected to criticism. The House may be portrayed
as a pliabre institution, dominated by the parties and the
executive, and manipulated according to their ends. The
sittings of Parliament are dependent on the will of the
executive which may choose to by-pass it by the use of
regurations or supplant it with caucus. whire in session
the time and other resources of the House are misused by
inadequate attention to the organisational requirements of
the institution. one other claim is that members of parria-
ment are inadequately served with information on which to
base their decisions. Although most of these issues are
not new to New Zearand poritics, events in the seventies
gave observers good cause for concern about the status of
Parliament. The heightened interest in parliamentary reform
(described recently by a sitting member as New Zealand's
"popular parlour pursuit")/ is evidenced by an unprecedented
number of publications on the subject.
Dr l4artlrn Fillay, retrnrted il tl.e Nelr Zealard Herald, March 3L, L977,guoted in Marillm waring, "Revitalffi, parlianent, andParties", in J Stephen Hoadley (ed) Inproving Nerr,r Zealand's Denocracy(Auckland: Neur Zealard For:ndation to
7.
While these issues, and the public attitudes they have
engendered are not central to this study, they suggest that
perspectives on Parliament are needed which will further
our understanding of the institution. For as Jackson has
observed:
The real problem with Parliament today is
not so much the question of any decline in
the parliamentary system j-n any absolgte
serrsi, €rs a rise in our expectations. S
While Parliament has not readily adapted to the extensive
changes in its political environment' it has not remained
static. Before considering the question of institutional
change, a review of existing research on Parliament will
serve to clarify the existing information available.
Research on Parliament
There have been, broadly speaking, two types of research
on Parliament: the reform-orientated papers of academics
seeking to influence politicians and the public; and a range
of studies on dimensions of the institution.
The academic writers of the post-war period have been
more neutral in their judgments than those observers cited
earlier, for their commentaries have been largely directed
to members of Parliament. The reformist literature RdY,
wj-thout undue distortion, be associated largely with each
of the last three decades.
8. Keith Jackson, Ns'r Zealard: Politics of Change, (Well-ington: Reed
Edrrcation, LgT3
The abolition of the Legislative Council, following the
acquj-sition by Parliament of the powers to accomplish the
reform, was the main factor stimulating concern with con-
stitutional issues in the 1950s. The question of a second
chamber was the subject of three parliamentary inquiries in
1950-2 | L961 and 1963-4, sometimes associated with the issue
of a second chamber were proposals for a bi_Il of rights and
a written constitution. AIl three \4rere concerned with pro-
viding for some form of constitutional safeguards and were
the subject of numerous submissions and paper".9
Perhaps recognising the virtue of Austin Mitchell's
remark that "the actual- necessity appears to be for reform
of the House of Representatives rather than changes of the
'constitutional' framework"I0 a second type of reformist paper
emerged most clearly in the 1960s. The initial contributions
appeared in papers submitted by members of the school of
Politica1 Science and Public Administration at Victoria
University to parliamentary select committees on other
matters: a second chamber (1961), Standing orders (1962),
the term of Parliament (Lg67) . II A parliamentary research
secretariat, changes to the committee system and an increase
in the size of the House were among proposars raised in these
submissions. The practice of submitting their views was
maintained in subsequent investigations, most notably those
See for er<angrle, suknfssions reproduced in L C1eve1and and A D hbinson
J.d"l Readings in New Zealard Coverrurent (Wellington: Reed Education,1972), pp.141-5, 191-248.
Austir llitchell, Covernnent by parW: parlialrent and politics in Nenr'
Zealand (*rristcfi
Cleveland and bbinson, Readings, pp.l37 arxi 143-5.
9.
10.
11.
by Royal Commissions into parliamentary salaries and allowances.
A semi-nar in 197I entitled "Can Parliament Survive Without
Reform'r at Victoria University was one further outcome of the
interest in "the working of parliamentary democracy in New
Zealand" .12
In the past decade the concern with improving Parliament
has been reflected in the numerous publications on the subject.
The range of reforms advocated has become broader and structural
and constitutional questions have become more prominent.l3 The
advocates of reform within Parliament have also published their
.L4vl-ews.
The other broad category of research has been primarily
concerned with the description and analysis of the institution,
although it has shared with the previous category an interest
in reform, for it is cofirmon for recommendations to be intro-
duced at some point. It has been usual for the more general
considerations of Parliament to form part of a broader study
of New Zealand politics,15 although books by Kelson and Mitchell
have provided more comprehensive coverage".l6 The House of
L2.
13.
!3re crcnference papers included: Alan bbinson, "Parlianrentarlr Derccraqgin Ne',v Zealard: Sorre Possi-ble F\:ture Develo;rnents".
Irbrshall, Reform of Parlianent; Geoffrqg Palner, Ilnbridled Potrer: An
rnterpretam constitution ard @: kform in
Nerv Ze:]arx1", The Parlianentarian, LX (October, L979\, PF.210-15.
For exanple, l"tidrael J l,[irogue, "Information and Pcnper: Parliatrentary
Reform ard the Right to Krrcw", i-n Steptren Levine (ed) Politics jn New
Zealand: A bader (Sydney: C'eorge Al1en and tln$/in, 197E F-8:86,-
@t, Parlianent, and Parties".
r.estie Lipson' The Politj-cs of nqualitv; K J Scott, Ttre N*r Zealard
constitution i Press, Ig62);ffi1ner-Fo fErties in Ners Zealard (london: Oxford lJniversity Press, 1956);
Politics (Wellilgton: Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellin .
bbert N Kelson, The Fnrivate l,lember of Parlianent ard the Fontqtion ofPublic Policy, Affi-
bY Partlz: Parlianrent ard
Politics in Nerr; Zea]-ard (ftris
14.
15.
16.
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Representatives has yet to receive the exclusive attention
of a furl-time study such as has been given to the Legisrative
1'7Councilr-' although an unpublished dissertation by Harrison
exists on organisation and procedur..18
Dimensions of parliamentary activj-ty have received
consideration in the published form of essays. Thus parlia-
mentary committees have been examinedr19 and the role of one
committee in the field. of pubric expenditure has attracted
particular interest.20 The backgrounds of members of parlia-
ment have been the subject of several studies, 21 as have the
1:arliamentary roles of their parties.22 other research
)2e.*<ists,-" but focused examinations by political scientists
of other facets of Parliament are relativelv rare.
L7.
18.
19.
24.
2r.
22.
W K Jackson, The New Zeal_ard Legislative Council: A Str-ldy of tl:eEstablishnrent s
IJnrvensity of Otago Press, L972).
R J Harrisonr"Organisation ard Procedure i-n tJ:e Nevy Zealard Parlia-
r€nt", (unpublished PtrD dissertation, Ohio State Universitlz I 1964) .
Keith .Tackson, "Ners Zealard ParUannentary Comnittees: Reality ard
Reform", Ttre Parli-lqrpntarian, LIX (April , 1978), pp.94-101; Fyank
wileyr "r.egffiitteei", politicar- scierce, 2L(Decsrber, 1969)r pp.3-L7i John M snittr@n: The
Lavn/ers' Cqmitt€e", in Levire, Politics in Ne^r Zea1arxl, pp.131-142.
AJ-an D l"bbbie, "ParJ-iarenta:12 'Control' of h:blic P;<perditx-tre" i:rIevine, Egliliss in Nerrq Zealand, pp.1l5-30; ndrienne rrcn Tunzelnanrn,
"Control@ nevy zeatana pr:lcIic E>perditr:re Conr-
rniittee", The Parli,anentarian, LIx (October, 1978) ; A F von I\.rnze1nann,
"rhe R:bl@ittee ard Parlianentary Control of Public
E:<penditure", Victoria llniversity of WellJngton Law Review, 10 (Februaqr,
L979), pp.I9-4
Austin l4itchell, "The New Zea'lard Parlianrents of 1935-60", Political
Science, 13 (laarch, 1961), pp.3l-49; Austin Mitche11, eolitiffi
Feopl-e in New Zealard, (ctrriltcfurctr: Whitconrbe c ttrnUsrTFg) , -
Iherese May, "Parlianentarlz Disciplile il Ner'r Zealard Since 1954", inClqrelard ard Robinson, Readings, pp.108-L2I-, Austjn Mitchell, "Caucus:
The Ners Zealand Parlianentarlr earties", Journal of Connprntealth Political
StudieF, VJ (March, 1968), pp.3-33.
Fbr o<anple, Larrlr B Hill, "Parlianerrtarlz Petitions, the Cnbudsnarr
and Po1itical Ctrange in Nerrs Zealard", Political Str:dies, )O(fI,(September, L9741, pp.337-46.
23.
1I
The major lack is an up-to-date and comprehensive ac-
count of Parliament (which could well be said of any signifi-
cant institution in the political system). The post-war
period, which is of most relevance to this research, has only
been partly covered by most studies of parliament. The ex-
ceptions are three recent papers, one as yet unpublished,
which have provided revj-ews of reforms or developments in
particular rph.."".24
fnstitutional Chanqe
The question of institutionar changes in legislatures
has been treated in severar ways of which three warrant
mention here. The reform-orientated literature approaches
legislative change by advancing proposals for improving
the capacity of the institution to deal with demands on it.
rn New zealand this research has not usually taken the form
of a comprehensive study which systematically relates recom-
mendations to existing practice or to a conception of parliamentrs
role in the political system. While broad agreement has existed
on many of the reforms necessary, i-t is less apparent what
Parriament's functions shourd be. part of the difficulty lies,
as Jackson has pointed out, in the fact that "to some extent
we may be faced with a choice under the parriamentary system
between one or other forms of effectiveness u .25
Jackson, "Parlianentarlz Oonmittees" ; Jackson, "parli_anentarl bform";Adrienne von Tunzelmann, "l"lerrbership of tl:e Nerrr Zealard Parlianent: A
sttdy of conditions 1854-1978", (unpubrished research paper for Mpp,Victoria urriversity of Wellington, 1979).
Jackson, "Political Scientist Iooks at parlianent,, p.22. In theBritish mnterct see the criti-cisn of crick's lack of "anareness oftie difficulty of reonciling his twin aims of strong single-partlz
governnent on the one hard wittr ccnrprelrensive bipartisan investigatory
[pv/ers for t]re House on the other" in s A walk1ard, uTtre politj-cs of
Parlianenta4z Reform", Parli.anenlarlz Affairs, 29 (Spring, L976), p.I92.
Benrard Crick's visns ar@form ol parliarent, rev.
2rd ed, (Iordon: Wej-denfeld and Niols
24.
25.
T2
Over time institutionalisation wil-l occur "the process
by which organizations and procedures acquire value and
)F,stability". -" Four criterj-a have been used to define the
leve1 of institutionalisatj-on: adaptability (measured by
chronologlcal a9€, generational age and the capacity for
functional change); autonomy (the establishment of boun-
daries which differentiate the organisation from fhe environ-
ment) i coherence (the degree of consensus on functj-onal
boundaries and procedures for settling disputes); and com-
plexity (the differentiation of subunits functionally and
hj-erarchr atLy) .27
Similar measures have been used for the study of legis-
lative institutionalisation with considerable 
"rr"""=",28 but
appear to be less appropriate for examining British parliamen-
tary systems without further adaptafion. For example, a
parliament which is highly institutionalised in some respects
may score poorly on structural complexity by comparison with
a congressional type of legislature. The concept does,
nevertheless, draw attention to significant institutional
characteristics. The process of institutionalisation, while
continuing regardless of the point the institution has reached,
is a developmental concept most appropriately applied during
the formative stages of its history.29
25. Sarmrel P Hr:ntington, Political Order in *rarrging Societies, (Nenr Haven:
Yale university eress
27. Huntington, Political Order, pp.L8-22.
28. Nelson W Polsby, "fnstitutionalization in the IIS Howe of kpresentatives",
Anerican Political Scierce Revieru, 62 (Mardr, 1968), pp.144-168.
29. A good eranple is Iarry B Hil1, Ttre lrtrdel Ordcr:dsrnan: Institutiorr,af i,ring
Ner^l Zealard's Dsnccratic D<perirrcJ)
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l{odels of change in legislative systems have been
developed which trace the inter-relationshi-ps of the various
elements. These show the environmental factors exerting an
influence on the institution, the effects on its personnel,
structure and processes, and the responses made by it in
order to adapt to the demands. By incorporating "feedback"
between the three "stages" this simple model becomes more
meaningful. This approach is possibly most productive when
confined to a lirnited range of reforms which can be directly
Iinked to the other elements in the modef.30
The more limited objective here is that of documenting
institutional change and its consequences. For this purpose
it is necessary to determine the magnitude and type of change.
The structural framework of Parliament is based on prin-
ciples which pattern relationships and are critical for the
maintenance of the system in its present form. These are
derived from constitutional tenets which specify Parliamentrs
role and its relationship to the executive, from parliamentary
forms and tradj-tions and from the place of political parties
in the system. The structure emphasises continuity, and this
is partly achieved by limiting the range of alternatives
within which it is possible to function.
It is helpful to distinguish also the organisation of
Parliament as the "directional activity" which orders
See for e<anpIe, bnald D Hedlurd ard Keith E Hanm, "Institrrtional
Developrent and Legislative Effectiveness: R:1e Ctranges i-n the
Wisonsi:r Assedcly", in ebdo I Baaklinj- and Janes J Heaphy,
ConFarative Legislative Reforns and Inrovations, (Albarry: @rparative
30.
L4
relationships "by acts of choice and decision". "In the
aspect of organisation is to be found the variation or
change principle - by allowing evaluation of situations
and entry of individual choice. "31 organisational change
involves minor alterations in the system which do not
affect the basic relationships or modify the structural
framework. It may occur because of procedural reforms or
the acceptance of practices which do not require formal
endorsement. Other patterns of behaviour are not settled
consensually but emerge from the interaction of the actors.
Change or innovation deriving from actions by Parliament
are more likety to be directed towards resolving internal
stresses. These may either be a product of pressures from
the external environment or g:enerated by variations in
personnel and the nature of interpersonal relationships.
The effect of such change is normally concerned with con-
solidation; conflict is contained, procedures are improved
and the internal equilibrium is maintain"d.32
For example, parliamentary responses to an increased
workload may involve one or more modeof adjustment.33 The
utilisation of time may be improved by alterations to pro-
cedures, organisation of business and the arrangement of
Rar/rond Fi-rtJ:, Elerents of Social , 3rd ed, (London:
Watts, 196I), pp.
Congare tlre discussion in bger H Davidson ard Walt€r J Oleszeh,
"Adaption arxl Oonsolidation: Struch:ral Inrpvation in the tlS House
of Representatives", Legrislative Studies Quarterly, I (Febntarlt'
1976), pp.37-65-
Erik Dangaard, "Stnrctr:ra1 Adjr:^strnents of the Danish Parlialrent in
ttre Tvrcntied: Centr:r1r", irr Baaklirri ard Heaphqr, Oonparative
Legislative kforns, p.266.
31.
32.
33,
I5
sittings; or the hours of meeting may simpty be extended.
The resources of the institution can be expanded by in-
creasing both the number of members and the professional
administrative and clerical staff. A third option is to
encourage specialisation both of members in their work
and by delegating business from the plenary body to
specialised groups.
Comprehensive change involves an alteration in the
mode of operations which extends to the principles governing
the form of relationships. The failure of Parliament to
cope with demands from the external environment could result
in structural change designed to adapt its roles. It is
also possible that incremental changes may cumulatively pro-
duce structural change over time.
fn practice, major reforms which affect the structural
framework and the internal equilibrium it sustains, are un-
Iikely to be initiated. The main constraint lies in the
relationship between the executive and the legislature for
the control of innovation rests with the government. It is
Iikely to resist proposals designed to enhance Parl.iament's
role in relation to the executi-ve.
Both types of innovation can be recognised in the pro-
posals of Parliament's critics. What is not clear from much
of the reform-orientated lj-terature is whether the protagonists
had inquired into the practicality of reform and had been aware
that unintended conseguences might result. Procedural changes
made by Parliament may produce behaviour which does not con-
form with the original intentions. The strength of existing
I6
norms may frustrate the successful incorporation of new modes
of operating.34 It is important therefore ',to know the kinds
of change that are possible and the conditions under which
change can occur" and this requires an understanding of the
"phenomenon of stability in change": ,'for stability over time
implies a process of reinforcement which may be every bit as
dynamic as processes of change".35
Research Objectives
The main purpose of this dissertation is to provide an
account of developments in the contemporary parliament. This
objecti-ve is followed by exarnining trends in the activities
of the House and organisational change, whether originating
frorn the environment or from the responses of parriament to
internal needs. The formal limits of the research are further
set by relying on public records and concentrating on the
post-war period.
Although other material is drawn upon, the main sources
of information are the public records of parliament. This
limitation on the scope of the research design precludes
consideration of dimensj-ons which, to be adequately covered,
would require other types of data. some of the difficulties
encountered in attempting to reconcile different official
summaries of parliamentary business are covered in a methodo-
logical note in the Appendix.
A good ocarple is ttre transplantation of a congtressional epe of@mLitt€e systeur to tlre Japanese Diet. l4alolm shar, "conclusions",in John D r-ees and l4aloJm shaw, (eds) conmittees in r.eqisratrrres:
A ConEnrative Analysis, (Durham, NC: Duk .
Barbara Hind<Iey, StabiliQz and Chrange in Oongress, (Nenr york: Har?er
& br^r, 1971) , p.2.
34.
35.
L7
There are good reasons for taking the post-war period
as a logical time-frame in which to study the House of
Representatives, and the Parliaments from the 30th (195r-54)
to the 38th (L976-78) as those which feature most prominently
in the analysis. By 1951 the effects of war had diminished,
Parliament had acquired the powers to amend its constitution
La L947, and having used them to abolish the Legislative
Council, became a unicameral legislature in 1950.
The era since I95I has been "marked by a dominant and
astonishing stabilitr"36 in which the term "consensus politics,,
came to be used to describe the style of poritical behaviour,
and economic prosperity was taken for qranted. The experi-ences
of other commonwealth countries with minority government and
parliamentary sessions abridged by early electj-ons, were not
encountered in New Zealand. The two parties dominated
Parliament, and one party controlled the government for most
of the period. since the early dissolution and election in
1951, trienniar elections have been predictable and three
year terms regular.
Notwithstanding the stability of the political system it
is possible to discern continuing political .h"rrg.,37 much of
which affected Parliament. rn the latter part of this period,
New Zealand experienced an unsettled phase in which two ex-
ceptional general elections occurred and five Prime Ministers
John bberts, "socieQr and its politics', in ran wards (ed) r?rjrter
Facets: Essays to Celebrate the Silver Jubilee of Queen fliz6stfi-Efi-e
**t *ti"=""/Oontinuing Political Change: The Neriy Zealarxl Case",(paper presented at ttre Eighti hkrrld Congress of the InternationalPolitical science Association, I'trnich, septernber, L970i Jackson,Politics of Change.
35.
37.
18
held office within four years. Economic conditions d.eter-
iorated and political rerationships became more strained.
The two maj-n parties retained their hold on parriament but
their support, both from parliamentary members and the
erectors (with a decline in the two-party vote), was ress
secure.
The influence of the environment on parriament wilr be
readily apparent from the analysis of parliamentary develop-
ments. rt is beyond the scope of this research to give a
systematic consideration of these factors and their relatj-on-
ships to the institution.
The dimensions of parliament which have been stud.ied,
were chosen for one or more of three reasons: they constitute
significant elements in the parliamentary framework; they have
artered in the post-war period,- and they will continue to pray
an important part in the future development of the institution.
They are: the impact of the parliamentary parties on the pro-
ceedings of the House; the developments in the organisation
of parliamentary time and business; role of the committee
system; and the members of parliament and their resources.
As a preliminary to the consideration of the contemporary
institution, the evolution of parriament is reviewed in order
to put the post-v/ar period in historical perspective. The
process of institutionalisation has emphasised particurar
dimensions which are of significance today. while many
characteristics of the House were established early in its
history, alignments which first allowed^ governments to be
19
formed and sustained in office are more recent. The growth
of political parties eventually 1ed to the emergence of a
highly developed binary system. A number of contrasts can
be drawn between the activities of the House in the past
and the post-war period which underscore recent developments.
significant features of the parriamentary framework
remained largery unchanged for much of the twentieth century:
the size of the House lvas fixed at 80 for 67 years; the
formal rules were relatively undisturbed for 30 years; and
the resources available to members were scant.
rt is possible to detect a number of trends in parliamen-
tary practice and behaviour which began to emerge most clearly
in the 1960s. The institutional response of the House to
certain types of demands is usually slow. However, once the
external conditions within which parliament functions began
to alter more rapidly, more immediate effects were experienced
by the institutj-on. The conjunction of a series of longer-
term trends with political developments in the 1970s have been
responsible for changing many aspects of parliamentary life.
The outstanding informal norm governing behaviour in
the House is that which commits members to the poricies and
strategies of either of the two parties. The tendency to
conform with the party's consensually-reached position on
other issues is examined by reference to the voting patterns
of members. The cohesion of the parliamentary parties has so
instilled habits of conformity that members are disinclined
publicly to depart from the modal position even when discipline
20
is not enforced. Nevertheless, changes have become apparent
in the past decade, although members have continued to maintain
their allegiences.
The adversary context of the House provides the potential
for partisan contentions. Inter-party relationships are in-
vestigated by considering the level of conflict over time.
A central problem for leadership in government is the
existence of a supply of candidates with the appropriate
skills and talents for selection to higher office. A major
tenet of the New Zealand form of government is the recruit-
ment of the cabinet solely from members of the legislature.
In a small House, the proportion of MPs eligible for executive
and other leadership positions is never large. The parliamen-
tary function of providing for leadership is controlled by
the parties and permits the distribution of patronage among
their members. The processes involved in recruitment, members'
opportunities for advancement, their success rate, and the
effect on the parties and the organisation of the House,
form the basis of the analysis.
In responding to the demands on the House, a succession
of procedural reviews have sought to improve the formal rules
within which the House operates, and practices occasionally
resorted to in the past have become standard. Consideration
is given to the more important changes affecting the use of
parliamentary time and the conduct of parliamentary business.
Parliament spends more time on legislation than any other
activity and the bills which pass through the House have
more significance for the potity than other types of "output".
2L
The examination of the regislative process concentrates on
the impact of the parliamentary stage of the legislative
process and in particular on government and opposition roles
in relation to public bills.
The committee system gives the appearance of bei-ng highly
developed for a range of committees have existed since the
nineteenth century which have made numerous reports to
Parliament. In order to determine their role and relationship
to the House, the activiti-es of committees are examined for
the post-war period.
The composition of the House is not subject to the ex-
crusive control of the party leadership or the parliamentary
party and is determined largely by forces external to the
House. Modest increases in the size of the legislature have
coincided with substantial exchanges of seats, and introduced
a new dynamic elementr 
€rn unusually high number of new
members. The socio-economic compositj_on of the House has
altered as new members in recent elections have brought
different backgrounds from those which prevailed before.
After a history of neglect, the resources at the disposal
of members finally became subject to regular reviews in the
post-war period. The changes to membersr remuneration and
the services and facilities provided by parliament have com-
plemented other institutional developments.
Chapter Outline
The next chapter concentrates on institutional develop-
ment prior to the post-war period which are relevant to the
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examination of the contemporary Parliament. In the following
two chapters, the importance of the parliamentary parties in
ordering political relationships in the House and controlling
political advancement are discussed. Chapter 3 focuses on
the intra-party cohesion and inter-party conftict. The pro-
vision of leadership in the House is considered in Chapter 4
in relation to party patronage.
The effect of changes to procedure and practice on par-
liamentary business are revj-ewed in chapter 5 with particurar
attention to the utilisation of time. The subsequent chapter
looks more closely at the main type of business of the House,
legislation. The development in the activities and roles of
the committee system is considered in Chapter 7.
The members of Parliament and their resources are covered
in Chapter 8. In the concluding chapter, an assessment is
made of the changes which have been introduced in the post-
war period and the prospects for the institution.
Chapter 2
EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT
To assist our understanding of the contemporary Parliament
it is necessary to place it within the context of its historical
development since 1854. This permits the study of institutional
tr:nds, whether of continuity or change, thereby clarifying the
characteristics exhibited. during a particular period.
In providing historical perspectives on the establishment
of institutional boundaries, and the members, internal organisa-
+ion and activities of Parliament, the main purpose is to
e.r.ucidate the post-war period which is the subject of the
following chapters. The patterns of behaviour described there
have thei-r antecedents in the earlier history of the House.
fn order to provide some reference points to the range
of dimensions considered, distinctions are drawn between
hj-storical periods, and leve1s of institutionalisation. The
history of the House of Representatives since its inauguration
can be divided into three periods of almost equal length:
1854-1-: t89I-1935, and L936 to the present. That these
d:marcati.-ns, which are usually defined in terms of stages in
the development of political parties, are also applicable to
Parliament indicates their influence on its institutional
evolution. The concluding surnmary attempts to evaluate the
developments discussed in this chapter by applying several-
measurements of the 1evel of institutionalisation to
Parliament.
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Establishment of Institutional Boundaries
The New Zealand House of Representatives is one of the
few legislatures in the world which can justifiably claim a
continuous existence since the middle of the nineteenth
'l
century.' For most of its history, however, it has been con-
stitutionally l-inked to other institutions which potentially
have been able to provide constraints on its functioning.
Gradually it has shed these formal relatj-onships, but it is
only in the period since the Second World War that the process
has been completed.
Historically, there have been four main factors which have
either posed potential or actual limitations on the status and
functioning of Parliament. An initial task of the new House of
Representatives in the 1850s was to develop a set of privileges
which would reinforce its authorj-ty and distinguish it from
other instltuti-ons. The federal elements in the constitution
up until 1876, set formal lirnits on the scope of Parliament's
role, and the issues raised by provincial-central relationships
often over-shadowed the proceedings. Both of these matters were
resolved fairly early in the history of the institution. More
enduring questions were raised by what have been argued to be
the "two main aspects of parliamentary development since 1852":
the successive removal of limitations on the legal powers of
Parliament and the general decline of the Legislative Council.2
Neither could be regarded as having been settled until after
the Second World War. One other development important for
The Canadian ard Allstralian national parlianents date respectively
frcrn 1867 ard 1901.
R J Harrison, "Goverrnent-Par1ianent", in A H l\blintock (ed) An
Enryclopedia of Ne$r Zealard, Vol. I (Wellilgton: Governnent PEnt€r,
1966) , p.847.
1.
2.
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establishing institutional boundaries, the career structures
of members of Parliament, was accomplished by the turn of the
century.
Parliamentary Pr ivileges
The 1852 constitution Act, while authorising the House
to enact Standing Orders, did not grant the privileges of
the House of commons. As parriament had no inherent right
of privileges (as was found by a select committee in Ig54),
it was necessary to enact legislation as the basis for this
authority. The 1856 Privileges Act conferred certain immuni-
ties on members (and witnesses summoned before parriament)
but omitted powers such as the right to discipline newspapers
for attacks on members. lvlore comprehensive legislation, the
Parliament Privileges Act, was passed in 1865 (now incorporated
in the 1908 Legislatures Act) to give the House the privileges,
immunities and powers of the House of commons. Accordingly,
members individually and collectively acquired the necessary
privileges to differentiate them and the House from the rest of
?society. "
Provincial System
An important issue in New Zealand politics between 1852
and 1876 was the role of the provinces. The 1852 Constitutj-on
Act had created six, each with a council and superintendent
elected on the same franchise as the House of Representatives.
In many respects the provincial councils resembled legislaturesi
they chose a speaker, adopted parliamentary procedure and
A ntmber of later anendnerrts were passed as tlre need arose. See
C J Littlejohn, "Parlianentary Privilege in Ne$r Zea1and", (r:npr:blished
LLP1 ttresis, Victoria Llniversity of Wellington, 1969) .
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privileges, and were subject to dissolution. Their powers
under the Act t4rere potentially fairly extensive with regard
to provincial matters, but specifically excluded a range of
functions such as customs, courts and currency.
In effect, the main functions of the provincial councils
were to be concerned with colonisation: sale of land, im-
migration and public works. In practice, the performance of
these roles depended on the central governmentrs willingness
to leave these responsibilities to the provinces. The central
legislature had legislative superiority under the constitution,
and the Governor was able to veto provincial legislation.
The system had the appearances of federali"..4 But the
central legislature's control over the division of functions
between the spheres, its right to constitute new provinces,
and (after 1868) its power to abolish any province, conflicted
with central tenets of the federal principle. Nevertheless
the circumstances of New Zealand, the difficult terrain and
dj-stances between isolated populations, and the independent
colonisation of these dispersed communlties, engendered
regionalised political sentiments.
So long as the people of New Zealand werefederally minded, the constitution could be worked
as a federal constitution. But the only safe-guards of the federal element were opinion 6
and convenience: there was no safeguard in law."
In the initial years of the new system a wide range
A recrent ercanple of a strrdy wtrich classifies the systsn as
federal is william H Rjker, Fedenalisn: Origin, Operation
Significance (Boston ana nor Z.
W P lttrrrell, Ihe Provincial Systan in Nerp Zealard 185277$,(Christctrurch:
4.
5.
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of matters was left to the provincial councils.6 Although
the General Assenbly gradually extended its influence, the
powers of the provinces and their relationship to the central
government remained a major issue. The potential remained for
the provinces to consolidate and expand their roles through
their representatives in the General Assembly, for holding
office in the provinces and either house of the central
legislature, was not mutually excLusive.
Not all provincial councils were avowedly provincialist
but membership of a council was inclined to mean a commitment
to provincialism or at least to the particular interests of
athe province. / Consequently the question of the central-
provincial relationship and provincial issues often arose in
the General Asse*bty.8 while divisions between provinces or
representatives from particular provinces prevented the
emergence of permanent alliances, at least two governments
were defeated by the provincialists on a motion of want of
confidence or provincial issues,9 Representatives from in-
dividual provinces might vote as a bloc in the interests of
their regions, and differences within a provincial council,
whether of personality or policy, could be transferred to
the General assembly.l0
" Itre provinces had trnssed npst of ttre legislation of Nesr Zealarxl,
artninistered rnany of ttre laws already in force, spent perhaps half
of the revenue, ard been to all intents ard purpses in charge of
colonisation."
l6rre11, Provincial Systsn, p.92.
For an exanple see G A !bod, "Ttre Political Structr:re of Nsv Zealard,
1858 to 1861", (r:npr:blished phD dissertation, otago Univensity , 1965) ,
pp.66 anl 69.
See for example l6ne11, Provincial Slzstsn, pp.91, 163, 190.
lvl:r:rell, Provincial Slzstern, pp.121, 162, I7B.
D G Henon,"ProviJnialism and Central-isn, 1853-1858*, ill bbert Ctlapan
ard Keittr Sinclajr (ds) , Studies of a Srnall Dameacy (Aucklard: PauI,
1963) , pp.26-7.
6.
8.
q
10.
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In the longer term provincial rivalries, the poor
performance of provinces with fewer resources, and the
growing strength of central gfovernment worked against the
two-tier system. The New Provinces Act of 1858 allowed
for the separation of relatively small areas with minimal
populations, and several chose to secede thereby weakening
the existing provinces. By the beginning of the 1870s "New
Zealand was emerging from the 'provincial period"' as
colonisation by separate provinces gave way to the "policy
of national developm"rt",II and the abolition of the pro-
vincial system was effected in 1876.
Parliamentary Sovereignty
Until l-947 there existed formal constraints on the
powers of Parliament through its dependence for some purposes
on either the Governor (from 1917 the Governor-General) or
the Imperial Government. After the granting of responsj-ble
government in 1856, the Governor, ds an Imperial appointee,
retained powers to make decisions at his own discretion or
in accordance with the wishes of the Imperial Government.
The narrowing of his role over time need not be reviewed in
1)detail here.-o No public cases of a Governor rejecting the
advice of a Minister has been known since L892 (with the
partial exception of 1895 when the Governor first declined
but then followed ministerial advice) . In 1930 the appoint-
ment of the Governor-General became dependent on the advice
11.
12.
l"lrrrell, Provinci-al Systen, pp.108-15 ard 214.
For details of tie developnents in parlianent's sovereignQr see
Harrj-son, "Governrent-Parlianent", pp.847-8; K J Sott, lllre Nenr
Zealand Constitrrtion, (Iordon: O>trorrl University Press, fgD ,ffi
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of the New Zealand Government and in 1939 the incumbent
became solely the representative of the Crown (and not as
before the medi-um for advice from the Government in the
United Kingdom).
Three main limitations existed on the legislative and
constituent powers of Parlj-ament until 1':g47 .L3 It was unable
to amend certain entrenched clauses in the Constitution Act
1852. There was doubt as to whether Parliament could pass
legislation on extra-territorial matters. Thirdly, the
Constitution Act prohibited the enactment of legislation
repugnant to English 1aw. with the passage through the
United Kingdom Parliament in L947 of amending legislation,
the New Zealand Parliament acquired full powers to amend its
constitution. Any doubts about Parliamentrs legislative
competence were resolved by the Statute of Westminster
Adoption Act 1947.
Legislative Council
The General Assembly, the central legislature created
by the lB52 Constitution Act, comprj-sed in addition to the
Governor and the House of Representatives an appointed
Legislative Council. The Council did not become a formidable
competitor to or opponent of the popular chamber. Its
relatively limited impact can be indicated by its roles in
the legislative process 
-
The Councj-I did not play a major part in the initiation
of legislation although until the 1890s a significant proportion
C C Ajjcrran, "Parliamerrt", in J L Robson (ed) Nqu Zealard: fhe Develop-
ment of its Laws ard Constitution, zrd ed, (I.o
inr-itations are dissussed: the
Governor-C€neralts trrcrrer of reservation ard the O:ovrmts trnv,er of
disall-or^rance.
13.
30
of government legislation was first introduced into that
chamber. The growth 1n party discipline and electoral ac-
countability Ied governments to concentrate on the House
for the introduction of legislation and a decline is most
apparent in the twentj-eth century in the Council's contribu-
tion to this stage of the legislative process. Councj-llors
rarely showed much interest in introducing private members'
bitls.14
A more important role was played by the Council in the
revision of legislation, particularly between I854 and 1891'
but the proportion of successful bills which it amended
tended to dimini-sh over time. Towards the middle of the
twentieth century its amending activities became insignificant.
The Council's power to reject legislation was not extensively
used even in the nineteenth century, and then it was exercised
more often with private members' biIls, A drop in this ac-
tivity occurred after 1895 and from L932 no bills from the
House lapsed in the Council.15
Whatever the deficiencies of the arrangement whereby
councillors were nominated for life, the introduction of a
seven year term in 1891 increased the control of governments
(which retained the power of reappointment) over the Council,
and contributed to its decline. Increasingly, it became a
means for dispensJ-ng patronage.
With its abolition in 1950, New Zealand acquired a
unicameral system. The limited immediate effects which its
14. Keittr Jackson,
Establishnent,
versity
the Nenr Zea]-ard islative Cor:ncil:
Press, L972), pp.
111-2.t5. ibid., pp.95, 103,
of the
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demise had for the House of Representatives (procedurally or
otherwise), j-llustrate its minor role (although the lack of
broader constitutional changes appear to have reflected the
uncertainty of the government as to whether an alternative
upper house would be conceived).16 There was one important
conseguence for the House. The removal of the Council and
the simplification of the legislative process narrowed public
attention to the House; conseguently "its abolition has con-
tributed directly to a new interest in constitutional improve-
ment and parliamentary efficiencyrr .17
Membership
A key dimension in the development of a legislature is
held to be the emergence of a relatively stable membershJ-p.
The identity of the institution is more firmly established
once it is differentiated from its environment by the exist-
ence of a distinctive career structure for its rnembers.
Stability in membership is important in parliamentary systems
because the executive 1s drawn from the legislature and the
formation of governments and their maintenance in office
depend on the existence of support within the legislature.
Where membership is fluid, with large proportions of new
members at the beginning of a Parlj-ament, or with members
resj-gning from office during the term, the executive may
be similarly unstable and stable patterns of parliamentary
behaviour may not emerge.
For the first 22 years of the House the provincial
system existed as a regional tier of government and pro-
16.
L7.
ibid, p.199.
i-bid, p.21I.
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vincial councillors and superintendents were eligible to sit
in the central legislature (although the provinces were not
directly represented in the Legislative council).18 For
this period the House was not clearly differentiated from a
subordinate set of institutions because membership of the
two 1eve1s overlapped.
The inaugural parliamentary session of I854 included
two superintendents and other prominent members of provincial
councils, and all si-x superintendents were members of the House
in 1856. A11 incumbents of the office of superintendent in
Auckland and Wellington during the provincial period were
members of the General Assemblv. Most superintendents of the
other provinces were concurre"ar, members of the General
Assembly f or part of their t"nrrt".19
Of the 263 members of the House between 1853 and l-876,
approaehing three-quarters had served on provincial councils.
For 62 per cent the joint membership of both a provJ-ncial
council and the House occurred concurrently for at least part
of their term, and another 9 per cent had previously served
on a provincial council. For most of the period more than
half the members of each Parliament were provincial councillors
during at least part of their t"t*,20 and Some general elections
resulted in much higher proportions of members (for example 78
per cent in 1855 and 67 per cent in 1871). The fluid member-
ship of the House during the provincial period indicates the
Ihe atterdance of superintendents drrring tlre sessions of the C;eneral
Assanbly was assisted by the passage of an act in 1855 wtlich aflor^t€d
tlrern to appoint deputies in tfiei-r absence. I6rre11, Provincial
Systern, pp.54 ard 66.
wood, "Polilical Stnrcture", PP.66 a-rd 369-70.
Ttre figrr-rres for overlatrrping terns are slightly higher than tlpse above.
lEnberi have been e><ctuded-vtro did rot have the opporblnit'y to atterdparlianent, whrile provincial cor:nci1lors, becan:se it was not in sessjon.
18.
19.
20.
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low attachment to it of many members. A commj_tment to the
centrar assembly had to await more widespread support for
national policies and development. In the meantime the divided
loyalties of a good proportion of members affected the in-
stitutionalisation of the House of Representatives.
Another factor influencing the turnover of members has
been changes to the size of the House. During period.s in which
adjustments have been made to its constitution there have also
been relatively high proportions of new members. These periods
have occurred twice in the history of the House. Between the
first election of 1853 and 1900 the size of the House was
altered on 10 occasions. For the subseguent 2L erections the
membership was fixed at 76 European members and four Maori
members, Three of the last four parliaments have commenced
with more members than their predecessors.
Prior to 1887 the House was the subject of successive
increases in its size. The original 37 members expanded,
following the acquisition by the General Assembly in 1857 of the
power to change its constitution, to 41 under 1858 regisration,
53 in 1860, 57 Ln L862, and 70 in 1865. rn rgGT the size was
enlarged by two measures: one raised the European represen-
tatives by two; the other created for the first time four
Maori seats. The European representation was further increased
to 74 in 1870, 84 in 1875 and 91 in 1881.21 Each election fol-
lowing these increases in the size of the House produced
particularly high proportions of new members (which is not
to suggest that other factors did not also contribute to the
high turnovers). The size of the House was eventually
2I. Gry Sqfnlfield, (ed) Nsg Zealand parlialrentary Reoord lg40-1949(Wellington: Gov
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stabilised at 70 between 1890 and 1900, and at B0 from 1900
until 1969. Another 12 members have since been added bv
three adjustments to the size.
From the point of view of the institutionalisation
of Parliament the most significant period was the nineteenth
century decrine in the turnover of member".22 rh. electj-ons
of 1855 and 1861 resurted in parriaments in which more than
half the members were new. Turnover declined to about two-
fifths at the beginning of the succeeding three parliaments
and subsequently to between one-fifth and one-quarter.
During the provincial period, and while the term of
Parliament was fixed at five years, the turnover between
generar elections was arso high because of the tendency
for members to resign during their term (possibly having
served for only a brief time) . In the first three year
term (1879-1881) the number of members attaining office,
after the general electionrdropped abruptly.23
Because of short term fluctuations it is more ap-
propriate to view turnover j-n terms of a series of elections.
Table 2.L divides the whole period into a number of phases
each consistj-ng of five elections, with the exception of the
22. these figures differ from tlpse given by Leslie Lipson in The politics
of 
_Equality, (Ctricago: Universiez of Ctricago press, l94g),8[E 3-
and 17. His data covers a-11 representatives nct in the previousParlianent ard therefore ilcludes MPs vitro have previor:sfy serred inthe Hor:se.
It was not unconnr:n jn ttre nineteenttr century for seats to be vacatedfor unconventional reasons. rtre nore wuaL reasons were because an
election ra,as declared vrcid or a nernber r^Jas unseated on petition. Three
nerbers (including Hone Heke and Reeves) r,yere obliged to 
'sacate theiroffice becar:se ttrry were adjudged a banknpt. Ttrene !€re a feui in-
stances in the first gnrt of the trentieth century of unmnventiorraldepartures frcrn office but the case of the Hr:nr:a electorate in 1979
appears to be the first for 50 years.
23.
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TABLE 2.I New lr{embers Elected at General Electi-ons:
By Period IB55 - 1978
Parliaments Period
Percentage of
New Members(Average)
2
I
T2
I7
22
27
32
37
6
11
I6
2L
26
3I
36
3g*
1855 - 1875
r879 - r890
1893 - 190s
1908 - 1922
L925 - 1938
1943 - 1954
1957 - 1969
1972 - L97B
48.0
30 .5
22.2
24.0
22.3
L7 .3
15. r
24.2
Includes only three general elections
grouping of the last three elections. The average proportion
of new members for the first five elections (excepting 1853)
was 48 per cent. This percentage dropped to 3l per cent in
the succeeding period and to between 22 and 24 per cent in
the three periods between 1893 and 1938. In the subsequent
two periods there were successive declines in the turnover with
a figure of 15 per cent being achieved in the late 1950s and
the 1960s. The turnovers of the last three general elections
go against the trend for the twentieth century (and particularly
the post-war period), and are consj-dered in more detail in
Chapter 8.
Internal Organisation
There exist formal and j"nformal dimensions to the pro-
ceedings of Parliament; the first relates to the rules and
procedures which regulate business, the second includes the
nature of the alignments of members. The three periods
distinguished in the introduction to this chapter have
particular relevance fOr the development of political parties
and their impact on Parliament. The incipient parties of the
years before 1890 became organised and coherent in the second
period and took on their modern form early in the third period.
These periods are also servj-ceable for reviewing the
evolution of parliamentary procedures. The development of
Standing Orders was relatively static before 1890, but a
period of change began shortly after that year. In the
third period the procedures were possibly used with greatest
effect in the stable two-party conditions of Parliament but
towards the end an active phase of reform occurred. The
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history of the Speakership may similarly be linked to these
temporal divisions for, as with procedural change, the nature
of the parliamentary parties was influential in shaping that
office.
Parties
It has been argued that:
once responsible government was introduced
the main line of divj-sion in the General Assenbly
was between those who wanted a tighter control
of the provincial governments and those who wished
the widest possible extension of their Powersthe Centralists and the Provincialists.z+
But it would be an over-simplification to represent the
)c,House as divided between two enduring alignments.-- Similar1y,
after the provinces were abolished, the collective labels of
"conservatives" and "liberals" distorted the degree of unity
which existed. Members were typically loosely aligned and
prepared to be opportunistic in order to achieve gains for
their locali-ties. As in New South Wales:
the faction system was characterized by
reference to what it was not: factions were notparties, and so they were not stable, cohesive,principled and enduring parliamentary groupings 2A
which reflected real divisions within the community.-"
Nevertheless, a trend towards requiring supporters of a
ministry to reflect their allegicrnces in divisions became ap-
parent from the late I860s. Whips became increasingly active
and with considerable success as members, at least on major
24.
25.
26.
W P lvlcrrell, "ltre Colonial Period", in Fobert O:atrxnan, (ed) Erds ard
lbans in Ns,r Zealand Politics, (Aucklard: liniversiQr of Aucklard
See for exanple Her:cnr"Provincialisn and Centralism", pp.I4-15.
G N Hawker, Ttre Parlianent of New South Wales 1856-1965, (Sydnqg:
Coverrrnent. P
38
issues, became more likely to adhere to their commitmerrt=.27
The convention became established that once elected under a
party label, Ir{Ps shourd support the party when confronted
with a vote of no-confidence, The last occasion on which a
premature dissolution occurred, because of a wj-thdrawal of
support by MPs from an elected government, was j-n IBB4.28
The emergence of organised, national parties, which
were crearly defined and reratively united, dates from about
1890. rn this formative stage, the relative weakness of the
opposition and the size of Liberal majorities did not en-
courage cohesive parliamentary behaviour. An examination of
party voting for selected years during the Liberal hegemony,
shows that the Liberars "splj-t" in 34 per cent of divisions
and the opposition party in ZB per 
"*rrt.29
There followed an unstable period in which onry two out
of seven elections produced parties with clear majoriti-es;
governments were otherwise minority or coalitional and three
parties were represented in parliament. From 1890 the number
of independents in the House dwindred (wittr the exception of
isolated increases in their number as a result of the major
swings in seats in the 1911 , L928 and 1935 elections) . The
effect of the "triangular" situation on parli-ament has been
described by one contemporary observer as follows:
27.
28.
29.
Lipson, Politics of EqualiBz, p.I28.
Scott, New Zea.l-and Constitution, p.59.
Calculated fron details for L892, 1894, 1896, 1899, 1904, 1907 and
1911 from Table 16 of Lipson, politics of Egura]-ity. A parez split
was defined as a division in of "declaredparty renibers" rrcted against thei:r colleagrues. llhese percentages
irrclude dj-visiorson various tlpes of free vote bills (pp.3a0 ana raz) .
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A large proportion of nearly every sessj_on
appears to be taken up by dreary no-confj_dencedebates lasting for weeks on end, when inter-
minable and irrelevant speeches are m4{e,
covering the whole gamut of politics.30
with Labour's attainment of office, and the replacement
of the coalition of non-Labour parties in 1936 by the National
Party, a two-party alignment has existed in the House. other
parties and independents have continued to contest electj-ons,
but no party has been able to secure more than one represen-
tative in a Parl-iament. Between the defeat of the last in-
dependent member in 1946 and 1966 the membership of the House
was shared between the two parti-es (Table 2.2). rn 1966 a
social credit ir{P was erected for a single term, and another
representative of that party was elected in a by-election
in 1978 and returned to office at the following general
erection.3l These exceptions do not affect the two-party
system which remains entrenched in the House of Representatj-ves.
ft is usual to regard the "classic" two-party systems
to be the united states, united Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia
and canada (witfr Austria as a possible inclusio il .32 of the
parliamentary countries, New zealand has come closest to the
pure two-party model j-n the post-war period. For the years
1945 to L973 the two maj-n parties gained 93 per cent of the
vote and 99 per cent of the seats in parliament (compared with
percentages of 91 per cent and 98 per cent respectively for
30. c J wray in williamPernbrer Reeves, Ttre rong white cloud, 3rd ed.(Iordon: Ceorge Allen & Unwin, 1924I;-F:35I:
Ttrere have also been three resignations from ttre trm inain parlianentary
pa.rties during the present and previous terms. Al1 were sr.rbsequently
defeated at their nerct electoral contest.
In five of ttre sjx (Canada is ttre erception) the tvn nain parties re-
ceive 90 per cent or nore of tJ:e seats in the legislatr:re, ard apart
frcrn Austria, rore than 90 per cent of the vote. Giovanni Sartori,
larties and Party Systars: A Franelrcrk for Analysis, Vol. 1 (Carbridge:
31.
32.
40
TABLE 2.2 Representation of parties in the House Lg46-7g
Si-ze of Social ActuaIElection the House Labor:r National Credit I{ajority Difference
L9 46
l-949
19s1
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
r969
L97 2
L97s
L97 B
80
80
80
BO
80
80
BO
BO
84
87
87
92
42
34
30
35
41
34
35
35
39
55
32
40
38
46
50
45
39
46
45
44
45
32
55
51
I
4
I2
20
10
2
T2
10
B
6
23
23
10
2
6
10
5
I
6
5
4
3
L2
L2
5
4l
the United Kingdom) . Apart from the United States, it is
the least "fractionalised,, of the two-party countri.".33
one of two parties arways formed the Government without
requiring the assistance of another party. This stable and
rigid dominance of two parties has had important consequences
for the proceedings of parliament.
The party majorities in a House of between B0 and 92
iv1Ps have usually been slim in the post-war period; with an
average of 12 resurting from the general elections l94G to
1978. The actual difference between the parties in terms
of voting in the House has averaged half that figure. fn
several- Parliaments the defection of as few as one, two or
three members courd have resulted in government defeats
(Table 2.2) .
One final development, which has assumed its greatest
significance for the House in the third period, has been the
increasing reliance of parliamentary parties on caucus meetings.
The use of party meetings has a much ronger history, dating
from the early years of responsible government in New Zealand.
The first meeting was in 1856; the earliest known reference
to a caucus meeting in parliament occurred in lg26; and
during the 1880s such meetings became firmry established.34
The rore of caucus and the freguency of meetings fluctuated
with the party and the circumstances. The growth of the
Labour Party, with its commitment to internal democracy
based on majority voting and party discipline, was largely
responsible for the emergence of the modern caucus system.
33.
34.
Sartori, Parhr Systenrs, Tables 39 and
Lipson, Politics of Eqr-raLittz, pp.L23,
43.
125 ard 126
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with the assumption of the readership by Fraser in the
Labour Party and Holland in the National party, the modern
caucus system with regular meetings became firmly estab-
lished in both parties during the 1940s.35
Procedural Development
The development of the ruLes which control the pro-
ceedings of Parliament were infruenced on the one hand by
resistance to reductj-ons in the rights of private members,
and on the other hand by the desire of governments to secure
the passage of their business. The political party provided
the means for obtaining compliance from members in the reform
of procedures.
rn the history of the House there have been two major
periods of procedural review by standing orders committees
outstanding both for the number of extensive reports and for
the adoption of significant recommendations. rt is clear
that pressures on the House (deriving either from the vorume
of business or political contention, or both) prompted these
reviews for most were initiated during or following sessions
that were unusuarly arduous in terms of hours.36 The first
phase is associated with the Liberal regime; between 1g9l
and 1910 six reports were produced (not alt of which were of
equar significance, the r9o6 report was mainly confined to the
proceedings of select commj-ttees) . More than 50 years elapsed
35. Mitchell, "Caucus:
of Ccnnprweal*rPolitical Stulies, VI (I4arch, f96g), pp.ffi
Lipson, Politics of Equatity, pp.336-40; Ar:stjl
t],re New @ i,.rties", Journal
36. For e<arple, 1903, I9IO, Lg2g-.9, Lg6L-2, 1967-g, I}TI-2,Itre strain on t}le healttr of nsnbss lias given b1z Fbrbesfor amerxtnents to tt* starding orders i''-1929, lr.z.p.D.,193f), pp.54-6
L974, L978-9.
as tlre reason
227 (l4arch 28,
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before the next phase (although the important review of
L928-9 occurred in the meantime) in which five committees
reported eight times on standing orders between 1962 and
Lglg.37
ft was only following the Liberals'assumption of power
that major changes were introduced.. For the previous 15 years
procedural development had been stymied by the terms of
standing order 401 which required that two-thirds of the
members should be present and notice of four sitting days
should be gi-ven. rn nine of the ll years between 18Bl and
1891, standi-ng orders committees had made proposars but time
had not been made by the House to consider them.38 In the
meantime, because of the House's commitment to the rights of
members to speak wi-thout restrictions, the daily average sit-
ting hours continued to rise as various tactics were used to
forestall the passage of legislation. By today's standards
the hours were often comparable but devoted to fewer items
of business and much of the time was spent after midnight.
The distribution of this time was unevenry spread between
members. Thus in the 1893 session six members accounted
for almost one third of the column inches in Hansard.39
By 1892 some procedures were obsolete, other rules
needed to be reconciled with the practices of the House
37.
38.
39.
Ttrere was also a 1925 Report on local legislation aryl another reportin I95t !fiich was largely concerned wittr the onsequences for the
House of the abolition of the legislative Cor:ncil.
Retrnrt of Starding Orders @nrLittee, A.J.H.R., I.6 (1892), p.l.
Report of Retrnrting Debates and printj_:ng Ccnrnittee, A.J.H.R., I.1O(1893), p.3. Seddon \,{as responsj-ble for 37A.25 ildrffi-per cent
of tlre total. ltrese figr:res rsere apparentry surpassed in 1895 for
ItbNab connrents that he was rnt a great offerder with a total lorgfii
of 10 yards 10 inctres, d:ile anottrer was ncted as a "twelve-yard
msnber" with 447.5 inctres. ttre return hras aptrErently rnt printedin tlr:is case becan:se of nsnbers' objections. N.Z.P.D., 91 (October30, 1895), p.895.
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while other amendments were required to correct "abuses".
The recommendations of the Report by the IB92 Standing
orders committee were generally directed towards economising
of time.40 The reforms were eventuarry passed in 1894 after
a means of evading the limitation on procedural reform,
short of passing legislation, had been found. Although the
provision for amending standing orders was strengthened by
requiring a vote equal to the absolute majority of the
members, the rule which provid.ed for the suspension of
standing orders was amended to reduce the number of members
required to be present from two-thirds to 40. Henceforth
the "safeguard" against revision of the procedures was
ineffective because j-t became customary to suspend that
standing order. rn L929 it was decided that a simple motion
should be all that was required to amend the rule=.41
Time limits were also introduced in 1g94 but the rules
sti1l alrowed members generous opportunities to speak. An
hour was allocated for each member,s speech in the forlowing
debates: Address in Repry, Budget, Motion of Ino confidenc€",
Approprj-ation Bill and second reading of a bil1. Contributions
to other debates were limited to half an hour (with the ex-
ception of those in the committee of the whole House). That
time lirnits on speeches alone were insufficient where conten-
tious issues were being debated can be seen from the following
Parliament in which one quarter of the time was occupied. in
sittings after midnight.
A debate such as the Address in Reply was still able
to last for four weeks (compared with four days in the New
40.
41.
A.J.H.R., r.6
N.Z.P.D. | 227
(1892) , p.l.
(l4areJr 28, 1931) , p.544.
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South Wales assembly') .42 The IgZg changes to the Standing
Orders included the halving of the time for members' speeches
in this debate and the fixing of 10.30pm as the time at which
the House should rise (previously no formal limit had existed
although no new business could be taken after 12.30am) . One
further reform in that year was to make effective the existing
provision for urgency. This was accomplished by adding a
clause that required an item of business which was accorded
urgency to be completed during the same sitting of the House.
The first Standing Orders of the House contained pro-
visions for "abridging or summarily terminating debate". In
the 1863 session they were used to curtail a debate on the
subject of moving the seat of government, but later that year
the House agreed to omit these rules from the Standing Orders.43
Successive Standing Order Committees reviewed the question of
whether a closure rule should be re-introduced but declined to
favour such a proposal. As Iate as L929 a Standing Orders
Committee "almost unanimously" agreed that adoption of closure
was not advisable.44
Two years later, Labour opposition to Forbes' scheme
for retrenchment (which was supported by the Reform Party and
paved. the way to the coalition ministry later in the year)
finally saw the introduction of the closure procedure. Forbes
argued that the prolonged obstruction to the passing of
business in an orderly manner under emergency circumstances
N.Z.P.D. | 22L (Augrust 2, l-929ll , p.875. Nevertheless, there has con-Eiffit-to be opposition to shorter address in Reply speeches. Coates,
for ocanq:le, argnred in 1929 against the introduction of a 30 rninute
limit to nsrbers' speeches. N.Z.P.D. , zL1. (August 2, L929), p.876-
lltre 1967-8 Standing orders coffi twice received representation
against the 20 minute ljmit established in 1962. A-J.H.R-, I.I4
(1967) , p.6; A,J.H.R., I.I4 (1968) , P.15.
A.J.H.R., A.6 (1882) , P.3.
N.Z.P.D. , zIL (August 2, L929), p.878.
42.
43.
44.
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necessitated the use of this power, but that it would be
"sympathetically applied".45 He later agreed to an amend-
ment restricting its application to the present session but
the following year the closure principle was permanently in-
corporated in Standing Order=.45 ,h" full range of procedural
devices which has served post-war governments now existed and
there were to be no further major revisions of the Standing
Orders before the 1950s.
Speakership
This "ancient and honourable office an essential
feature of the parliamentary system" has several distinctive
characteristj-cs in the House of cor*orr".47 The prestige of
the Speaker is derived from the tradition of removing the
office from any assocj-ation with partisan behaviour. In
order to maintain the most essential quality of impartiality,
the Speaker retires from the political arena by severing his
association with his party, taking no part in debates whether
of the House or in Committee,4S and by not participating in
election campaigning. It is customary for the Speaker to be
re-elected while he remains in the House (and usually the
election is neither contested nor opposed).
These traditi-ons did not always survive the transference
of the office to colonial legislatures. The departures were
45.
46.
47.
N.Z.P.[r. , 227 (Mardr 28, 1931), p.548.
N.Z.P.D. , 23I (Marcll I, 1932), pp.114-38.
trdornran t.i'ilding and Philip Lar:rdy, An Erclzcloped"ia of Parliarent revised
ed. (Iorron: Gsse11, 196I) , p.slO strip ard
His Offir,: jl tlre l\rvrentieth Centurry" in S A Walkland (ed) the Hcuse of
Connpns :-rr 'h.€ T\rsentieth Cen l4snbers of the
--
Parl-]-arrEnf. ..ilaoup, versiQr Press, , PF.
48. Precedenr- exist for ttre Speaker to participate in Conrnittee but rpne
have done so ,,iJrce 1870. Wilding and l-aurxly, Encryclopedia, p.591-
47
in part due to the fact that the Speakership was stiIl evolving
in Britain during the period in which these legj-slatures were
created, and practices which placed the office above party
were barely establishea.49 The Speakership in New Zealand
did not evolver ds many parliamentary procedures have, by the
incorporation of new practices adopted in the House of Commons.
In the nineteenth century the sma1l size of the House influenced
the development of the office, for it meant that the Speaker
might be call-e,ii upon to vote and it was exceedingly dif-
ficult for the incumbent to insulate himself from the intimate
atmosphere. With the emergence of political parties, partisan
considerations came to be important.
The traditional practice in the House of Commons of
casting a vote in order to produce an outcome that would allow
further discussion of a matter, has been accepted h"..,50 but
there appears to have been numerous departures from it.
Speakers were obliged to exercise a casting vote j-ntermittently
during the nineteenth century, and the Liberal I'{inistry. The
Speaker's vote could lead to the downfall of a ministry (as in
L862) or preserve a government in office (as for example on
no-confidence motions j-n 1885 and 1912). Since then these
occasions have been rare with the exception of the terms
1958-50 and 1970-2. In the highly disciplined context of
Parliament since the Second World War the Speaker's first
priority has been to support his party in office. It was
thought proper for the Speaker to vote freguently with the
government during the 1957-60 term because the electoraLers
49. Ceoffrqg Bolton, "Ihe Choice of the Speaker in Australian Parlianrents",jx Colirr Hughes (ed), Readings in Australian Coverrrrent (St Lucia:
Universitlz of Oreensl
50. Hon Sir bnald Algie, "The b1e of t.l:e Speaker of the House ard theCtrairnan of ConmiLtses", Public Adnui:ristration Newstetter 95 (August
1965) , p.l.
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verdict had granted the party a majorj-ty of only two including
the Speaker.
Until the early decades of the twentieth century Speakers
were often active as individual members in the Committee pro-
ceedings of the House. The reconciliation of a partisan role
in those debates with the impartial status of the office was
not easy to achieve and Speakers more recently have been in-
clined to avoid involvement in those debates (although the
present speaker voted in one of the divisions of the National
Development Bill L979) .
In the nineteenth century cases of partial decisions by
Speakers did occur.5l But the Standing orders have been revised
considerably since then to curtail the unrestricted rights of
private members and to recognise the priority accorded to
government business. Nevertheless respect for the office may
be lost in the heat of adversary debate and members of both
parliamentary parties have accusedSpeakers of partiality during
recent Parliament=.52
It was usual for the Speaker's electorate to be contested
by j-ndividuals, who claimed the constiLuents were not being
properly represented, and then increasingly by parties. Ir{unrcl's
re-eLection in 1866 appears to be the only exception. Electoral
opposition was in fact fairly successful for five of the 19
Speakers experienced an electoral defeat following their elevation
to that office.53 Speakers were obliged therefore to campaj-gn
51.
52.
53.
See A F Canpbell, "1[tre Speakership of the N.Z. House of hpresentatives
1854-1912", (urrpr:blished l,A ttresis, Canterbr.ulz tlniversitlz, L952) Chapter
See tJ:e discussion in Ctrapter 3.
they were: ltmro in 1871, O'Forke irr 1890, Lang Ln L922, Barnard in 1943
ard Sdrarm in 1946.
V.
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actively and to make partisan addresses to their constituents.
while the House was in session i-t was necessary to champion
the needs of their e1ectorat"".54
rn the nineteenth century it was widely held that a
speaker should not necessarj-ly share the outrook of a govern-
ment, and be dependent on the government in order to remain
i-n office. For exampre Munro (speaker from tg61-1g70) served
during the terms of a number of ministries. Fitzherbert was
nomj-nated by Vogel in 1876 although known to oppose the 1atterrs
ti"*"-55 A major change occurred in 1g9r when steward ,,a true
Liberal" was instarled by the majority party following the
first contested election for the speakership, and in which the
members voted on party lines.56 Because steward,s performance
was less than satisfactory another contested e]ection occurred
at the beginning of the foltowing parliament when o'Rorke (pre-
viously speaker from 1979 untir his defeat in the rg90 general
election) was also nominated. The division was not on party
lines' although those voting against o'Rorke e/ere temperance
*"rr.57 The onry other occasion in which the position has been
contested was in Lg23 when Mccombs was defeated by statham.
while the convention has usually prevaited that one
member is unanimousty supported, the Labour opposition strongry
objected to the election of sir Roy,rack in 1976, but did not
GLiruress (1903-1913) was particularly active becarxe of electoralpresstrres. canpoell, "s5:eakership", pp.rg-zr, L44-5. Ban-nard pro-
npted tro 1oca1 bills in 1936.
rt is ttrought ttr,at vogel wished to neutralise a strong opponent.Can@eUr "speakerstripu, pp.l6-7.
Carybellr "Speakership", p.19.
Carpbell, I'speakership", p.19. cf tlle webbrs subsequent obsenzation ttrat
"the Speaker of the House- is contstantly absent incapacitated from hisdulies by drink". D A Haner (ed), fee weUOs in New Zeale4d (Wellington:Price lvtilburn, 1974) , p.42. ft *roul enzation was
made in o'brkets final year_as- Speaker after senring a total of alnost 20years. in the office, a rEaord vhiah has never been afpiota[ed bt aqfg16etincrmbent.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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go as far as nominating an alternative candidat".58 This
particular case illustrates the difficulty a member has in
making the transition from a partj-san rore to that of an
impartiar chairman. Jack's mastery of parliamentary pro-
cedure earned the respect of both parties during his first
period as speaker (1967-72) | but it also lead him in the
adversary atmosphere of the New Zealand parriament to engage
i-n unruly behaviour and to chalrenge the rulings of speakers
in both the 1958-60 and the rg73-75 parliaments. consequently,
his election as chairman of committees in 1961 and as speaker
in 1976 were opposed by the opposition. rn the latter case,
Jack's defiance of the speaker's authority and his subseguent
expulsion from the chamber on the last day of the 1975 session,
the last sitting day prior to his nomination as speaker, in-
fluenced the Opposition stand.
rt was still possible in 1935 to craim that the speaker-
ship in New zearand mai-ntained the British tradition of con-
tinuity of t"rrrr"59 for Guinness had been re-erected by the
Reform Party in L9r2 and statham, as an rndependent (1923-35)
served during Reform and united ministries. As statham was
not a Member of parli-ament j_n 1936, the new Labour Government
elected one of its members and continued to do so while in
office. of the five occasions in the post-war perlod in which
a change of government occurred, the question of continuity of
the Speakership did not arise in two cases (in 1958 the Speaker
of the previous Parliament, sir Matthew oram, had retired, and
in 1973 Mr A Al1en, the speaker for the rgTz session, was no
58. N.Z.P.D., 403 (June 22, 1976), pp.2-5.
59. W P lbrrell, New Zeatqrd (Iondon: Ernest Benn, 1935) , p.ZI7.
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longer in parliament). In 1950, 1961 and Lg76 the majority
party (in a1l cases National) chose to elect one of its own
members as speaker. There is little doubt that the office
is now a party prize.
The office has become i-nstitutionalised to the extent that
it is awarded to members with long service in parliament before
their appointment. Table 2.3 divides the time-span of the House
into six periods, each of 2r years. with the exception of the
early years and the two speakers first elected in the 1917-39
period, the averagie parriamentary experiences of speakers is
high. This is particularly the case in the final period in
which no speaker had less than 12 years in the House prior to
his attainment of the office.
TABLE 2.3
1854 IB75
1875 1896
1895 1917
L9I7 1938
19 38 19s9
1959 1980
Parliamentary Experience and Tenure of Speakers
1854-1980
Nurber First l,ban Tenr:re of
Elected in Speaker prior to lban TenurePeriods Eadr period ri:st Election of speaker
3
3
2
2
4
5
I
20
t9
9
16
l5
7
I
9
IO
4
4*
Excludes incumbent
The position has not, however, become stabilised by
allowing speakers, once elected, to remain in office until
they retire. The conseguence of di-scontinuity in office-
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holding under a system of disciplined parties can be seen in
Table 2.3. More speakers were first elected in the last two
periods than previously, and the mean tenure of speakers, which
was slowry climbing between 1954 and 1939, has since dropped to
four years for the two most recent periods. while this higher
turnover of Speakers is not entirely due to the practice of parties
favouring their own nomin"",60 it is undoubtedly the main factor.
Speakers have continued to attend caucus meetings (although
l-ess frequently with National members, the present incumbent does
not), and participate as party members both in parliament and in
election campaigns. The disadvantages of a party nominee in a
smalI partisan legislature are clear but neither party appears
inclined to change the nature of the offi"e.61 a former speaker
has observed that it is "symbolicalry inappropriate" for the
speaker to be nominated and seconded by the whips, "the tactical
battle leaders" of his party (rather than by the British practice
of an opposition backbencher seconding the motion where prior
agreement has been reached ) .62 rt may be inappropriate to the
traditional conception of the office but it reflects the reali-ty
of parliamentary politics in New Zealand.
60. For oranple, Sctrranrn was defeated in ttre 1946 General Election. In ttre
case of Barnard, ttre parez rray be held responsible for tfie termination
of his tenure after only tlvrc terms. He had resigrned from tJ:e party in
1940 but c.ontinued as Speaker until the 1943 election i:r hltricflhe wasdefeated by ttre party's cardidate.
In his valedictory address to the House, Oram proposed that the Speaker's
term should be o<terded by a decision of Parliarent to six years ard thathis seat shoul-d be vacated ard a new nernber elected. N.z.p:D. , 3r4 (1957)pp.3331-4. lbre.recently, Jack expressed t].e viemr tlat i-ffi'un1iJ<e1y
th,at any steps will be taken to develop the indeperdence ard parLialilr ofthe Speaker. One minor change drich he prolnsed was for a secord. aeputy
speaker to be appointed fron the opposition party. Hon sir by Jack,
"A sPeaker rooks at Parliarent", in sir John r"rarsharl (ed) , Ttre Reform ofParlianent, (We11i.::rgton: Neur Zealard Institute of h:blic @lF8l , p.84. On a nr-urUer of occasions he took ttre initjative ard invited
the Senior Opposition !!hip to take tlre chrair.
Jack, I'A Speaker Looks at Partianrent", p.85.
6r.
62.
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Parllamentary AcLivities
The legisrature showed an earry proclivity to engage
in a wide variety of parliamentary activities. Notwithstanding
the smarl number of Europeans in its first two decades, the
population was growing steadily and the many needs of political
development were expressed through parliament. Two striklng
indications of the demands on the institution by the earry
r870s can be derived from the comparative data presented by
two contemporary observers.
Trollope was amazed that a country of ress than 300,000
could warrant, as werr as the central institutions, eight pro-
vinces (each with a superintendent and his cabinet, and a
council), and concluded "that New Zealand is over-governed,
over-legislated for, over-provided with officials, and over-
burdened with nationar debt". He provided. colonial office
figures for the early 1870s which showed that New zearand,s
per capita expenditure was 113.7 compared with r^7.z for New
south wales, .i4.5 for victoria and tl.l for canadu.63
An early indication of the concern with the increasing
amount of work which confronted each session of parliament was
a reguest for the clerk of the House of Representatives to
investigate the mode of parliamentary business in Victoria.
The Australian colony, although experiencing a rater start in
terms of settlement and deveropment, had grown rapidly in the
1850s with the influx of persons associated with the goldrushes,
and its population soon exceeded that of New Zealand. For this
reason the comparative information provided by the crerk in his
63. llFo"y Ito11ope, Australja ard New Zee'land (uelbor:rne: George bbertson,1873) , pp-554 ad Mrrie1 F Lloyd prichard,An Econcmic Historlz of Ner.r Zealarrd to 1939 (Aucklard: Col1ins, 1970) ,'p.407.
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report to the House is particularly revealing for the dif-
ferences between the business conducted by the two lower
horrr"".64 The data reproduced in Table 2.4 were the averages
for the years 1871 to 1974.
TABLE 2.4 Parliamentary Business in the New Zealand House
of Representatives and the Vj_ctorian Legislative
Assembly, 1871_ to lB74
Bills In-
troduced
Bi1ls Passed And
Assented To
Select Comnittees
Othen Ihan OrdinarT
Sessional @nmitt€es
Petitions
Received
Victoria
New Zealand
48
r60
29
83
103
200
I
19
Source: A.J.H.R., H.2I (1976) , p.2.
For each category of business the amount of work conducted
by the New Zealand legislature far exceeded that of its Australian
counterpart. Despite a smal-Ier population the House of Represen-
tatives received twice the number of petitions of the Victorian
Assembly, more than three times the number of the 1atterrs bills
were introduced into the New Zealand legislature, and almost the
same ratio existed for bills passed and assented to. Of partipular
concern to the C1erk was the much greater amount of work devolving
upon the New Zealand select committees. Even at this early stage
the New Zealand House of Representatives had numerous select
committees and problems had arisen with their servicing by
committee clerks.
64. A.J.H.R. , H.2I (1876)
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Many of these committees were estabrished for a singre
task, to be accomplished within a fixed period of limited
duration. whlIe most committees were dependent on the House
for the referral of business, some came to be incruded in
the Standing Orders (for example, Goldfields, public Accounts,
Public petitions and Loca1 Bil1s) and automatically received
certain types of business. They were otherwj-se circumscribed
as to meeting times (unless the l_eave of the House was granted)
and because they onry had the power to report opinions to the
House- Notwithstanding the large number of reports made to
Parliament in many sessions (often numbering several hundred),
most were concerned with petitions.
The latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed a
steady rise in the amount of business conducted by parliament
in each session. This growth was maintained untir the two
decades before and after the turn of the century. During
parliamentary terms at that time the vorume of business
measured by such activities as legislation and petitions
reached a peak, and the sessionar hours of the House $/ere
also high.
with the nationalisation of politics following the
aborition of the provinces, parliament had become an arena
for the allocation of pubric works to localities. The bar-
gaining processes involved in the pursuit by Mps of public
works affected pubric policy maki-ng and often overshadowed
the proceedings of the House. Accompanying the expansion
of the representative base of parliament and the wider role
of the national instituti-ons, was the growing practice by
members of the public of resorting to individuar reguests
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for ventilation and redress of grievances. The number of
petitions grew steadily after l865 until a sessional peak of
1286 was reached in r90r and a term peak of 2529 between
1903-5. rn the 50 or so years between the 6th and 22nd
Parliaments, 300 or more petitions vrere presented on the av-
erage during each main session of the parriamentary term (in
2l years of this period the annual number exceeded 5oo). The
number presented each year has since decreased, but they
have conti-nued to play an important role in the work of
select committees until recently.65 A better indication
of the changes which have taken place is provided by
legislation.
The volume of legisration has fluctuated throughout
the history of the House for various reasons: a foreshortened
session, crises such as war and depression, unstable parlia-
mentary majorities and the interest of private members in
promoting bills. rt is possible to discern an increase j-n the
nineteenth century; already by the 4th parliament over 100
bi1ls were being introduced each session and gg were being
passed on the average. More than 500 bilrs were shortly
being introduced during each three-year parliamentary term.
After a peak of 640 bills was reached in the 15th parliament
(1903-5), the volume of new bi11s is noticeabry ress until
the dramatic increase in the 1950s.
The legislative activj_ties
bined into groups of four in order
35 Parliaments were com-
show the developments during
of
to
65. See Chapter 7.
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the last r20 y""r".66 The growth of both d.isciprined parties
and the government's control of the legislative process are
reflected in the trends in Table 2.5.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the
early part of the twentieth century large numbers of private
members' bills were introduced. The decline in the number of
birrs introduced per day can be largely attributed to the
dwindling initiatives of private members faced with the
prospect of having their biIls ',strangred" at the second
reading and "thrown into the waste-paper basket,,.67 The
last few Parliaments have the highest average for bills in-
troduced per day since the first decade of this century.
legislative output was fairly stable for the first 20
Parliaments with a rate of about one bill per day on the
average. The drop in output between the 21st and 2gth
Parliaments can be attributed first to the depression and
then to the second world war. Most apparent is the rate
at which legislation has been passed. in the last three decades;
the number of bills passed per day is higher than for any
other period in the history of the institution.
rn the first few parriaments, a substantial proportion
of legislation introduced was successful. Thereafter a
declining proportion was passed by each successive parliament
as members continued to introduce bi1ls which did not have
the support of the government (and government legislation
failed to pass).
66 - ltre last tr,uc Parliffrtents could rot be anarysed in tlre
because of tl:e practice of hording regislation over to
sessjon. See Ctr,apter 6.
SaIIE l^jay
the nort
67. Qtroted in Lipson, politics of Egr:ality, p.3lg.
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TAB E 2.5 l.egri.slation Introduced and Fassed LgS6-],g7Z
Ratio of Bills
Passd to gi"lls
2
5
'9
t3
[7
2I
2.5
29
33
4*
I
L2
l6
20
24
28
32
36
1..13
I_.43
[ ,- ]-8
I.32
r.. l-6'
4.97
0 ,83
1.67
1.84
,0 
"74,
0.56
0.48
0 .53
0 .6,5
0.58
0 .91
g-.92
0 .89
1856-70
r-871-84
L884-96
1897-0E
I909,-22
1923-35
L 935-49
195,0-60
L96L-72
Bills Irtroctiqed
L.53
2.s6
2.45
2.51
l.7g
I.42
0.9r
1.82
2,06
* The f,,irst Farliarcent is ,not incl.uded
Source: Vot_e-s 4nd proce.edingg and
of =RepTesentAtlYe,s.
.Igurnal.s of the House
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Between the 7th parliament (r879-gl) and the 15th
Parliament (1903-5), the proportion of legislation which
failed to pass was about equar to that which was enacted
(Tabre 2-5) - rn the following parriaments about two-thirds
or more of introduced regislation was assented to. The
return of the Labour Government in 1935 marked an important
change i-n the pattern of regislative activity. A highry
disciplined party was able to manage the process in order
to secure the passage of its regisration. The pattern set
by Labour has been maintained in the post-war period with
about 90 per cent of introduced legislati-on being passed
between 1936 and Ln2.68
Historical Overview
Four major changes have taken place during the last
100 years of parliamentts history. First the growth in the
scope and complexity of government has had severar implica-
tions for Parliament. rn seddon's day it was stil1 possj-bre
to govern a relativery simple political system with a handfur
of minj-sters. Multiple centres of authority, each with some
degree of independence, have since come to exist. The direct
involvement of the institution and its members in particularised
arlocative activities has been largery transferred toagencies
in the state apparatus. Government departments attend to
welfare needs of the public, agencies such as the National
rt stnuld be noted that the trerds irr Table 2.5 are the reverse ofthose for Ote Canadian House of Connrns. In that legislatr:re the
average"relative legislative load"(bills introduced per day) hashalved from 2.02 +rr early parlianents to 0.94 nnre recentry.9i1.. the_averagre"relative legislative ouq>ut, (bills passeh perey) has declined fron 1.39 to 0.54. uo parrianent between 1967
and 1968 attained tne hj-gh ratios (of bifls passed to bills jntrc_&rced) of ttre New zeal-ard assenbly. Al1an xornberg, "paru-anentin canadian society", in Allan Kornberg ard Lloyd o rtnsorr (eas)Legij-slatr:res in Derzelopnwrtal perspectiv. (Durh-an NC: Drke Universiez
68.
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Roads Board stand between local demands and parliamentarians,
and personal grievances may now be catered for by the Ombudsman,s
office. Parliament is no longer the recipient of particularised
demands to the extent that occurred in the past. organised
i-nterest groups now form an integral part of the poritical
system, but their attention is more inclined to be directed
towards influencing the government. parliament may only
enter the process if a particular matter is referred to a
select committee. The demands on the institution have increased
its workload, while expectations of the rores it shourd adopt
in order to scrutinise the administration and "contror" the
executive exceed its capacity to do so (or the willingness of
political leaders to change it).
secondry as the parochial preoccupations of members came
to be leavened by a commitment to national matters there fo1-
lowed a move from individualistic actions to colrecti-ve
behaviour. The independence of the private member which was
so fiercery maintained during the nineteenth century became
subsumed within the group will of the politicar party.
A third development has been the shift of the deliberative
function (such as it existed) from the pubLic arena of parliament
to the private meetings of the parties. The party most respons-
ible for developing the modern caucus system also exposed the
proceedings of Parliament to the fullest publicity by authorising
the broadcasting of its proceedings. The House became a medium
not only for the ratification of cabinet decisions but also
for the registering of the colr-ective views of two cohesive
party groups.
6I
Fina11y, with procedural changes an organj-sation evolved
that did not dissipate its tj-me to the same extent in unpro-
ductive debates. Through successive enlargernents of government
control over the proceedings, the effectiveness of the House
was increased with regard to the passing of business. The
reduction in the opportunities for obdurate obstruction by
minorities was not however counter-balanced by the development
of an effective range of mechanisms for scrutj-ny.
The apprication of Huntington's concept of institution-
alisati-on to legislatures has been more successful- with con-
gressional rather than parliamentary systems.un *oarithstanding
the limitations of his four measures of the revel of institu-
tionalisation i-n relation to the New zealand parliament, they
serve to highlight its significant features.
since the first session in 1854, the House has met in
every year, with the exception of two years of the second
Parliament, and these sittings have usually lasted for several
months. A succession of generations of political leaders have
passed through the chamber. parliament retains a centrar
place in the poritical system and continues to perform a range
of functions which cannot be suppranted by other politicar
institutions. The House can therefore be regarded as having
met the first criterion of institutionalisation, adaptability.
The House has also been fairly successful, given the
nature of the parliamentary system, in achieving autonomy.
The differentiation of the institution from its environment
was mainly accomplished in the nineteenth century, although
vestigial elements of its rinks with Britain have linqered
69. See the discussion p.I2.
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until the middle of the twentieth century. The significance
of the relatively 1ow turnover of the membership of the House
can be more readily appreciated through some comparisons. A
stable membership was attained earlier than the us House of
Representatives (despite the ratter's age), and it has remained
relatively constant in contrast to the canadian House of Commons
which has averag'ed a turnover of 40 per cent since the l_930s.
Parriamentary tenure in canada has been less important for
promotion to cabinet office than either New zealAnd or Britain.
The limit to further expansion in parliament's autonomy
continues to be set by the degree of independence which the
executive is willing to concede to it. As a structural- feature
of the parriamentary system, the relationship between the
executive and the legislature should not detract from the
measure of autonomy which the House has attained in other
respects.
By coherence, the third criterion, Huntington means
"substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the
group and on procedures for resorving disputes which come
up within those boundaries" ]0 This consensus has been re-
flected in the attachment to the forms and procedures of
the House, the socialisation processes which have exlsted
for new members, and the irregularity with which reviews
of the rules have occurred in the past.
Parliament achieved a modest degree of institutionalisa-
tion with regard to the fourth criterion, internar comprexity.
A range of select committees has existed from the first
session and over time some have acquired a permanent status
70. samuel P Hr:ntington, political order in ctr,anqinq societies(Neriv Haven: yale Univ
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either by being incorporated in the standing orders as a
mandatory requirement or by being automaticarly appointed
by custom at the beginning of each session. However, com-
mittees have remained creatures of the House without
i-ndependence or much importance in most cases. The exten-
sion of this complexity by the differentiation of further
sub-units has been confined to the sub-committees of one
committee, and then only very recentry in the history of
Parl iament.
Two further observations need to be made about
structural comprexity. within the broader parriamentary
context there has been some growth i-n organisational com-
plexity. The caucus system has become highly developed
with the appointment of numerous caucus committees (often
more speciarised than the commi-ttees of the House) and the
expansion of their investigatory rores. The offi-ces of
the party whip arso came to be specialised leadership
positions in the House, which more recently received formal
recogni-tion by references to them in the standing orders
and by their incrusion in the civil List as recipients of
parriamentary salaries. secondly, at the tai-l-end of the
historicar time-span of parliament, recog,nition was finally
being given to the divergence between the relatively simple
organisational structure of the House and the complexity of
the politicar environment, The changes to the committee
system, administrative resources and other dimensions of
Parllament are consi_dered later.
Historically, the post-war period may come to be regarded
in the future as another transitional phase in the history of
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Parriament. The House exhibits a number of characteristics
which are the product of developments described in this
chapter. But durJ-ng this recent period major institutionar
changes have occurred.; they are the subject of later
chapters.
Chapter 3
PARIIAMENTARY PARTIES: COHESION AND CONFLICT
Po1itical parties are held to play various roles in
legislatures. According to one view they impose the greatest
constraj-nt on legislatures by reducing the scope of individual
action and imposing alternative demands on members' Ioyalties.l
They are also held to be essential in regularising the behaviour
of members and facilitating the passage of business.2 It is in
the structuring of the vote that the influence of parties is
most obvious, but the extent of this influence depends upon
other factors.
In New Zealand the cast of political relationships is
determined by the parliamentary framework. Tn Parliament a
Government and an Opposition are officially designated and
the Chamber is arranged so that they confront each other.
The development of the two party system, outlined in the pre-
vious chapter, has meant that each party adopts one of these
roles according to whether it is in the majority or minority in
the House. Because of the size of the legislature the parties
form relatively sma1I and intimate groups and are frequently
separated in numbers of members by a narrov/ margin. Con-
sequently the preconditions exist for parties to lay heavy
claims on the loyalties of their members, but for relation-
ships between them to emphasise their differences as they
present themselves to the public.
Jean Blordel, 4! Inbrcductiotr to Cotrparative Coverurrertt (Lordon:Weidenfeld ard
A vier hihich has been reaffi::nred for MPs in Nert Zealard tryt their
er<perierrce of free rrctes in recent Parlianents. See for oranple
IrE J Hr:ntbrenrarks on the Hospitals Anerdrent Bill 1975: N.Z.P.D.'
397 (rrhy 23, 1975) , p.1375.
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This chapter j-s concerned with the impact of parties on
members' behaviour in Parliament. It covers both intra-party
behaviour, the extent to which members conform to their partiesl
positions in the House, and inter-party relationships as measured
by the level of conflict. The voting divisions of the House
during the post-war period provide the maj-n source of data.
It is easy to disregard voting as a source of information
about behaviour in the House, because of the overriding influence
of the parties on the proceedings. In other legislatures analysis
of voting records is regarded as a productive exercise for a
variety of purposesr3 while in other parliamentary systems with
strong parties, dissent within parties is the subject of lengthy
studies because of the frequency of defections and the numbers
of members involved.4 Nonetheless, the examination of divisions
over time in New Zealand can yield useful information about the
role of parties in Parliament.
It is well known that party discipline has been high in
Parliament since the mid-1930s, and that relatively few occasions
have occurred in which members have been permitted a free vote
or exercised a vote against their party majority. The details of
the exceptions have been covered in several studies in the post-war
period." Unlike those studies the concern here is not with
See the sttrdies cited in lt{alcolm E Js,ve1l, "Legislative Sttdies in Wes@rn
Denocracies: A @nqnraLive Perspective", l,egj-s1ati]re Studies Quarterly,III (Novsrber 1978) , pp.541-3.
See for exanple Philip Norton, Consenrative Dissidents: Dissent Within theparl janentarar Consenrltive par
l4cst nctably: bbert N Kelson, "Voting in the New Zealard Hot:,se of Represertatives, 1947-54", in L Clevelard ard A D bbinson (eds) Readings in Neur
Zealand Coverrurent (We1lington: Reed Education, L972), pp.95-107; rcbert
@te Mgrrber of Parlianent and ttre Fonnation of PublicPolicy: A New
ttlay, ftFarlianwrtary DiscipUne in New Zealand,
1955-63'; in Cleveland and bbirson,Readings, pp.108-21; R S Milne' Political
Parties in Nsr Zealand (Iordon: OxiGdTfiir*-versity eress, pp.I36-44;-ffi-t ard Conscience" (unprtbiished l"lA-Ihesis, Universitlt
of Canterbury, L974).
3.
4.
5.
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detailing the circumstances of each event, but with the behav-
iourar patterns which emerge from the voting contexts.
The extent of members' conformity and cohesion in parlia-
ment is explored by following a number of steps in the analysis
of the votj-ng patterns in the post-war period: the frequency
with which formally sanctioned occasions for free votes have
occurred; the extent to which llps have taken advantage of
these occasions; the extent to which members vote against
the "party position" as represented by a majority of their
fellows; and the extent to which members vote against their
party on issues which have not been sanctioned as free vote
bills.
one other d.imension of party cohesion i-s the types of
behaviour undertaken by Mps in order to evade embarrassing
the party on an issue. Absenteeism by }4ps from the chamber
is one indication of individual- opposition to the party lj"ne,
but its incidence is difficult to estabrish systematically
for disapproval is not always expressly stated.
The complications in analysing free vote bills the
relatively few number of cases, the variations in behaviour
towards different issues, and the ambiguities in some voting
situatj-ons 
- are not associated with the study of inter-party
behaviour in the House. using divisions as the main basis for
measurement, the latter part of the chapter considers the level
of conflict between the parties as expressed in their behaviour
in Parliament.
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Intra-Party Cohesion
Party Voting on Legislation
The most simple measurement of the degree of party
cohesion is the frequency with which members of the two
parties vote in unison. Mueh of the day-to-day business
of the House does not require voting, but some matters
require a voice vote before a decision can be taken or pro-
gress made, in the case of a bill, to another stage. As a
matter of formality the matter is usually approved without
a recorded vote.
The votes of the members are recorded when a division
is called for. This occurs when doubt is expressed about the
result of a voice vote and more usually because the minority
party wishes to register a more tangible expression of its
opposition to a government policy or procedural measure.
I"lembers of both partj-es vote strictly according to party
lines with the Government securinq the majority and endorse-
ment of their action (or rejection of an Opposition motion).
The main departures from this predictable outcome occur
either when a free vote is offered to members by one or both
partiesr or when members cross the floor and vote against their
party. The free vote is usually associated with a stage in the
passage of a public bill which concerns a question of conscience;
occasionally it has arisen with local bi1ls. Departures from
party voting do not occur during other aspects of parliamentary
proceedings (the last exception occurred in 1947') .
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For the purposes of demonstrati-ng the extent of party
cohesion, attention needs to be given only to public bir1s.
They encompass the regislative policies of the government
and account for most of the legislation d.uring the parliamen-
tary session. The non-government public birls, pri-vate
membersr biIls, rarely receive a second reading and usually
rapse without an opportunity for a vote to o".rrr.6 The public
bills which pass through the House are therefore almost always
government bills.
Between 1950 and L97g almost 3,000 pubric bills were
introduced, of which only 21 were the subject of at least one
division that was not on party rines (Tabre 3.r). rn 15 of
those years there were no sanctioned departures from the
party line with voting on government legislation. Free vote
bills were so rare that their proportion of public biI1s for
the period equalled less than one per cent.
Cross-Voting
The truest test of conformity and cohesion arises when
l"1Ps cross the floor on questions of party poricy which have
not been exempted as matters of conscience. rn the 32 years
in the period 1947 to rg7g, L2 recorded, instances of cross-
voting have been detected involving 1g divisj_ons and 22 l{ps.
This fact alone is a sure indication of the extent to which
Private rerbers' bi11s wtrich have been tl:e sr:bject of divisionsinclude: tl:e Hoardilgs Bill r94B on vfiich both parties appearedto have rntd freely; the Ginres Anen&nent BiU j:e 1956;-!!flicfi
r,vas decided on partlz lines; ard the Crfurs Aren&rpnt Bill l9Z4
ard tl:e Hospitals anerftnent Bill 1975 on vfrich free rrctinq oc-
curred.
6.
?0
EAB,IjE! 3 .l .Fre,e \xote BiUs 1950-1978
Prio.lic g{lJs
trrrrbrcduced*
NParLi"ansrt
ParW (o: Non-)
\,lete B':iILsNZ Vote Bil1sIF?GeN
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the party lj-nes have been maintained. But these apparent
violations of party solidarity can usually be shown to be
attenuated by the circumstances of each case.
These circumstances can be summarised as follows: the
members involved were always small (a single member in seven
of the L2 cases); their action never posed a threat to the
outcome of the guestion before the House (with one possible
exception); and it was often acknowledged that there were
reasons other than conscience or judgment which motivated
members in several cases (a public j-ssue may be a local
issue for individual MPs). It is also clear that the party
leadership and caucus had usually been advised of these moves
before they hrere aff ected.
The last occasion in which members appear to have crossed
the floor on a government measure, other than legislation,
occurred during the estimates in 1947 when five opposj"tion
members voted with the Government. Four of the group were in
their first year as new members of Parliament (and later
became cabinet ministers) . The issue was apparently not
subject to party policy and could be disregarded as a minor
matter.
Mr W H Brown voted agai-nst the government on one of
numerous divisions on the Transport Amendment BiIl L967. As
the automobile associations' representative on the National
Roads Board, he strongly opposed a clause which j-ncreased
the petrol tax, particularly since it was to go to the
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Consolidated Revenue Fund rather than the Board.T
MPs are more likely to act agaj_nst the party line when
the issue affects their el-ectorate or because of electorar
pressure. Thus Kearins supported a government bill in 1953
because it affected the King country,S and Lapwood, the Mp
for Rotorua, opposed his party's legislation on the introduc-
tion of fish farming (which requi.red the Speaker,s casting
vote on one of the divisions). The Labour Government received
the voting support of three National tr{ps on a clause of its
Land settlement Promotj.on Amendment Bilr in 1959, reputedly
because of electoral pr.""rrr".9 The most persistent opponent
of a party's policy was Begg, who voted against the wool
Marketing corporation Bill on three occasions during the
introductory debate in 1973, and at each of the second Reading,
Committee and Third Reading stages in 1974.
rn two cases, the GATT bill 0f 1g4g and the News Media
ownership Bill 1965, the individual conscience of the members
was the sole reason for their action. But in both cases a
sj-ngle defection was involved, and in the r94g example it was
an opposition ltp voting with the government. rn an unusual
case the beliefs of two government members led them to move
an amendment to the fndustrial Conciliation and Arbitration
Amendment Bill in 1964 but their action was opposed by the
combined vote of a1t other members in the House. The ci-rcum-
7.
8.
N.Z.P.D., 350 (l,Iay 25 , 1967),pp.898-900.
!?rere rryere tuo divisions on the Licensing Aner&nent Birr (lilc 2) inhfti& Kearins rrcted with tlre goverrnent. rn ttre second division,
nine goverzrrent nsrbers rrcted w-ittr the opgnsition. rtrejr actionhas been treated elsewhere in ttr:is chapter as a free rrcte, r,vtrilethat of Kearjls is regarded as a cross-vote.
hyr "Parlianenbry Discipline,', p.109.9.
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stances of another occasion were very similar: Mr N P H Jones
moved an amendment to the fndustrial Law Reform BiIl 1978 but
received support f rom only one other National I\4P.
The most unusual instances of cross-voting were also the
most recent. While party lines may dissolve when free vote
bills are under consideration, they are inclined to be main-
tained on procedural motions prior to the debate. Mr R F Wal1s
voted with the opposition against the motion to take urgency
on the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Bill 1977, and
was publicly reproved by the Prime Minister as a result. Three
National lvlPs who had already displayed independent views on
other matters, supported an oppositi-on amendment to the National
Development Bill in J-979. Despite the exceptional circumstances
of their action (the government was heavily committed to the
legislation and had encountered strong public opposition), the
outcome of the vote (46 to 4I) d.oes not appear to have been in
doubt. The Speaker of the House did, however, make an appearance
for the purpose of voting in this particular division in the
interests of party solidarity. I0
Since Lhe war two cases of cross-voting have occurred in
both the late 1940s and the 1950s, another three in the 1950s
and five in the last decade. National members were more pre-
pared to act independently (which lent support to the party's
claims as to its members'rights, despite the fact that most
of them during the period never took this action). Only two
Labour members cross-voted and it has since been suggested that
sanctions may have been applied because of the behaviour of one
N.Z.P.D., 428 (Decenber 11, 1979) , p.47L5. Ihe
EhE-Waikato region, were Ivf M J H lfirrogue, Dr I
Warinq. In one otlter unusual vote in ttlat year
tml itdeperrdent nerbers agrairrst the rest of the
on the Report of the Starding Orders Coilmittee.
tlrree MPs, all frort
J Shearer ard I\4s M J
Dr Wa-l-l rrcted- with the
House during tJle debate
10.
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of them.11
The tendency to vote according to party may be taken a
step further by an examination of the extent to whj_ch l4ps
depart from the majority position j-n free vote situations.
Free votes are usually given on bills (or clauses in bills)
about which the parties have no policy which is agreed to
by their members. There are two main reasons the parties
decline to formulate poricy. some members have particular
strong views about particular subjects and to force them to
conform would be to invite cross-votj-ng. secondly, free
votes permit governments to escape the electoral consequences
of decisions (just as referenda on the sale of liquor shifts
the responsibility for the outcome).
Milne has distinguished three different types of free
vote situatiorr.l2 The most common grounds for a free vote
have been moral or conscience guestions such as capital
punishment, gambling, abortion, marriage, homosexuality and
liquor- A second type involves matters of taste without
moral or political significance. The main example is the
vote on the title of the parliamentary commissioner. The
third type arises when a party has not conceived of a question
in terms of a free vote but particurar members perceive it as
a matter of conscience.
Ivlost bills, which could be the subject of a free vote,
were not controversial and did not divide the members during
11.
L2.
see Kelson, "voting", pp-102-3; Milne, pol-itical parties, p.r4z.
lvlilne, Politica! parties, pp.142-3. F\rrther detairs of sone ofthe free@ :n tne sb:dies cited in footnote 5.
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their passage through the House. of 46 ,,potential,' free vote
bills between 1950 and 1972, only 15 produced divisions and in
two of these cases they were resorved on party rirres.13
Between 1950 and 1978 2r bills have divid.ed the House
along li-nes that were not completely party based. usually
both parties have been prepared to acknowledge a birl as
quarifying for a free vote. rn two cases dealing with capital
punishment, whi-ch was the subject of party policy, Labour
members do not appear to have been given a free .rot".14
once a free vote has been granted members may not neces-
sarily take advantage of the option. There have been occasions
where the parties appear to have given their members the op-
portunity to vote independently but none have chosen to do so.
An example occurred during the passage of the Licensing Amend-
ment Birl 1976 in which it was made clear by the Deputy Leader
that Labour members would oppose the bitf on a formar vote at
the second reading because of the principles involved, but
that members were free to vote during the committee stage on
the clauses which affected independent trusts.15
considerations which may cast doubt on the freedom of a
vote are the use of pairs for the purposes of the division and
the choice of tellers. Each departure may increase the party
erement in the voting context. The retention of pairs by the
parties is one possible indication of the maintenance of party
13.
14.
15.
Oottrell, 'rParlianrent and Conscience", Tab1e I.
Capital Pr:nishnent BilI 1950, Crjnes Bill 1961.
r,uould appear to be the Garning Anerdnent BilI of
N.Z.P.D., 408 (Decerber 10, 1976) , p.4743.
Another ocarple
1950.
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1ines.16 Despite the defection of 10 Mps (one from Labour
and nj-ne from National) on the 1953 Licensing (no U 8i11, the
use of pairs suggests that party lines did prevail for most
members and the bill was passed. where the terrers for
ei-ther sid.e in divisions are consistently from the same party
(and particularry when they are the whips) an element of the
usual voting behaviour is stilr present. For a majority of
divisions in the post-war period either three of the four
tellers, or all four, were from the same party. But between
L963 and 1971 divisions on free vote bil1s usually resulted
in opposed party majorities with each providing the terrers.
rn examining free voting it shourd be noted that con-
siderable variations may occur between divisions of one bill
with regard to the size of majorities, the arignments of
members and the couplings of tellers.
There is some doubt about the classificatlon of a few
bilIs, particularly with regard to the Labour party. There
is no difficulty with the two bills on capital punishment;
the party's position was decided by its policy. rt is some-
times unclear whether a free vote was offered and identity
of political interests determined the outcome, or a party
vote occurred. The Gaming Bill l95o has been regarded as a
case of the ratter while the 1976 Licensing Trusts Bill has
been included as an example of the former. The single Labour
member who voted with the government on the Licensing Amendment
(No 2) Bill 1953 is classified as a cross-voter for it appears
AltJrough in tlrc divisions of the Hospitalspairs are reorded, but in both cases therzIabour Party.
Atterdrent Bill 1975
leere nErnbers of tlre
16.
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that the party did not allow a generar free vote. Less cl_ear
is the Nationar party's position on the Licensing Trusts
Amendment Bill r976 which affected trusts in some members'
electorates. The Labour party charged, notwithstanding
Nationalrs claims of a genuine free vote, that the party
had determj-ned who would vote against the measure in advance.
As the defectors included several members who were not affected
electorally by the bi1l, it has been classified as a free vote.
The party elements were ress prominent in the divisions
of some birrs. The alignments usually showed either a majority
of both parties' members confronting a minority of both parties'
members or no discernabre pattern. This type of free vote
situation was more common on the divisions of the following
birls: 1950 Licensing Amendment, the 1962 sare of Liquor,
the 1962 Parliamentary conmissioner, the LgTo sale of Liquor
and the 197r Transport Amendment, the crimes Amendment Lg7s,
the Hospitars Amendment 1975, the contraception, sterilisation
and Abortion 1977 and the contraception, sterilisation and
Abortion Amendment 1979.
with a second type of free voting party considerations
appear to have intruded to a greater extent. Tellers are
usuarly based on party 1ines, divisi-ons are constantly deter-
mined by two opposed party majorities and only a few dissenters
in each case vote contrary to party majoriti-es. The 1963
rndecentPublications, Lg65 sale of Liquor | !g76 Sale of
Liquor Amendment (llo 2), and Licensing Trusts AmendmenL 1976
bi1ls falt into this category. similarly only one National
member voted independently on the 1950 Capital punishment Bit1.
7B
of the small number of bills which qualified as free
vote bills in the period 1950-1979, few were unaffected by the
considerations which normally structure voting behaviour. The
habits of members and the pressures to conform to majority
party opini-on reduced the freedom of the voting situation".17
Members of the same party were incrined to act as tellers for
the ayes or noes in voting. on most divisions few members ex-
ercised the right of a free vote. of the 35 occasions between
1950 and L97L in which all Labour members did not vote together,
an average of only six departed from the majority view and
21 divisi-ons involved five or less dissenters. of the 40
occasions in which a1l National members did not vote together
in those yearsr dn average of four departed from the majority
view, and in 27 divisions five or less dissenters were in-
volved. rn the two most recent parliaments slightly more
Labour members (an average of seven) and rather more National
members (an average of nine) made up the party minorities,
Moreover, the traditionar party alignments prevailed on
most of the 4L free vote divisions between 1950 and Lg7r. rn
61 per cent of such divisions a majority of members voted
with their party in opposition to the other p.rty.18 This has
occurred less frequently in free vote divisions since that
time. on only two of the eight free vote bills between Lg73
and ]-978 (the licensing and liquor birls in 1976) did the
divisions usually refrect opposed party majorities.
Thus H J walker describes a free rrcte he trnrticipated in as an
rccasion in vfuich he "sossed the floor oi ttre Hou,se ard rrcted
agg+Ilft lhe goverrnre+ '' (my er@rasis) "A Coverrunent Back:ffiher",PoJ-Ltl-cal- Scierce, 15 (Septenrber, 1963), p.46.
*.t"d* ah. f",* bi1ls in *rich rabor:r did rrct o<ercise a free\rcte.
L7.
18.
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The foregoing discussions can be put in a statistical
form by calculating the extent of intra-party unity and
inter-party disagreement. Rice's index of cohesion and
index of difference have been used for this purpose for
bills in Table 3.2 and periods in Table 3.3.I9 Although
the behaviour of members varies considerably between bil1s
and divisions of the same biII, and the number of divisions
in some bills (for example the Contraception, Sterilisation
and Abortion BilI 7977 ) affect the aggregate indices, varia-
tions between parties and over time are still pronounced.
The index of cohesion for the House of Representatives
on free vote bills between 1950 and 1978 was 53.3 which means
that more than three-quarters of MPs voted with other members
of their party on these occasions. The partiesr indices of
cohesion for bills vary between almost ni1 to complete unity.
They were more cohesive on bills relating to sale of liquor
and licensing although the highest indices for both parties
were recorded for the fndecent Publications Bill 1963 in
which 91.5 of Labour and 94.0 of National members voted
together (fable 3.2).
Both parties were more cohesive for the bi1ls occurring
in the years between 1950 and 1969. National's index dropped
from 74-Z in the 1960s to 55.0 in the 1970s and Labourrs fell
from 62.8 to 38,5 (Table 3.3). About half of the divisions
on free vote bills in the latter period were accounted for by
the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Bill L977, but
the indices for other bills were consistently lower than in
the previous decade.
19. Stuart A Rice, Quantitative I'bthods in PoliLics (New York: Alfred A
I(nopf, 1928) r pp.208-10.
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TABLE 3'2 rndices of cohesion and Difference
t"
Divisions Irde>r of CohesionYear Bitl N Iabour National Irde>r of DiJferenc<
I950-59
1950 Capital pun:ishrnent 2 na 94 . O na1950 Gaming l,rnenerent 1 na 62.0 na1953 Licensing Anendnent(No 2) 1 na 60.0 na
1960-69
1960 Licensing ererdnent 4 36.0 4r.o 23.5
1961 Licensing Arnerutrent 5 sg .2 91. g 73.o
1961 Crines (capitalpunishrent) 1 na 50.0 naL962 SaIe of Liquor 11 60.9 GZ.g 38.7
L962 parlianrent ConrrLis-
sioner (Gnlcrrdsnan) r 2z.o 64 .0 2I. o1963 rrdecent pr:blications 4 gL.s 94 .0 gz.g
1965 Sale of LiquorArrerdrent g 74.0 g6.5 g2.6
1968 !4atrfuronial koceed-
inqs Anerdrent I 26 .O 1OO .0 37 .0
r970-79
1970 Sale of Liquor I 36.0 88.0 3I.O
1971 Ilanslnrt &rerdrrent,(r{o 2) I 22.0 90. O 56. O
1975 Hospitals Arertrnent 10 48, B 57 .4 27 .7
I97 5 Crirres Anerdnent(honpse><udity) 2 46 .O 19 .0 30 .5
1976 ilealttrArrenrtnent 3 40.0 46.0 36.3
1976 Sale of Liquor
Anendnent (lilo 2) 10 69.0 S7.g 62.L
L97 6 Licensing T:rustsAnendnent 2 l0O,O 74.0 g7.0
1977 Contraception
SteniJ-isation ardAbortion 45 32.9 54.7 Z4.B
1977 Sale of LiquorAnerdnent I 14 . O Z.O 6. O
1978 Contraception
Sterilisation ard
Abortion Anerdrent 11 L6.7 55.7 ZZ.5
source: Journals of the House of Representati , 1950-197g
8I
TABLE 3.3
Periods
Indices of Cohesion and Difference for
Divisiorg on "Free Vote" Bills 1950 
-1978
Index of Cohesion Index of Difference
Iabour
N Irdices NationalN lrdices N Indices
19 50-59
1960-69
r97 0-7 I
34
86
62.8
38.5
77.5
74.2
55.0
I
35
B6
na
34
86
na
58 .1
31.4
l9s0-78 l-20 45 .2 l-25 61.0 120 38.5
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There the simj-Iarity between the parties ends because for
the whole period National members were much more cohesive than
Labour ir{Ps. on the averagre, about go per cent of National l,1ps
voted together on free vote birls and although they were far
more inclined to vote independently in Lhe last two parliaments
(compare the index of gO.7 for the five bills between 1963 and
1971), the party remained more cohesive than Labour.
Members of the Labour party have been more prepared to
depart from the majority vi-ewpoint on free vote bills through-
out the post-war period. On all but laur bil]s, the party,s
indices are lower than those of National. The fouT exceptions
occurred in the years L975 to 1977. rt is posslble that National
members have remained more cohesive because the party was in
office for most of the period and free vote bil1s during its
tenure were (with one exception) introduced by the Government.
The index of difference measures party opposition in
voting. rn most divisions in parliament the index equars
100 with all members of each party voting together. on free
vote bills the size of the index depends on the extent to
which voting producesopposed alignments of party members, and
the size of the majorities invorved. The highest indices
of difference resulted when members of each party were both
cohesive and opposed: rndecent pubrications Bill 1963,
Licensing Trusts Amendment Bill 1976, sale of Liquor Amendment
Bill 1965 and Licensing Amendment 1961. on some bills the
differences between the parties are sright and voting patterns
typlcally consist of aliqnments between majorities of both
parties in opposition to minorities from both parties. Ex-
amples include the Licensing Amendment Bill 1960, parliamentary
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Commissioner (Ombudsman) Bill 1962 and three of the bills on
the question of abortion. rn the single division on the sale
of Liquor Amendment BilT L977, the parties divided fairly
evenly and an j_ndex of only 6. O resulted.
The parties have maintained their differences in free
votes on bills throughout the post-war period, arthough the
index is not particurarly high. This may be largely attributed
to the tendency of Labour members to vote against the party
majority on many occasions and the general decline of party
cohesiveness in the 1970s. The index of difference was much
higher for the bi11s in the 1960s (58.1) than those voted on
in the 1970s (31.4).
Inter-Party Conflict
Relations between the two parliamentary parties in the
House are influenced by the lnstitutionaL context which dis-
tinguishes a Government and opposition and accords a position
of primacy to the former. There has rarery been doubt that
the governing party will be able to achieve its objectj_ves by
mobilising the support of its members. Because the opposition
is pubriery denied a consistent rore in infruencing outcomes,
inter-party co-operation is not encouraged. The opposition,s
rore "in the House is to resist or de1ay, by al1 means at its
command, the passage of legislation its members think harmful
to the country".29 under these circumstances, the potential
exists for adversary poritics to manufacture conflict where
20. Dr M finlay, N.Z,p.D.t 4ZI (October 6, L97g) , p.4299.
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it does not exist and to exacerbate it when genuine conflict
2L15 presenr.
The one respect in which the Opposition can unequivocally
register its disapproval of Government actions is by requesting
a divisj-on. As this course of actj-on may not be denied by the
majority party, divisions in the House provide a clear indica-
tion of the level of conflict.
During the last three decades the number of divisions
has increased in both the Committee of the whole House and in
the House (Table 3.4). From a post-war low of 65 divisions in
the 195I-4 term, the incidence has risen to a post-war record
of 616 during the 1973-5 Parliament.22 As the length of the
parliamentary session has increased during this period, it is
more meaningful to relate the number of divisions to sitting
days. Between 1951-54 and L967-69, the frequency of divisions
was less than one per day on the average. In the 1970-72 term
this level was passed, and in the two most recent Parliaments,
the ratio has been approachirg, on the averdg€, two per day.
Notwithstanding the fluctuations in the number of divisions
associated with the loss of office by parties in 1958-60 and
1961-63, the trend towards more frequent divisions in the House
is clear, and was only heightened more recently by the loss of
office again by each party before the 37th and 38th Parliaments.
Associated with the increased frequency of divisions has
been a change in the substance of the measures on which the
2L. Nevil Johnson, In Searctr of tlre Oonstitution: Reflections on State ard
Society in erita
Ttre innediate gnstroar term, L947-49, recorded 177 divisions ard the
short 29tI Parlianent, 1950-51, 89 divisions.
22.
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TABI.E 3.4
.DivisionS in part-iamen_ts 1,95I-84 to LgV6-79
-
Di.lrisions
Days of In the In Ocmrnittr:e natio ofDimisions trParliarsrt
30
31
32
3-3
34
35
36
37
38
Illnrse of, llhotre House Sota.lDiv,isions si
L95t-s4
1955-57
1958-60
L95L-63
1964-66
I967-6e
L970-,?2
L973-V5
1976-78
254
Z2:8
223
251
257
273
296
32
302
I9
2L
7s
v5
5I
67
r06
I53
224
4V
78
115
154
108
L09
26A
463
332
66
99
194
230
159
L76
365
6t6
556
.26
.43
.8'7
.92
.62
,64
L.24
l. gg
r.84
Souree: ,Jagrn4Ls of the House q Re , LgL,l-LgZg.
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House divides. rn the sessions of 1952, 1953 and 1954 there
were few recorded votes but in every case that did occur it
concerned a policy proposal. The subjects of the motions
were amendments to the Address in Repry and biIls, proposals
to reduce votescontained in ttte main andsupplementary estimates,
and opposition to the incrusion of clauses in bills. rn con-
trast' the divisions during the 38th Parliament were on a wider
range of matters, and procedural issues were prominent. For
example, 20 per cent of the divisions were on motions for clo-
sure, urgency or the reporting of progrress by the Committee of
the WhoIe.
Divisions represent more than the inclination of a minority
party to oppose a government's policies (for a few birls may
account for a large proportion of the divisions within a session);
they can also convey something of the atmosphere of party re-
lationships within parliament. There are other means of
examining the nature of inter-party conflict in the House,
and the contrast between behaviour in various parriaments.
A second indication of the increase in the leve1 of con-
flict in the House is the behaviour of members with regard to
their right to raise matters of privilege. once a member has
raised such a matter the Speaker may allow discussion in order
to establish the nature of the complaint or alreged breach and
will subsequently rule whether a prima facie breach has occurred.
The matter may then be referred to the Committee of privileges
23for a report.'
standing orders 428, 430, 431. rtre general guestion of privilege isgi-ven a mnpretrensive t:eatnent irr c p rrittlejohn ,,earlianentanryPrivilege in Neur Zealand,,, (rrrpr-rlclished LLM thesis, VictoriaIJniversity of Wellington, 1969) .
23.
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fn most Parliaments questions of privilege have been rare.
During the.first six Parliaments in the post-war period privilege
was not raised in four, while in three Parliaments a single case
was brought ,rp.24 Beginning with the Lg64-66 Parliament the
number of questions of privilege has steadily increased with
each Parliament until a total of 16 cases occurred in the most
recent (Table 3.5).
Prior to L970-72 none of the cases involved the conduct
of members of Parliament. Seven of the eight cases between
L947 and 1969 concerned possible breaches of privilege by
reports or articles in newspapers. In two cases when prima
facie cases had been established by the Speaker, the House
contented itself with discussion of the issuet in a third
case the Speaker concluded that a technj-cal breach had oc-
curred and left it at that.
The referral of questions to the Privileges Committee
became more common following two issues in 1967 and 1968
which were thought more seri-ously to lower the esteem of
Parliament: the first because it reflected on the Speaker;
the second because of the imputation that statistically four
members of Parliament lrrere homosexuals. As part of a code
of rules for handling allegations of breaches of pri-vilege
and contempts of Parliament, the 1968 Standing Orders Com-
mittee recommended that once a prime facie case had been
The 1952 instance was not regarded strictly as a breach, the 1955 case
$Jas reported as a breadr but one ttrat was neither deU-berate ror serious,
and ttre 1951 incident was tJ:e sr:bject of a notion vhich descri-bed it as
a technicaL breacjLr. According to K J Sqctt tJ:e last previor:s firdinq
of a breach of privilege prior to that of 1955 was in 1938 vilren a
uerber had, criticised tlre Speaker and Standing Orders in a letter to
a nelrspaper. Ttre New Zealard Constitution (London: universitlt Press,
1962), p.66.
24.
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TABLE 3.5
1941749 t'o L9v6-ig
t unbq of Ref,enred to Actions of
Farri.qenr 
"e=," %?rff "'H#* ffi iffi
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
I
I
L
2
3
4
7
16
1
1
I
I
z
2
4
7
L94V 
-49
r_9 50 
-51
1951-54
rg55:-,57
1958-,60
L96L-63
1964-66
1967,-6'9
L970-72
1973-75
L976-78
1
1
2
z
4
7
3
2
lrl
Sour,ee3 Journels=qf. the llouse of Repregentati_veF, Lg47_Lg7g,
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established, the matter should be transferred from the floor
of the House to the privileges Committe".25
In the subsequent Parliament (L970-72) , three of the four
complaints more directly involved the actions of lvlPs (although
one, the case of documents purportedly signed by l{r Tolhurst,
IvIP for Wanganui, was found to be without foundation as far as
he was concerned). The last two Parliaments produced a total
of 16 questions concerning members' conduct. In the L976-78
Parliament, 14 of the 16 charges involved individual MPs and
it appeared that there was a retaliatory element in the readi-
ness with which members found fault in the action of political
.26opponents.-" Thus in 1976 it was concluded in two cases that
the matters were not of sufficient consequence to be breaches
of privilege and could have been resolved by points of order
(which suggests the process may have been forestalled by the
firm hand of the Speaker). Two other cases were reported as
technical breaches. Yet in all four instances the questions
had been referred to the Privileges Committee. One further
case resulted in the suspension of an Opposition member for
one day but only by a majority decision of the Committee.2T
Six of the seven referrals to the Prj-vileges Committee
during the 38th Parliament occurred therefore in 1976 and
25.
26.
A.J.H.R., I.14 (1968) , pp.12-13.
Itre clearest expression of this was the Hon R D l,Iuldoonrs observation
ttnt:
in this Hor.:.se there is an r:rnrritten rule t}tat tatten soneone on
either side puts ttre boot in, to use a oUoquialism, rrc rnatter
what happens at the tiJre, sonetirre before very long solleone on
the other side will put the boot into him
N.Z.P.D., 397 (rray 27, L975), p.1199.
Ore nenlcer vfio r,vrent before ttre Privileges Conmittee in 1975 describedit as a "Kanga:roo Oourt". Insight prognalrne, Radio New Zealand, Atrgust
L975, guoted by Keitn Jaclcson, I'Neur Zealand Parliarentary Oomfttees:
rea1it1l and Reform", TLre Parlianentarian, LIX (April 1978), p.98.
27.
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five involved MPs. In the other sessions of that parliamentary
term the right to raise questions of privilege contj-nued to be
misused, for all nine complaints in L977 and :-978 involved
membersr conduct, but a prima facie case viras not established
by the Speaker in seven cases. oreother charge was resolved
by the claimant withdrawing his request for a ruling on a
matter of privilege.
It would appear that the Speaker may have approached such
questions differently in these latter years. This finds sup-
port in the observation of the L979 Standing Orders Committee
that the "privilege jurisdiction of the House has been used
too readily for trivial matters u.28 The Report proposed that
the complaint should be considered privately by the Speaker who
will decide if a question of privilege i-s involved before it
is raised i-n the Hous ..29
There have been a number of other hiqhly publicised in-
cidents in the last two terms of Parliament which concerned
members of opposing parties. These events need not be re-
counted h"r",30 but they indicate the acuteness of the party
confrontation in the House. Personal attacks and unparliamen-
tary language are accepted (although not necessarily condoned)
as part of parliamentary life but the events of recent sessions
have been more serious.
28.
29.
A.J.H.R., I.LA (1979), p.16.
The Rt Hon Sehqrn Llqfd, Speaker of the House of Connpns betrreen 1971
and 1976, had nnde a practice of nct ruling that a prirna facie case
existed (although auttrority for it could be found in Erskine l4ay) fe-
cause it jnplied a judgnent. "tlnited Kingdom: Cont€npt of Parlianent",
lfie Parlialrentarian I-X (July J-974') , p.2I2.
One re;nrt r,vas as follows:
In an incident apparently without precedent jl the NZ Parlianrent,
the entire Labor:r Opposition lialked out of the Chanber &:ring thefinal stages of the debate on the Supplerentary Estirnates.
"New Zealand: @position Walkout", Itre Parlianentarian, LVIII (Janua.ry
19771 , p.67.
30.
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one type of issue is worth mentioning because it has
significance for the reputation of the institution. Both in
the 37th and the 38th Parliaments the Speakerrs authority !{as
thought to have been brought into dispute. rn the heat of
debate a member may challenge the speaker, but normally relents
and defers to his authority. rn both parliaments, members of
the opposition criticised the type of rulings made by the
?1speakers."t on one occasion in rg73 the serjeant-at-Arms was
requested by the chairman of committees to escort the Member
for Tamaki from the Chamber fotlowing his refusal to withdr.r.32
The Labour opposition opposed the nomination of sir Roy Jack as
speakerr on the first day of the 38th parriament in 1976, oD
the grounds that he had defied the authority of the previous
Speaker on the last sitting day of the House in 1975, and had
been obliged to withdraw from the Hous..33
The factors which have contributed to the heightened ten-
sion in the House the political and economic crimate, new
members unwilling to accept the traditional norms of behaviour,
loss of office and personalities are beyond the scope of this
review. The general trend has been clear; the party conflict
in recent sessions has been greater than in earlier parlj-aments
and many of the disputations involved neither guestions of
policy nor matters of substance.
According to tlre Rt Hon R D ldrldoon ttris befraviour crcntinued in 1979:
rn this session .. . we have seen a contarpt for tie speaker ard
the Ctrairrmn of Conmittees that is unprecedented in my nearly 20years in the Howe ... The habit of interrrpting Irtu speaker ardtlte Ctr,airnan of Conrnittees wtren they are on their feet, ard ttre
o5:en disagreenent with their snnents, does considerable darmge,
rot only to the House in the eyes of the pr:blic, but to ttre Housein tl:e esteern of its cn^rn menbers
N.Z.P.D. , 428 (Decenilcer 13, 1979), p.4814.
N.Z.P.D., 384 (.ruly 31, 1973) , pp.2glr6-2920.
S{ by Jack had previously encreuntered opposition to his alryointnent as(hairrnan of Oonmittees in 1961 hitrictr Labour took to a division. In ttreint*vening years he had been accepted urranincr:sly both as Ctr,ai:rnnn ofOormittees ard as Speaker.
31.
32.
33.
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Each recent Parliament has produced observations about
the deterioration of behaviour. Sir John lvlarshall commented
in his valedictory address to the House that the L975 session
was the most acrimonious he had experienced in 30 years in
Parliament. The Rt Hon W E Rowling observed three years later
that in the past term Parliament had been "a sad, and in some
cases rather sick, institution. Too often in that period have
issues given way to personalities, something that is reflected
in the considerable public disillusionment with Parliament" -
Of the most recent session, the Rt Hon R D Muldoon has stated
"the House has run far less smoothly in the past year or so
than at any other time since r have been in the House".34
Conclusions
The voting behaviour of members illustrates a major
dimension of the impact of the parties on the proceedings of
Parliament. MPs have voted with their party on most divisions
which have been requested during the period examined. Apart
from the officially approved occasions for free voting, most
MPs have never voted against their party during the post-war
period. Even in the free vote situations the tendency for
party members to be aligned was often marked. Government
legi-slation was rarely defeated by the actions of members of
?qits party"- and the behaviour of opposition members never
really cast doubt upon their party's policies.
N.Z.P.D.' 402 (October I0, 1975) , p.5470i N.Z.P.D-.' 421 (October 6, 1978),p.4289tN.2.P.D., 428 (Decenber 13, 1979) , p.4815.
Gorrernnent strnnsored bi1ls (or clauses in bilts) $ftiich were the subject of
free votes and not tlterefore based on agreed party Folicry, harrc been de-feated. Exanples are: the capital punishnent clause of the Crines Anerd-
nent Bill 1951 ard ttre Health Anen&rcnt Bill 1976. Coverrurents nny ex-
perience a tenporaqz defeat because of the dtance absenteeism of an MP or
rniscalculations bV the drips. n^'o e<anples of gorernnent defeats occr::red
wittr a closure notion j:e 1949 and tJ:e T5:ustee Savings Bank Bill in 1970.
Both outcoues r,vere sr:lcsequently reversed by go\rerrurent rnajorities.
34.
35.
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on the rare occasions in which free votes occur it is
difficult for members to ignore their usuar inclinations to
vote with their fellow party members. This is to be expected
to a considerabre extent for parties are groupings of persons
with simirar ideological outrooks. party policy, whire not
usually explicit on conscience issues, mdy orientate members
towards a position on an issue, but otherwise the party stilr
serves as a reference group to which members defer for voting
cues. fndependent thinking has not been sufficiently ingraj-ned
to activate more dissent in either party. Free votes have
frequentry served to give the few with strong views on an
exceptionar issue the chance to folrow their conscience.
Notwithstandi-ng the claims of the parties with regard
to the rights of their members to exercise a free vote on
conscience i"=r-r.=, 36 it is clear that National has been more
cohesive than Labour. Nevertheless, it is stirl correct to
argue that National has alrowed members greater freedom for
independent action. Nationar lvlps have exercised a free vote
on more numerous occasions and they have been prepared to
stand against their party and cross-vote on more occasions
and in greater numbers than Labour lvlps. once a free vote
j-s allowed, however, Labour members are incrined to display
more independence in their voting.
The discussion has not speculated about the freguency of
other forms of dissenting behaviour. rt should be noted,
therefore, that on a number of occasions l4ps have expressed
their views on regislation before the House, and then either
absented themselves from the chamber when it came to a vote,
36. See Milne, Politica]. parties, pp.137-9.
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or declined to force a division.3T A practice, apparently
initiated while Sir Keith Holyoake was Prime Minister, was
for members to obtai-n "official leave" on such occasions.3S
That this behaviour is far more common than the recorded
instances of cross-voting underscores the influence of the
party. Kelson claims that "disagreement with the party in
speeches reflects only a fraction of the actual disagreement,
and even disagreement in speeches is more extensive than
disagreement in actual votes".39 A few strong-willed members
may act in exceptional circumstances, but the majority are
unwilling to depart publicly from the unified position of
the party.
Both parties have been relatively cohesive on free vote
bills but this has become less marked in the 1970s. The
solidarity of the parties j-n other respects has been dis-
turbed in recent parliamentary terms by resignations of
members and actlons by lvlPs at variance with party policy or
the party leadership. A dynamic element was introduced by
the entry of unusually large batches of new members. Their
predecessors had normally trickted in smaller numbers into
the House and been socialised more gradually into the norms
of parliamentary behaviour. The independent attitudes of
such newcomers has been refrected in divisions on free vote
bills but has rarely extended to cross-voting.
During the same parliaments in which members have been
voting more independently the level of conflict has risen.
37.
38.
For e>ang:le J B Cordon registered a "vrcice \Dte" in 1971 against ttre
oonndttal of tJ:e Nurses bill because it affected ttre hospital boardin his electorate, but took tlre rnatter no further.
One nerrber has taken "official leave" on about firre occasions dr:ring
tJ:e last fevr sessions (private conrnunication).
39. Kelson, Private trbmber of Parlianent, p.1I6.
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Divj-sions have occurred far more frequently than in the past
and on a wider range of questions. The relatj,onship between
the parties has become more constantly adversary in character.
This is not confined to voting or debates on substantive
matters. There is a tendency for partisan differences tc>
exert a more pervasive influence on the proceedings. This may
take the form of procedural wrangles and points of order which
are peripheral to the business under consideration. Some
types of business have had their character transformed from
that which was origj.nally intended.
The opportunities provided for private members to raise
constituency grievances or other issues may become occasions
for attacking or defending the Government. Private members'
bills are frequently utilised as a means of questioning the
Government's actions (and several in the last Parliament were
refused an introduction) . Private members' notices of motion
have become marked by the inclusion of partisan comment more
appropriate for debates on the proposed motions. The 10 pm
Adjournment Debate, introduced in 1962, was discontinued in
L967 because it became an occasion for g,eneral political
debate and did not provide, as was intendedr &rI opportunity
for private members to raise matters of a local or special
, 40naEure.
The purpose of the Committee of the Whole is to discuss
in detail the matter under consideration, the clauses of a
ReSnrt of ttre Standing Orders Cormittee, A.J.H.R., 1.14 (1968), P.5;
R J Harrison, "Organisation and Procedure i.:n the Nevr Zealard Parlianrent"(r:npr:blished PhD dissertation, Ohio State Unive:sit1r, L964) , p.278. The
original drange was descri-bed as sonelotrat nairrc by Mitdell for "jJr the
tventieth centurT party issues preoccr4)y private nenbers", Austin lrlitchell'
Gorrcrrurent by ParQr (Christchrurch: lrlhritconbe & Ibnbs, 1956) , P.66.
40.
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birl or the items of expenditure in the Estimates. Freguently
the second reading debate is carried on to the Committee stage
and the "prj-nciples of the Birr are reopened for discussion on
a party basis".41 rn Lg72 members were permitted to discuss
policy when considering the Estimates. what was thought to be
a minor change at the time (designed to reduce constant in-
terruption on points of order about the seope of the debate)
has led to a change in the nature of the Estimates from a
scrutiny of items of expenditure to a general debate.42
The frequency with which Standing Order Committees have
been appointed in recent Parliaments reflects in part the level
of politicar contention, but there are limits to the extent
to whj-ch the House can reduce internal tensions by the use
of formal rules. Procedural changes can restriet the oecasions
for dispute (for example the new method of dealing with matters
of privilege), but ultimatery it depends on the wilringness of
the parties and their members to regulate their behaviour.
41. L I'ta:quet, i-n Presiding offiers and clerks of ttre parriairerrts ofArrstralia .. .ffi
Standing Orders ComrLitte€ (Final Eport) 1979, A.J.H.R. , T.LA (1979)p.10.42.
Chapter 4
PROVISTON OF LEADERSHIP
The parliamentary parties were shown in the last chapter
to play a key role in the structuring of voting in parliament.
They are also responsible for supplying the leadership in
Parliament. under the New zealand system the majority parry
appoints the members of the executive, who sit in parliament
and provide the focal point for its activities, and the two
positions of speaker and chairman of commi-ttees. The member-
ship of the House of Representatives must provide both the
personnel of the executive as werl as the other positions of
responsibility in the House.
A number of constraints have operated to limit the degree
of choice available to the parties. The pattern of recrui,t-
ment is also related to the patronage which the parties can
offer members. This chapter considers the provision of
leadership in the post-war period and the conseguences for
Parliament of the form it takes.
Provision of Leadership
Most legisratures perform recruitment, socialisation
and training functions in the broader sense of preparing
politicians "to and for other roles in the political system
in which they wi-eld more power than they do as national
Iegislators" .1 In certain types of legj_slature this function
Robert A Pakerihan, "r.egislatures and political- Develotrment,', in AllanIbrnlcerg ard Llold D Dtusolf (eds) Leqislatr:res in pevelormental pers-pective (Dlrhdn, N.C.: Duke UniversG
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assumes greater significance. This occurs when the executive
is partly or wholly dependent on the legislature for its
personnel, and particularly if skills regarded as important
for the performance of ministerial rores can only be acquired
through experience in the assemblv-
A major tenet of New Zealandrs form of government is the
recruitment of the executive solely from members of the legis-)lature.- A reratively smalr number of countries share this
convention with New Zealand; most are based on the Westminster
model - New Zealand is the only country with a unicameral legis-
lature from which all members of the executive are recruited.
The rule establishing the House of Representatives as the
single source of ministers, channels ambitions. under this
system the career paths of individuar lr{ps are quite simple;
there is only one route to the highest political office, the
legislature. Parliament is not normarly a stepping-stone to
other eiective or appointive positions.3 The ambitious do not
wish to stay so1e1y as Mps for the locus of power j-s certainly
cabinet, and Parliament does not present comparable positions
of influence.
There is no structured hierarchy of positions through
which ItIPs must pass in order to attain cabinet status, although
the post of parliamentary und,er-secretary has come to resemble
Prior to 1950 rrfrren legislative effect was given to this nrle it
appears to have operated as a converrtion.
various forms of patronage are used to rgitrard faturrured senior
cabinet mj.:risters in tlle twilight of tlreir careers, ard it is
conceivable ttrat ttrey rnay have entertained long-term e<pecta-
tions of attaining a particular office r,rfiile bacldcenctrens.
2.
3.
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a first step for some members and some ministers have served
as whips prior to their promotj_on.
A number of scholars have maintained the importance of
recruitment in the parliamentary system including Bagehot who
stipulated that the main function of the House of Commons was
that of an electoral chamber which chose a ,'board of contror"
and Laski who wrote of the "serecti_ve function" of bringing
to party leadership men with the appropriate quarities to
4govern. - Aran Robinson has described the House of Represen-
tatives as:
the arena in which leaders are found and shaped.
Two processes are j-nvo1ved. On the one hand isthe individual search for power and responsibilityby members. This may take the form of aspiration-for public office or merely of the pursuil of in-fluence behind the scenes. On the other hand the
various parliamentary processes are mouldingpolitical personalitj-es and evolving leaders. Itis success in parliamentary activities that brings
a man to top leadership positions. It is parlia-
mentary experience that provi-des the basis of thepolitical skills and habits of co-operation of
cabinet Ministers,5as well as their responsivenessto public opinj_on.
The importance of parliament in the making of New Zealand
cabinet mj-nisters can be demonstrated by examining their
tenure prior to promotion. Table 4.1 presents details for
the period 1949-1980 based on the three year term. About
one-third had served as an Ivlp for more than three terms prior
to their first appointment as ministers; seven of this number
were finally rewarded after more than 15 years in the House.
4. Walter Bagetnt, Ttre Englisl Constitution (Lordon: Coll-jns, 1867 1963) ,pp. 67, 6g ard r covernment in Englard:
A Cqrmentary (lordon: Allen and Unwjn
Alan Robinson, Notes on Nevs Zealard poritics (wellington: Victoria
University of W
5.
10;0
.TAtsLE 4 .1 Tenlrr"e in the t{ew geal.and parniament Eefore
ALtaining Cabinet o.fficea 19-49-!g80
Years N
3
4-'6
7- 9
r0 
-L2
13-15
Over 15
Tota,Is
15
28
20
15
v
7
16.3
30,4
2,!..7
16. 3
7.6
v.6
100.0
Zealand Parliamentary Reeord: Suppl_ement 19
nment, Pr
Calculated from information in Guy [t Scho],ef,ield,(wettington-.
Government pr O Wilgon, New
92
Sources,:
ryoy tweJ.J.rnclton!
ocn-er sourcei.
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The average tenure was approaching eight and a half y"ut".6
Political advancement was clearly based on an apprenticeship j"n
Parliament for no member had experience of less than three years
and the majority had experienced two or more terms.
In his choi-ce of the I97B cabinet the Prime Minister de-
parted from the practice of previous years by promoting more
relative newcomers to the House. Nevertheless, the five ministers
concerned (p1us two under-secretaries) had all been in Parliament
for three years.
The importance of this convention in New Zealand can be
illustrated by comparative figures for the lower houses of
Australia, Canada, France and the united Kingdo*,7 rn the
exercise of the recruitment function some legislatures pro-
vide a government; others produce cabinet ministers. In the
former case, talented individuals may be given seats in the
Iegislature and are rapidly promoted.
The "classic view" of parliaments making ministers applies
more to Britain and New Zealand. Between 35 per cent and 48 per
cent of the ministers in the other three countries became mini-
sters after four or less years in the lower house. Over 50 Per
cent of eritish ministers had ten or more years of experience
in the House of Commons. The comparable proportion for the
New Zealand Parliament of 32 per cent exceeds the experience
'of ministers in Australia (B per cent), Canada (22.9) and
6. The average for Labour mjlisters between 1935 ard 1949 was 9.5 years.
Peter Can6)bell, "New Zealard Ministss, 1935-57", rylflignl Science I0(septenbei, I95B) , p.70
7. ltre data oomes frcm Joseph A Schlesinger, "Political Careens ard ParQr
Leadership", in l-el'ris J Edingen (ed) Political Leadership in Irdus-
trialized- Societie-s (Ner,v Yori: John w uld
ffiinger's figr:res only e><terd up to 1957-60.
I02
France (16.5). The most outstanding
of any ministerial promotions in New
to one yearrs experience (the range
was between 4 per cent in Brj_tain to
contrast was the absence
Zealand of lvlps with up
for the other countries
29 per cent in Canada).
Parliamentary experience is highly valued in the New Zealand
system as a prerequisite for executive office. There are re1-
atively few means of evaluating an Mp's suitability for mini-
sterj-al office and their performance in the House over time
provides one yardstj-ck, for ministers must spend a good deal
of time in the chamber advancing and defending the poricies
of their departments and government.
Four other types of leadership position exist. Apart
from the ministeriar positions there is a lower tier of
executive posts, the parriamentary under-secretaries. The
speaker and chairman of committees form an exclusive category
because of their specialised roles as the presiding officers
for the meetings of parrj-ament. A very different type of
office is that of the party whip; each party appoints a
senior and junior whip with organisational responsibilities
covering its tactics in the House and the management of party
membership. A11 these offices (plus those of Leader and
Deputy Leader of the opposition) are recognised. in the civil
List and awarded sararies graded according to the status of
the positions.
Two further positions have been created in the last six
years. A Deputy chairman of committees was first appointed
following a Standing Orders Committee recommendation in L974,
and the Prime Minister assigned his role as Leader of the
House to another member aL the beginning of the l-979 session.
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Both positions are occupj.ed by persons who hold other offices
(in the first case the Senior Government Whip; and in the
second, a cabinet minister).
Members may also be appointed as chairmen of select com-
mittees of the House, and to the party roles of spokesperson or
chairman of caucus comrnittees. The former office is limited by
the restricted powers of select committees and does not carry
any emolument, while the latter are more significant within
the party.
AII positions are conLrolled by the parlj-amentary parties.
The majority party selects the executive, the Speaker, Chairman
of Committees and its whips (and through its majority on select
committees, the chairmen). Other than its caucus appointments
the opposition party is confined to its Leader and Deputy
Leader and the two whips. While the members of both parliamen-
tary parties select the Leader of the Party, the Labour caucus
also elects other office holders. In the National Party, this
latter responsj-bility (with the exception of the whips) has
rested with the Leader.
By their nature the senior positions require that members
should have considerable parliamentary experience before their
appointment. The positions of Speaker (as was Seen in Chapter
2) and Chairman of Committees are normally awarded to senior
members. Organisational abilities may gain a member more
rapid promotion to the position of junior whip, and three
members (Mr Birch, Mr Prebbte and lvlr Rodgers) have been
assigned this position during their first term. While Mr
Lange became Deputy Leader of the Opposition after
serving for less than a full term the members of Labour's
"shadow cabinet", announced at the beginnj-ng of 1980,
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had otherwise all been in the House for three years. Never-
theless the convention which held for ministerial appointments
also applies to the other posts for no member of a majority
party advanced to a senior position without serving a term in
Parl iament.
Table 4.2 records the status allocated to government
members between each general election and the middle of the
following year during the period 1949-78. The New Zealand
House of Representatives consisted of 80 members for most of
the post-war period, and between 84 and 92 members since
1969. While the size of the House was fixed at 80 MPs, the
majority party averaged 45 members (57 per cent of the total)
but fell as low as 41 (51 per cent) af,ter the 1957 general
election. In 1972 and L975 a larger House exi-sted but
electoral swings produced larger than usual government
majorities equal to 63 per cent of the total membership.
Between L949 and 1966 the size of the cabinet was 15 to
L7 members; since then both the number of cabinet ministers
and total executive positions have increased, reaching 24
for the latter in the current Parliament. Notwithstanding
the enlargement of the House in the 1970s, the proportion
of Members of Parliament who belong to the executive category
increased at a faster rate. During the 1970s they have formed
26 per cent of the membership.
The two right columns indicate the rather small number
of backbench MPs remaining in the majority party after the
distribution of the various posts. From 1966 to 1978 the
number of experienced MPs has never exceeded L4, and dipped
as low as three following the 1975 general election.
TABLE 4.2 Status in ParLiament of Governmeu-t MFe
Etr-ected in General Electiens L949-197ga
year S]ze of ffivern- Cabinet ffiider- 
_ 
mj:" nitripsHsr:se nent MPs lrtirdstess Seeretaries Fositions MFsV€tdrsr Nelrt
1949 80
1951 80
r9s4 80
19,57 80
l-960 80
1963 80
1966 80
1969 84
L9!'.12 87
L97s 87
19,7€ 9,2
rcb 3
t5 3
15
l6
,l,?e 2
16 ,2
L7 1
182
20 3d
203
trg5
4,6
50
45
4L
46
45
44
45
55
55
5tr_
,2:
lt
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
tr5
23
,16
15
13
r.8
Lr!
Ltl
L2
3
Irl
I
r5
I
6
t0
5
I
7
15
2t5
9
b
e
Includes appointments na.ile, up till the middle of he year
fo.Ilowirr,g the generaL election.
W iI Folscrrir, MLC, is not i.ncl-uded.
W H Gilfespie die-d bef,or€ the session b'.e,gan; his posi'tion
w,as a5signed to an existing c.abine,t ninister.
Appointed after the eomrcncement of an eirrly sesslon'
As in lab,le 4-.L
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Political Advancement: Success Rates of I"Ips
rn determining the rate at which members of parliament
advance to higher office it isnecessary to take into account
members precluded from the seLection process through lack of
parliamentary experience. since no member of parliament
served for less than three years before being appointed to
cabinet or to any other position controlled by a majority
party, "eIigible Mps" are defined as those members with at
least one term of parliamentary experience.
rn the Parliaments between 1949 and l97B an average of
fl37 members of the majority party qualified." Of those
erigible members, almost half received a cabinet position
on the average, 53 per cent an executive post, and almost
two-thirds an appoJ-ntment of some sort (Table 4 . 3) .9 ,h"r"
is a trend during the period towards the advancement of a
higher proportion of experienced. Ivlps during each term.
This is most apparent during the last four completed terms
as an ever-increasing percentage of members reach higher
office. since 1965 the percentage has risen from 64 per cent
to the astounding figure of 90 per cent for the LgTs-79 term.
I{snbers elected at by-elections dr:ring the previous term are certainlyineligi-bIe for tie initial selections, br:t are erigible for cabjnet
changes. I\4r E Hollard is an er<anp1e. Since the r.rhole term is urder
consideration they have been jncluded as eligible Mps.
Cabinet appointnrents over all appointments to tJ:e cabinet dr:ring the
term incltding rnsrbers of the Executive Cor:ncil vtto were rnt given a
ministerial portfolio but fi:nctioned as cabj.:ret ministers. See $re
discussion and conclusion of K J Sott, The New Zealard Constitution(Iordon: or<ford Universitlz Press, 1962),
i.nchde renbers of a rninistrry: cabinet rninisters ard urder-secretaries
appointed during the term. Ttre category "trtal appointnents" incluiles
all appointnents dr-rring a term: cabinet rninisters, urder-secretaries,
speakers, ctrairnren of connr-ittees, ard vfiips. Ttre aggregations include
each irdividual by ttre highest position attained. For exarple, an MP
vfro was pronoted frcnr the position of Senior Governnent !{trip or
Speaken to Cabinet apl=ars once.
8.
9.
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TEI+E 4.3 Ap,polntmenus of. EIigiFJ_e menbers of parlianent:
By Terms for 1949-1978
Teun
uLigrible
Itrs
Ibtal
Cabirret
Agpoint{dent€
I-tlf,al
'Secutirte
.qpjntrreirts lbtalAFFointrrerrts
19,,4 9-1g51I
L951-19s4
les4-19s7e
1957-1960,
I.960-1963
I953-1966
1956-L969
Ls6s-rg7'22
Lslz-L9752
1975-1978
38
45
36
35
36
40
36
38
39
30
N
L6
15
18
16
I9,
16
18
23
2L
20
I
42
36
50
46
53
40
50
5L
54
67
N
L9
t9
18
16
19
18
19
24
24
23
&
50
42
50
46
,53
45
53
63
62
7il
N
23
2i
2L
30
23
z2
23
28,
2V
27
I
60
51
58
57
64
55
64
v4
59
90
Av.efage 1949-76 3;T
Notesl
1. Folson ![,C, a fnernb,e.r of, t]re ExecutXve CoUnCil ln J..950,is uot i.ncluded.
2. The terrns 1954-7 | Lg6g-72 and LgTz-75 had two ministries:IloLl,and L95,,4-7 ahd- Holyoake L9s7; Holyoake J,969-22 andMarshall L,972t Kirk Lg?Z-[ and RowLtng fgZe-S
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The initial appointments for the present Parliament
have produced percentages in each category which are lower
than those for the previous term because of the large number
of eligible I4Ps (42) . Nevertheless 57 per cent gained mini-
sterial positions and 67 per cent senior appointments, pto-
portions which compare favourably with the results for the
latter half of the period.
The higher percentages for the recent years are partly
a result of an increase in the size of cabinet, the reap-
pearance of under-secretaries to assist ministers and
higher turnovers of members. New governments in 1949, 1960
1972 and :-975 (but not in 1957 when the Labour Government
had a slim majority) are the main occasions for a high
incidence of appointments. Other contributing factors have
been: the death of two ministers in 1961-52 resulting in
three additions to the cabinet; and the dropping of three
ministers in early L972 following I4r Marshall's succession
to the leadership.
A systematic examination of the factors determining the
selection of particular cabinets are beyond the scope of this
'ln
chapter,^" but a further range of factors needs to be intro-
duced into the calculations. A proportion of members are dis-
qualified for varj-ous reasons. The ages of young (under 30)
and old (over 65) Ir{Ps may rule them out. In the case of the
Labour Party, caucus members have been known to withdraw
their names from the ballot for cabinet ministers.
For details about the selection of senior office-holders see: R S Dtilne'
Political Parties in Nevs Zealard (lordon: O:cford tlniversiE' Press, L966) ,
cal Leadership ard Surcession in tJle New
Zeafana National Part1r", Political Science, 27 (July-Oecefter 1975), PP.l-
24; and Keith Jacksonr"caffi Minister", in stephen revi-ne, 
,(ed), PoliLics in Nen Zeal-ard: A Reader (Sydney: George Allen & Unwjx, 1978)
pp.64-
r0.
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Rose has put an approximate figure of 5 per cent upon
personal grounds for MPs, 5 per cent on those not admini-
stratively competent and I0 per cent on those who do not
desire office.ll He calculates that between one-third and
two-fifths of aII MPs in the majority party in Britain are
"de facto" ineligible for ministerial positions. If this
factor is introduced into the calculations at the rate of
either I0 per cent or 15 per cent of eligible members,
figures of 7L per cent and 75 per cent respectively are
derived for total appointments L949-78. In those parliamen-
tary terms in which the "eligible" MPs were low relative to
the number of positi-ons to be fiIled, more than 80 per cent
of eligible members were allocated a position. For 1975-8
100 per cent of "eligib1e" mernbers received a post if the
I0 per cent factor is applied.
Another way of depicting the extent to which New Zealand
MPs attain higher office is to fo1low their careers over a
period of time sufficient to give them a reasonable opportunity
for advancement. The highest offices reached by ivlPs who first
entered Parliament during the period L946-72 are shown in
Table 4.4. Of the 132 members, 52 per cent became cabinet
ministers and 66 per cent gained at least one formal positiorr.12
Because their party was j-n office for most of the period,
National Party members were more successf u1 than Labour ivlPs;
7I per cent held an office other than that of private member.
tl. Richard bse, Itre Problem of Partta_Goverlnent (Iordon: I4acl"1i11an, L974),
pp.359-70
Itrese figures nay be mnpared with a British calculation for MPs 1918-
1955: 25 per cent had held an official position, vtrile 74 pr c-ent had
rentaixed as bacldcenclrss. P W Buck, Arnateurs and Professionals in
British Politics 1918-59 (Chicago: tn g),
L2.
11.0r
TAtsI"E 4.4 Highes,t O,ff,ice Reached by Mps Who Entered
Fqtlianenr 1946 - Lgzz
Labor:r lbrqtr Nat Onal partlr parliarrent
_Position N B- N t N I
Ministersr 26 42 ,6; 42 50 ,0 68 51 .5
Under-secretarie-s 3 4.9 3 ,4.3 6 4.s
Other positionsa 7 11.5 5 T,l Iz 9.1
MPE (of mone tlran
one tern) 20 32.8 t4 ZO.0 34 Z5.g
MFs (of, one term) 5b B,z 6 g .6 :'zc 9,1
Tota.l 51 1100.,0, 7,O 100.01 132 100.0
Notes I
a. Other positions: Speakers, Chairmen of Committees and
hlbip:s.
b. rncludes Msr"agonn a Member of, the r,egrxslat,ive counci.L
and ,cabinet rn:lnister before taking a seat in the tsouse
o,f Repriesentatives.
c. xncludes !14 Craeknell- of, the Social Credit, Farty.
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A smarl proportion of New Zearand Mps were ineligible
for consideration for higher office because they were defeated
after serving a single term. By subtracting their number (prus
Mclagon, a Labour cabinet minister at the time of his election,
and cracknerl who was never a member of a majority party), a
more realistic calculation is possible. A total of 57 per cent
were appointed as ministers during the period and 72 per cent
gained at least one of the organisational or executive positions.
The distribution of leadership positions among members of the
National Party was particularly wj-de for 7g per cent of its
members received at least one post.
Leaders and Farliament
New Zealand politicians have been extraordinarily success-
fu1 in achieving higher office. For most Mps in the post-war
period their election to Parliament was tantamount to further
political advancement (conditional upon retention of their
seats). "Far from being difficult for an Mp to get into
cabinet in New Zealand it is almost impossible for an Ivlp who
has served more than one or two terms to keep out of cabinet
if he happens to be in the winning party.,,I3 th* sm.all size
of the House j-s undoubtedry the main contributing factor,
but it is necessary to take into account the demand for, as
well as the supply of, manpower. rt is the low ratio between
the number of MPs and the number of positions which is respon-
sible for the high success rate.
13. w K Jacl<son, Ttre Nql zealand r.egjslative oouncil: A study of tlleEstablis :
Uru-versr_ty of Otago Press, L972) , p.2L4.
IL2
The maintenance of an executive system consisting of a
large cabinet, involving a large number of portfolios (between
55 and 60 since cabinet membership increased to 2o') plus as-
sociated under-secretary positions, has arlowed the partj-es
to distribute patronage widely to plps. once in cabinet,
ministers were unrikely to be removed; ministerial turnover
has been lower in New Zealand than other Commonwealth countrie".14
"This refrects the rearity that there are only a few abre men
in any party and to fill a cabinet rea1Iy exhausts the
available supply."15 rt has also arlowed the preservation of
an i-ncentive structure which rewards those who have served the
party and acquired seni-ority.
The other remunerative positions also offer to incumbents
status within Parriament and the party. other claimants for
higher office can be recognised in the short term with the
chairmanship of a serect committee. whire the "domestic"
commj-ttees (House, Library and privileges) , plus Selection
(Private Bills) are usually chaired by the Speaker, the
Chairman of Committees or a senior minister, and whips or
under-secretaries may chair other committees, this has still
left nine orten of the permanent committees for backbenchers
in recent Parliaments.
The nexus between party and member is preserved by this
ability to reward members. A small parriament offers the
promise of upward mobility for a high proportion of members.
14. Valentine Herrnan "Oonparative Perspectives on lvlilisterial Stabilityjn Britai.n", in v Herrnan ard J E /\It. (eds) cabi:ret. studies: A Reader(Iordon: l4acl4iltan, 1975), p.64. For detai
Zealard lvli-:nisters", p.70 ard Milne, political parties, p.156.
John Roberts, "C:bjret", il AIan bbinson, Notes on New ZealardPolitics (Wetlington: Victoria University o@
p.103.
15.
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Conseguently, the MPrs career and much of his behaviour is
a response to this structure and the opportunities for
success within it. There is a strong inducement for the
ambitious it'lPs to act in conf ormity with the party's ob jec-
tives in their parliamentary conduct, reserving dissent for
behind the closed doors of caucus.
The main consequence for the House of Representatives
of this pattern of recruitment is that about half of the
members of the majority party have as a first commitment a
role other than that of parliamentarian. Once those positions
have been allocated, there has usually remained a relatively
small number of experienced MPs who serve purely as backbenchers,
and the more talented members have generally been recruited to
cabinet.
The select committee work of the House has been par-
ticularly affected in the past by the shortage of personnel.
Government members with other commitments have not always
been able to maintain regular attendances at committee
meetings, while those without other roles may be overloaded
with committee memberships. Members have been obliged to
show their face at several meetings of different committees
j-n order to make a quorum or maintain the government's
majority in voting.l6
A lack of role specialisation has also been apparent
with members of the executive chairing parliamentary select
committees concerned with public policy. In recent Parliaments
Keittr .Iackson, Nery Zealard: Politics of Grange (Wellirgton: Reed
Education, 1973
Parlianent and Politics i-n Nerrv Zealard (ctrristcffic
16.
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this has involved two or three of the under-secretaries
and in one case a cabinet minister. The whips have con-
currently held the chairmanship of a committee, most
notably the Public Expenditure Committee, during the 37th
and 38th Parliaments. The most intriguing example of con-
trary roles held by one individual has been the combination
of the partisan office of senior covernment whip with that
of Deputy Chairman of Committees.
The executive presence in the House has become more
prominent in the post-war period. A majority of the ex-
perienced lrlPs in government caucuses are members of the
executive and they may collectively hold the balance of power.
caucus affords a number of opportunities for the centrarised
and hierarchical management of the parliamentary party.
The leader of the party as chairman of the meetings can
act as gatekeeper on the content of the meetings and
determine the selection of speakers. Senior members of
the party may dominate the proceedings on particular
matters .17
Nevertheless, a variety of modes of influence exist
in the relationship betueen caucus and the execrrti.r",18 and
backbenchers may countervail the decisions of the party
leadership. Austin Mitchell has outlined the reasons for this:
L7. See Keitlt Jackson, "Caucus - Ttre Anti-PaJrlianrent Systenr?n lltreParliarenlqlian, LIX (,fufy 1978) , p.161.
Roderic M Alley, "Parljanrentary Partias il Office: Governnent-
Bacldcerch Relations", in Step'tren Levire(ed) Politics in Neur
Zealand (Sydney: George AIIen & Urwin, 1978);E;98:iff
18.
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The uniform and integrated nature of New Zealand
society makes caucus a more united body New
Zealand's parties are not only smaller than most
comparable overseas units but the New Zealandparliament is unicameral so that caucus is not
swollen by upper house members. A small size can,
within certain limits, be equated with more real
pos/er because of the intimacy of the institution,the absence of any distance or barrier between
backbenchers and ministers, and the lack of a
management group or executive. Small size makesfor integration and effective secrecy where large
numbers lead to a formalisation of relationships.Finally in a more complex and sophisticated society
no one institution could be regarded as a guide toboth public and party mood as caueus can in NewZealand. For all these reasons the New Zealand
caucus in both parties can probably be regarded as
the most continuous influence on thq leadership and
government of any comparable type.19
The team ethos which prevails in the parliamentary parties
encourages the diffusion of responsibilJ-ty among their members.
At the very least the role of caucus usually extends to the
approval of bills proposed by Cabinet. In thls respect it has
acted as "a clearly defined stage in the process of legislation".20
Caucus committees may have a prominent role, depending on the
priority given by the Government to its policy area, and the
attitude of ministers. The committees may derive their
authority more from ministers rather than caucus, but as many
ministers have been prepared to share decision-makj,ng with
enthusiastic members, active committees may exercise an im-
portant influence on policy orrt"o.es.2I
The sharing of responsibility between members of a par-
liamentary party has been given its most fullest expression
19. Ar:-stin lvli-tchell, "Caucus: The Ner,v Zealard Parliarentaqr Parties",
Journal of Connonoealth Politj-cal Studies, VI (lhrch 1968) , pp.24-25.
Austin Mitchell, Covernment by ParBr p.59. See also I'[itc]re1l,
"Caucus', p-11 .
Neil Sott, "Ttle Caucus Connittee in the Decision-lthliing Process",
( r:npubl ished cons titr-rtional law serni-:rar paper, Victoria Univers iQz
of Wellirgton, I"larch 22 L977) , pp.2-4.
20-
2t.
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by National and Labour Oppositions in recent years. In L974
the new Leader of the National Party Opposition assigned
direct responsibility for some area of policy to all members
of the Opposition (with the exception of the Whips). Each
member became a spokesman for his area, supported by a smalI
caucus committee and the partyrs research unit. At the time,
Mr t"lu1doon made it clear the appointments were not shadow
cabinet ministers "their performance until electlon time
will determine what happens afterwards".22
with the largest Opposition caucus in the post-war period,
the Labour Party has taken this sort of arrangement a step
further in 1980 by introducing a two-tier system. It consists
of a shadow cabinet of 16 members, each with one or more
"portfo1ios", which meets as a group, and eight caucus committees
each with a convenor. Most members who neither belong to the
shadow cabinet nor chair a caucus committee, have the status
of spokesperson for a special subject.
In the later years of the 1970s a number of exceptions
emerged to some of the observations made so far in this
concluding section. Party cohesj-on, while preserved in the
adversary context of the House, has been challenged in the
last three years by a number of events: the resignations of
members and public differences between members and the Ieader-
ship. It is no longer true that fillingr a cabinet absorbs
the available talerAwithin a party for the recent intakes of
new MPs include many of great ability. It is also thought
22. EVsring Post, Ltrovernber 23, 1974, p.4.
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that caucus committees have become more influential. Indeed,
one experienced observer has stated that the growing power of
the caucus committees, "particularly in relation to Ministers,
bureaucrats and parliamentary committees, has been one of the
principal constitutional features of the decade".23
Leadership circulation has been higher than usual for
some senior positions. While inter-party turnover, occasioned
by the results of |'he 1972 and 1975 elections, was comparable
with that for 1957 and 1960, the retirement of one incumbent
and the death of another meant that five members came to be
Prime Minister within a four year period. Similarly, more
members have held the office of Speaker than in any comparable
period of New Zealand history.24 Both parties have demonstrated
their willingness to remove persons from leadership positions
while in opposition (although party leaders have previously
been deposed) and cabinet ministers have been dropped by
National Prime Ministers. The 1978 Cabinet was notable for
the number of relative newcomers; five members had served for
only one term.
The opportunities for political advancement have not been
reduced. by successive increments to the sLze of the House be-
cause additional executive appointments have been made and the
traditional emphasis on seniority and security of tenure of
leaders has been somewhat relaxed. ft is unlikely, however,
that the system will be able to reward all members of talent;
23. Colin Janes, "The
National Busiless
Year the 'Id.ea' Cane Back
Revier.r, 17 Decenber l'9-79,
into Politics",
p.2.
24. See Chapter 2.
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the "causus centredtr ErouPS whiCh liaVe been prominent in
E-€e@rrt years can be expected to contLnue pJ.ay,ingr active
roles.
Although th-e nrurnber of c-ltaimanships of eorunittees
has itecl,;ined in Lhe lasrt L8 years as a result of suecessive
revisions to the system, the corylrittee system has been
deveJ-oped,, ft is too soon to judge ttre effect of one
potentiaL gain for parliamer'ltary' scrutflrry, the 19?9 deoision
€o refef alL non-finanqi.al bi]]-s to sel,ect conmitteesr b'ut
backbencherS' energies wi.1l ceftainllt be more heavJ.Iy oc-
cupied by eOrunitte-e work. Although the l-ndLviduaL astions
of the Waikato trio suggest the 5lossibitities for members
w,ho may not ,expect prorotion to Cabin*tr25 tt is unli.trcely
that a "parliament sentred" grorlp wiLL ertlerge- aflPng l[Ps.
thre DFs,frcm the Waikato area bave asquiied repr$atLons fO.r.tLrcir
cnltryqli€wregs. lltr lvtirngpq, for exarple' has'b€n hi$l.V critiel
of the leck of ac$qmtabllitjl of, the e:<egtlve b Farliarertt.
25.
Chapter 5
PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview
of parliamentary business and the utilisation of time. It,
sketches some of the main responses of Parliament to the
demands made on it in the post-war period. These have taken
the form of procedural changes and the adoption of new
practices.
Some dlmensions are only
The following chapters examine
and resources.
touched on in this chapter.
legislation, committees
Demands and^ Responses
Growth in Parliamentary Br.rsiness
The official summaries of sessional business record a
variety of activities including legislation, petitions,
guestions, papers tabled, notj-ces of motion and select com-
mittee reports. These statistical details do not provide
a complete synopsis of the ful1 range of parliamentary ac-
tivities for omitted are details of debates which occupy
significant portions of the session but are not appropriately
quantifiable. The advantages of using these statistics are
that they allow comparisons over time from which can be
determined trends in the workload of Parliament. They there-
fore pr.ovide a convenient starting point for this review.
Table 5.1 records the volume of business for each
Parliament from the 30th (with the exception of the first
L20
TABLE 5.1 Parliannentary Busi.ness l-'9 52-1978
Yeare
Iegislation Petitions
Irotroclued* Preserrted.
Qrstions:Pagnrs ora1 and-. tutioes ef
maUfeA l{hittsr** Mrtion**
A. voluloe Ber Parllament
30
3I
3Z
33
34
35
35
37
38
3E3
405
432
523
5,10
5,84
603
626
747
r67
t42
114
208
L43
137
2ta;
16n
LL2
47'
54
54
69't
79A
539
674
781
893
992
1178
1350
236
26L
392
L952-54
r955-57
L,958-,60
1961-63
r'954-66
L,967-69
L970-72
L97,3-75
L97 6-7 8
B. Average Bgr Session
L226
3086
3680
480 I
7617
7572
888
2255
30,
115
14e
2'98
11 54
1'534
33
333
30-32 t_952-60
33-35 I_961-69
36-38 L970-?8
I_35
t81
2'L5
*.
rncl-ud'es al-l legislation before Parlianent in a given
session incLuding bills held over fror. a previous
sesrs-ion.
Questions and notice of motion are recorded from the
change's in 1962. Supplementary guestions are not in-
el-uded.
Source: S-ched,ules of, Brsiness,
R€pFesentatiyes.
Jorrrnals of the l{suse of
L2I
of the four sessions) I to the 38th. The main types of
parliamentary activities have either increased in the last
three decades or maintained a fairly constant leve1. Those
which have rapidly increased fill the extra time that is
increasingly devoted to the sittings of the House.
The freguency with which petitj-ons are presented to
Parliament has fluctuated over time. That the most recent
Parliament had received the lowest number for the period
does not indicate an absolute decline for it will be seen
from Table 5.1 that within each decade the number of petitions
is highest in the first Parliament and decreases with each
succeeding Parliament only to rise again at the beginning of
the next decade. Notwithstanding the existence of an alter-
native agency in the Ombudsman's office from which to seek
redress of grievance since L962, the number of petitions has
remained fairly constant largely because petitions have been used
more frequently by individuals and groups wishing to influence
public policy.2 The number of petj-tions presented per session
for the niddle three Parliaments was, on the average, identical
to that for the last three in the 1970s.
The most spectacular increase j-n business has occurred
with activities which allow the individual member scope for
initiative. Since the introduction of the new procedures for
asking questions and moving private members'notices of motion,
their number has multiplied with each successive Parliament.
The first session of ttre 30ttr Parlianent is eccluded because 1951
lvas broken b1r a general election. As ttre term lasts for for:r years
data for L952, 1953, and 1954 are r:sed. Lnrless ottren,rise stated,
ttnt year will nct be included in subsequent data.
See Larry HiIl, "Parlianentary Petitions, the ffiudsnnn ard Political
Charrge i-n Nsv Zea1ard", Political Strrdies, )O(tf (Septenbet, 1974),
pp.337-46.
1.
2.
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Almost 8r000 oral and written questions (not including
supplementary questions to the oral questions) were asked
between L962 and 1969. In the following three Parliaments
a total of 20,097 questions were asked in the House (again
excluding supplementaries) . The greatest increase in the
number of questions occurred between the 36th and 37th
Parliaments.
Both the volume of legislation and papers tabled have
come close to doubling between the 30th and 38th Parlj-aments.
In recent Parliaments members have had more than 1r000 papers
to scrutinj-se. Legislation is the most important item of
business shown in Table 5.1, for consideration of bills oc-
cupies more of Parliament's time than any other activity.
The volume of legislation increased by 85 per cent between
1952-54 and I976-79.
Select committees are not part of the formal proceedings
of the Chamber, and usually depend on decislons of Government
as to whether or not matters are referred to them (with some
exceptions as specified in the Standing Orders) . They are
closely lj-nked to the work of the House and have been in-
creasi-ngly used for business which might otherwise be conducted
in the Chamber. The growth in the workload of committees is
discussed in Chapter 7.
Detailed statistics of the distribution of the House's
time to various activities are not available but a recent
analysis of space in the New Zealand Parliamentary Debates
provides a guide.3 The average time devoted to legislation
3. Ttrc 1=rcentages are averaEes for ttre years L966-7 ard f976-7 in Table
2 of Geoffrey Palrer, IJnbridled Pcr'rer? An Inf4qpretatj-on of Nerr Zealandrs
Oonstitr:tion ard Cove
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(including private members' bills) in the last decade or
so was about 42 per cent. Debates on government policy
(other than legislation, but including the budget and imprest
supply debates) occupied approximately 22 per cent of the
House's time. Question time and discussion of the Govern-
nent's estima.tes of expenditure took respectively 18 per cent
and 9 per cent of the session. Other business (including
select committee reports and notices of motion) filled the
remaining 10 per cent.
Procedural Change
The procedures of the House are the rules which govern
the proceedings and regulate behaviour. Informal rules and
conventions also exist but their unwritten character precludes
their consideration here. Changes to procedures are usually
designed to facilitate the business of the House (more usually
the governmentrs business) or to protect the rights of the
minority and private members, particularly with regard to
scrutiny of the government. The task of general reviews of
procedures should be to maintain a balance between the two
in the effects of their reconunendations.
Frequent procedural changes can be regarded as both a
symptom of the demands on a legislature and one form of
response to those demands. Reforms may generate more work
and have unintended as well as intended consequences. The
increasing demands on the New Zealand Parliament can be
shown by the activities of Standing Orders Committees in
revising the rules governing the proceedings of the House.
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The last major period of pr-ocedural review b1r Standtng
Ordeqs Conrmittees until re,cent,ly oceufred in tlre 2,0 li'ears
between. 1890 and 19L0. Subsequett to that period such co.m-
mittees were app{tinted, at irregular inte,rval.g, usUally well
spreed in time. There were reports in 1925 axd 1929 r ansttrer
revier* 2I years later in L950 and tr*o regrorts afte.r the eJ.apse
of, another 11 years in 1962.
Since then th.ere has been a flurry of re.ports ' In 'the
14 years between 1966 and 1979 four different Standing Ord-ers
Cosmtittees hav€ baen appointed at approximately four-year in-
tefvals, held nre'e,ti.ngs in eight of those Jrear'sn ancl producad
s,ix reports. In addition, a special comrnittee on parllarnerrtarlr
cnntroL of, dele,gated legislation reported in 1962. That eaeh
connittee produc,ed gubs:tantial repo,rts can b'e seen f,rom 'bhe
U.st b'elowr
TABI.,E 5.2 Reports of Standing Orders Committees
Year
Est-a.blished
Length
Reports in Pagqg
1961
19 61"*
1_966
1971
L974
1978
L9'62
L952 (secorrd)
1962
L967 (interim)
1968 (final)
J,972
r97 4
L979 (interim)
1979 (final)
27
4
13
I6
22
l8
23
4
2E
* Del.egated tegisl-ation Cornnittee
L25
The reviews were not all of equal significance. One
view of the 1974 report was that "the amendments proposed
are for the most part minor in nature, tidying up anomalies and
difficulties that have arisen in the course of the conduct of
the House".4 Nevertheless, the frequency with which it became
necessary for the House to redefine its procedures, in such a
limited period of time, j-s a clear indication of the pressures it
was subject to particularly because of the volume of business.
A special committee of the House is not the only source
of change. Standing Orders have been amended by the government
majority without a committee report (for example, the intro-
duction of closure in 1931) . A practice may be introduced and
Iater supported by a Standing Order (for example, the formalisa-
tion in l-974 of the practice of holding bills over from one
session to another).
The review of procedural reform in the subsequent sections
will concentrate on the formal- chang,es which have resulted from the
work of Starrding Order Committees. Of the six such committees in
the post-war period, attentj-on is mainl-y conf ined to the ma j-n
reconrmendatj"ons of the reports produced between L962 and L979.
The 1950 Standing Orders Committee was prompted by the need to
recast the procedures for a unicameral legislature following the
aboliti-on of the Legislative Council. Most amendments were in-
consequential (such as the deletion of redundant rules) and one
potentially more substantial change, the interposition of a
delay on public bitls between the Committee and Third Reading
Stage, was revoked following the next committee's report.5
4.
5.
N.Z.P.D. , 395
A.J.H.R. , r.I7
(Novenber 8, 1974), p.5748.
(f951), p.3.
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Parliamentary Tj-me
The most direct response to the pressures of business
is the adaption of the time framework within which Parliament
operates. This may take several forms such as an expansj-on of the
number of formal sitting da1rs, regulation of the form of the
annual session, and the extension of parliamentary work into
the recess. Within the session a range of options also exists
for managing time or reducing the time occupied by particular
items of business.
Sitting Days and Hours
Several forms of measurement show an increase in the
amount of tj.me occupied by meetings of the House between the
30th Parliament (L952-4) and the 38th Parliament (1976-8) '
There was a steady expansion in the number of sitting days
from 209 for Lg52-4 to 3O2 in 1976-8, with a peak of 326 in
the 1973-5 term (Table 5.3). The proportions of each year
taken by parliamentary sessions rose to 30 per cent in the
Iatter term from 19 per cent in the 30th Parliament. Similarly
the average number of hours in each session increased from 402
hours Lg52-4 to a peak of 652 hours in the 1973-5 term of
Parliament. The other two columns in Table 5.3 show fluctua-
tions between Parliaments without an obvious trend being
apparent, although by chance the first and the last Parliaments
record the lowest and the highest figures, respectively, for
the hours of sitting after midnight.
The general trends in the statistics can be clarified
by combining the nine Parliaments into three groupings: L952-60 ,
196r-69 and LgTo-78 (Table 5'4) ' Notwithstanding the increase
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SABI,E 5.3 s and Eours of
L952-54 to L976-X8
fsr ParI
ParlialrEnt
' btal Da!€
of l.{eeting
'(Per
P.arliatrEnU
Total- Itrours
of ibe-ting Horrrs Pe:r HolEs after(Ave':ragp pe XvEeU[ng Midnidftt
sess:ion) (Aleragel lq
30
31
32
33
34
35
3,6
37
38
209
228
2i;23
25L
257
273
296
326
3,0 2
442
456
4VA
s13
544
544
608
6s2
620
5."17
6.14
6.32
6'.13
6. 35
5 .98
6 .17
6.O0
6.16
25
14
EO
36
66
35
83
75
153
t9s2-54
1,955-57
l-958-'50
1961-6 3
]r964-66
L9 67-6 9
L970-X2
L973-75
1975-79
TABLE 5.,4 Sittlng r{o-qrrs fqf &ree periods L952-78
AvEEagB Hours
per lffier tn
Eadr Sesslon
A\reragp
Hours Grd
Hours After
Midnight as agrotrnntion of
P'arl{anErft
30-32
33-35
36-3,9
1952-1950
19 61-19 69
L970-1978
5.58
6,67
7.29
6 .08
5 .15
5.10
4.4
2.8
5.5
I2B
in the size of the House, the hours per member (that is'
total sitting hours divided by the number of members) in
each session increased at a more rapid rate. The average
was 5.58 for the first period and 7.29 for the third period.
A clear picture is given in Table 5.4 of the data which fluc-
tuated over time in Table 5.3. The average hours per meeting
is fairly consistent with only a few minutes separating each
of the periods. The hours spent in sittings after midnight
have increased in the third period with each of the three
Parliaments recording high averages. The most recent Parlia-
ment , Lg76-8, sat after midnight for the highest number of
hours since the 1920s.
Sessions and Extra-Sessional Activities
The growth in the number of sitting days has meant that
successive sessions have occupied more of each year. The
summary in Table 5.5 of days occupied and sitting days, as a
percentage of days in the year, shows the extent to which this
has occurred.
TABLE 5.5 I,C
Total DaYs Occtryied
Tbtal Days Oeupied* D<ch-ding Adjounrurents Itotal Sittilg Days**
Average Proportion Average Prolnrtion Average Pro;nrtionper ot OaYs Per of DaYs Pe{ of DaYsparUansrts Session in Year Seision in Year Session iI Year.
30 32 t56 42.6 L26 34 - 5 73 20 'L
33 35 L6g 46 -4 r44 39. s 87 23 '8
36 68 223 61.0 L77 48 .5 103 28 .1
* Days occupied in ttre period betr,een the openilg ard dissol-ution ofparliarent. ltrree speciaf sessions opened bV the grreen in 1954, 1963
atf, L977 are rrot included.
** Ttre days on vtrich Parlianent net.
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parliamentary business in the 1950s was contained within
the formal session which occupied about two-fifths of the year'
Most bills introduced into the House, whether government, loca1
or private, were passed during the parliamentary year- Govern-
ments l^lere, however, prepared to call early Parliaments in
order to obtain endorsements for their policies.
The Standing Order Commi.ttees in the I960s considered the
question of the sessional period because of the demands of
committee work, cong'estion before particular committees, and
the needs of ministers in relation to ad^ministrative work and
members in relation to their constituents. The reports reviewed
the sessj-ona1 pattern of the Federal Parliament in Australia but
restricted their reconmendations to suggestions to the Government
that adjournments for one week could occur at intervals and
early commencements to the session "might be advantageous".6
Short adjournments subsequently increased and there was a ten-
dency for sessions to begin earlier-
Increasingly in the 1960s and 1970s parliamentary business
has been formally extended into the recess. fn L962 the new
publ-ic Expenditure Committee was empowered to sit during the
recess, primarily to survey the public accounts, and the
Statutes Revision Conunittee was given a similar power for the
consideration of regulations. Following a sharp increase in
the number of local bills in 1966 the Loca1 Bills Committee
was established for the term of a Parliament (rather than
the annual sessional period) and received the authority to
sit during the recess. Local bills received outside the
session were referred to the committee prior to consideration
6. A.J.H.R. I I.L1 (L962), p.6iard A.J.H.F., I.14 (1967), prp.10-11.
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in the House.T AII select committees came to be established
for the duration of a Parliament rather than each session
following a recommendation of the I972 Standing Orders
RCommittee. -
The holding over of bills from one session to the next
was already common before the practi-ce was utilised for another
reason:
A perennial criticism of Parliament has been the
rush of legislation at the end of the session.
This criticism has been largely overcome by the
introduction last year If973] of the procedure
whereby Bil'Is not passed during the session were
held over until the following session and pro-
ceeded with then atothe sane stage they had'
reached previously.-
The L974 Standing Orders Committee lent support to the pro-
cedure in the form of a Standing Order.
A constitutional issue arose in L976 out of a L975 reso-
lution of the House to hold bitls over to the following session.
With an election in between the House was carrying forward bills
not from one session to the next but from one Parliament to
'ln
another.tt Two questions raised by this action were the legal
right of the House to transfer business from one Parliament to
the next when prorogation or dissolution had occurred, and the
legality of select committee meetings held between dissolution
7.
8.
o
10.
A.J.H.R., r.14 (1967) , p.8.
A.J.H.R., r.19 (1972), p.11.
A.J-H.R. , I.L4 (1974), p.6.
Bills had also been carr ied over between tire 197f 2 ild 1973-5 Parli,enrents .
In 1976 tl1e Oplnsition ctpse to disprte the crcnstitutiornl- validity of
select ffirmittee neetings as a reaction to ttre lergttt of the recess-parliament was erzentrrally sunncned alnrcst seven rpnttrs after ttre elec-
tion, the latest ccmnencsnent date for the first session of a Parli'anent
since 1950. In ttris respect tlre Natiornl Coverrsnent was consistent with
the ottrer trr,o occasions in whicfr it had tvron office frcrn the lJabour party.
lltre dates of ccmnencsnent for 1950, 1961 ard 1976 were respecXively, 27
June, 20 June arn 22 June.
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and convention which included new members yet to be sworn irr.ll
Consequently, the Legislature Amendment Act was passed in I977
to enable the House to carry over business from one session to
another, whether of the same Partiament or not. It also permits
select committees to function after dissolution and unsworn l4Ps
to sit and vote as members of the committees. 12
Having gradually breached the constraint of the formal
session, recesses have been increasingty used for parliamentary
business. A number of bills are held over each session, indeed
some are introduced in the final days of the session in order
that they may be referred to recess committees. The magnitude
of the extra-sessional select committee work can be gauged from
the frequency of their meetings. In the last two Parliaments
totals of 50 and. 194 meetings were respectively recorded for
recess meetings pri-or to the opening of Parliamerrt.13
There has also been considerable experimentation with the
form and length of sessions in the last three decades. Despite
the stereotyping of parliamentary sessions as five months between
June and October,14 the sessional patterns are much more
u. L B l'larguet, "New Zealand: I?re Effects of Prorogation ard Dissolution on
Parlianentarlr Br:siness ard the Legisl-atr:re Alten&nellt AcL 1977" r .F" Table:
Trre Journal of the Society of Cteiks-at-ttre-ttouse in colnncrn".ealthEliF
Ifre 1979 Stand.ing Orders Cdmn:ittee reoonnerded anen&nents to Starding
Orders to ernble the Statutes Revision @nmitte to deal w"ittt refesals
of regmlations vrhen tJ:e House is "nct in se-ssion" ard to broaden
t}e referencas for ttre local Bills ard Public Eryerditr:re Conmitt€es.
A.J.H.R., T.L4 (1973), pp.13-14.
Obtained from the Conrnittee Clerkrs record of ccnnrittee neeti:rgs. Figures
do nct incfu.lde the odd neeting held after Parliarent has risen for the yeari
L2.
13.
L4. ttre pr:b1ic Revenues Act. 1953 enables tlre Ccvernnent to spend up to one-
quarter of tJ:e srrn appropriated by Parliarent in the previous year' As
the financial year e"ns on 31 lr4arctr gCIvermrents are rot obliged to aonveneparlianent in order to vote furtfrer 
"Wply before tate Jr-lre. Fror 
details
on the historical reasons for the sessiorrat period ard oonparisons with
Britain see: T D H Hall, "public Artnj:ristration ard Parlianentarlt Procedurejn Ns'v Zealand", Journal of Soc
Parlianents, X (I of Clerks-at-the-llbble 
in
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"o*pl.*.15 At least four patterns can be discerned during this
period, each associated with a particular ministry (Tab1e 5.6).
Five of the nine sessions in the first three Parliaments
were without adjournments. The Holland Ministry resorted to
two forms: no adjournments (L952 and the election years of L954
and 1957) or early segments to the sessions (1953,1955 and 1956)
followed by a long break of two months or more and resumption in
July or August. During the term of the Labour Ministry 1958-60,
the sessions occupied fewer days and there were no adjournments
within a session, although it convened a short session in
January of 1958, and a second session in June of that year-
The pattern under Holyoake's l4inistry for the Parliaments
1961-3 to 1967-9 was for May or June conmencements in eight of
nine sessions, which were broken by rel-atively short adjourn-
ments. Table 5.5 shows that the frequency of these adjournments
increased during these years.
In the following term (L970-2) the Government departed
from this pattern by calling Parliament in February or llarch
in two of the years. The Labour Government also opted for
February or lvlarch starts in all three sessions of the 37th
Parliament, and combined long and short adjournments in two
of those years.
The Muldoon administration adopted a hybrid pattern for
the 38th Parliament consistinE of later dates of commencement
(May or June), ro adjournment in the election year, and only a
Parlianent was oonvened in June in every year 1945-51", on 10
occasions betr,reen 1951 and 1969 ( jgrnring special sessions opened
by the Queen) , dnd i-rr tr^lo years in the 1970s. Since 1959 thefs.l sessions lasting from Jr:ne to October have been in election
years.
15.
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single brief adjournment in each of the other two years. In
this Iatter respect the figures for these years differ from
other Parliaments because the adjournments were so brief they
equalled only 4 per cent of total days occupied.
Utilisation of Time
Blondel's impression, derived from his comparative legis-
lative data, was that "where participation is highest, about a
quarter of the members or even fewer do not participate at a11".
In New Zealand it has usually been the case that a1l members
participate. What appears to be the onl-y published analysis of
Hansard, that for the 1893 session, shows that all 73 members
present recorded speeches with only seven occupying less than
10 inches of 
=p."".17
The maj-n types of activity allow a variety of opportunities
for members to participate: short speeches on the introduction
of bilIs, the more substantial contributions at the second
reading stage, question time, main and supplementary estimates,
and the set debates.
The full membership of the House not only participat.es in
its proceedings but normally in a range of activities. Kelson
observed in the 1950s that:
unlike Great Britain, where there is a tendencyfor the leaders to make the longer speeches and
the members to keep their remarks brief, New Zealand
members tend to show little hesitancy in speakingfor as long as possible.IS
16
16.
L7.
18.
J B1orde1, Conparative legislatr:res, (Hrglerlmd Cliffs, l{I: Prentice-
ILall, 1973) , p.71.
Retrnrti.:rg of Debates and Printing Comrlittee, A.J.H.R., I.l0 (1893),p.3.
bbert N Kelson, Ttre trrivate l4snber of Parlianent ard the Ftortnation of
hlblic Policy: a
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fn the following decade Harrison commented that:
members seemed to feel it incumbent onthem to speak
to the maximum of their time limit Paradoxically
the small size of the House is partly responsiblefor the circumstances necessitating this limitation.
The non-participant is more conspicuous j-n a small
House and the tendency in New Zealand, unlj-ke thatin Britain in the House of Commons, where no timelimits have been found necessary, is for every Member
' to speak on every important occasion and to m.ake hig.
speech at least as weighty as every other lvlember's.tt
The broadcasting of debates is an important inducement
for members to be heard to participate for:
it is still the belief of Ivlembers that Parliament
retains a wide audience and they are often surprised
on returning to their electorates at the weekend to
be questioned by their constituents about stalements
they have made in Parliament during the week.20
While the more able and experienced debaters are more
likely to speak at peak listening hours "the Whip must do what
he can to give all his rr,embers a f air share of these hours ' .2L
fn a typical session all members (the Speaker excepted)
may participate both in question time and in debates on bills,
and most will contribute to discussions on the Estimates. Nedrly
all members will speak in both the Address in Reply Debate and
the Budget Debate (although exceptions have possibly increased
among' senior government members anxious to move on to other
business, but who usually participate widely in other aspects
of the proceedings ) .22
19. R J llarrison, "Organisation and Procedr:re in ttre Nevs Zealard Parlianwrt",(unpubl-ished PtrD d'issertation, Ohio State Urriversitlz,I9S4), pp.189-90.
20. H N Dollinpre, "Parlianenta4r Broadcasting 1n Ns,v Zealand", The Table:
Journal of the SocieQr of Clerks-at-ttre-Tab1e in Ccnnornruealth lell:Lgnen'Ui,
2L. H J L lthy, "Ttre ble of the Vftrips",
p.50.
Political Scisce 15 (Septarber 1963)
22. Figiures obtained from a record of tlre then Senior OpSnsition.Wttip.sttowtnit onty seven Iabour nerrbers strnke on fener than 3ix occasions-in the
1962 sesiion on second readings, notices of nntion ard adjournnent
debates, Harrison, "Organisation and Procedure" , p.3'17.
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Procedural amendments designed to make more effective
use of time have taken several forms: limits on debates,
limits on speeches, devices to foreclose debates, and the
streamlining of procedures for stages in the legislative
process or other types of debate. Of the significant changes
introduced in the past, the House was still using in the
post-war period time limits dating from 1894 and 1929.
Restrictions had been considered by the 1950-t Committee
but it had not been prepared to recommend reductions in time
timits on either debates or extensionsof time to members'
speeches, although it did sugrgest that set times for debates
should be arranged between party leaders. By L962 it was
thought necessary to propose amendments (to be balanced by
creating additional opportunities for members to address the
House so that there was not an excessive reduction in rights
of speech). Major cuts in the length of a range of speeches
were made, usually involving a decrease in time of one third.
Of significance were the restrictions on the two set debates:
the budget address of each member was cut from 60 to 30 minutes
and the Address in Reply speeches from 30 to 20 mj-nutes. Ex-
tension of members' time limits were not to exceed the original
period allotted (unless otherwise giranted by the Hous") .23
The objectives of the 1962 Report i-n reducing time limits
are not entirely clear. If they included a desire to hold the
growth in sitting days and hours, it was not successful for both
continued to rise in the next Parliament. It would appear that
an effort was being made to raise the standard of debate, by
A.J.H.R., r.17 (1962),ffiiImit on Address
1967 ard 1958 reports.
pp.1l-12. The restoration of tlre 30 minute
in nepfy speeches was rejected by both the23.
r 37
encouraging members to present more cogent speeches in shorter
times. Immedj-ate effects of the change, observed by Harrison'
were improvements in the quality of debates and reductions
in the tedious repetition.24
Subsequent reports have given more emphasis to limiting
the time allocated for debates. Two changes introduced in 1967
were designed to reduce time "wasted" on diScussj-on Of Select
committee reports on petitions. In future only petitions which
were reported with no recommendation were to be discussed in
the House, and the debate was to be limited to orr" horrt.25
In 1967 it was also recommended that discussion of private
membersr notices of motion be confined to one hour with individual
contributions reduced from 15 to l0 minutes in order that two
motions could be considered in one duy, a greater number of
members could participate and more motions could be dealt with
in a session. The length of the debate, and the speeches of
members other than the mover and next speaker, were halved in
Lgl 4 .26
The 1972 Committee approached the question of saving time
by reviewing the allocation of time to types of business. The
number of days for discussing the Main Estimates was fixed at
16. It also proposed the overall control of each stage of
debate rather than further reductions in members' individual
24.
25.
Harrisonr "organisation and Procedure", p.190.
"parlianentary Tirre: New Zeal-and", The Table: the Journal of ttte-hiety
of Clerlcs-at-the-Table in Connonroea ;
A.J.H.R., I.LA (1967), pp.6-7i A.J.H.R. 
' 
I-I4 (L974), P.7.26.
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time, and suggested a Whips Committee which would allocate the
time spent on each debate (thereby supplanting the normal time
limits) with the details being stated on the order p.p"t.27
According to the 1979 report this arrangement worked until 1974
but had rarely been used since; it extended an invitation for
this function to be t."rr*"d.28
The distribution of time for the introduction of govern-
ment bi1ls was considered by several committees in order to
simplify the procedures and improve the debates. These reviews
led to the fixing of a time-1imit of two hours for the debate
in L974 and the reintroduction of specific time-Iimits for
categories of speaker in Lg|g.29 Third redding debates have
also been problematical because of the
tendency for members to stray widely over the
subject matter of the 8i11, covering the prin-
ciples of the Bill and matters raised in the
Committee of the whole House more comprehen-
sively llran is appropriate for a third readingdebat6. 30
By cutting the time limit of members I speeches from 15 to 10
minutes, their length in 1980 became one-third of that which
prevailed before the reduction made in L962.
A number of other alterations have been made to stages j-n
the legislative process in order to streamline the procedures.
When select committee reports or bills do not recommend major
amendments, the bills are now considered in toto by the
Committee of the whole House. The report stage has become a
27.
28.
29.
30.
A.J.H.R.,
A.J.TI.R.,
A.J.H.R.,
A.J.H.R.,
I.19 (L972), pp.10-11.
r.14 (f979) , p.14.
I.14 (]-:974), P.7; A.J.H.R., I.I4 (1979) ' P'5-
I.14 (1979) , p.8.
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formality with the abolition of delay in 1952 and of debate
in 1972. The latter change was made because of the overlap
between this stage and. the third. reading.3l other time-
saving changes have involved the procedures for consideri-ng
financiar propos.l". 32
One other means of saving time has been raised in the
discussions of Standing Order Committees, the recording of
votes by a facility other than divisions. The I95I and 1967
Reports rejected proposals for mechanical recording of voting
(the latter was influenced by the possible cost of installing
the equipment). The Interim Report of the 1978-9 Committee
recoilrmended an increase in the period for which division bells
ring in order to allow ministers to proceed from their
offices in the Beehive to the Chamber, but declined to supPort
the use of an electronic voting method.33
One respect in which the House has yet to set limits is
on the lengths of the set debates on the Address in Reply and
the Budget. They deserve more attentj-on because of the time
they have occupied in the session.
The Address in Reply debate, as the response to the
Governor-General's (or the Queen's) speech at the beginning
of each session has two distinctive characteristics. First
it provldes members with the first opportuni-ty to address
the House in the new session. Secondly, the Governor-Generalrs
speech on behalf of the Government reviews the domestic and
31.
32.
33.
A.J.H.R. , T.I7 (f962), P.14; A.J.H.R., I.19 (L972), P'10'
A.J.H.R., I.I4 (1968), pp.8-I0.
A.J.H.R., I.14A (1979), P.3. In sessions with nrrrerous divisions,ffi-possible that tlre equivalent of several days might be saved'
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international situation, Government attitudes towards various
matters, and foreshadows its intentions to introduce bills as
part of the legislative progranrme. As this speech may range
widelyr So may members cover any matter in their speeches,
lrhether it pertains to their constituencies, the nation or
international questions. The content of their speech may
not relate to the speech from the throne, supposedly the
rationale for the replies from *.*b.t".34
There are certain matters common to most speeches. It
is usual to pay homage to certain persons the Governor-General,
the Speaker, another member's speech, the initial mover and
seconder of the Address j-n Reply (often new members delivering
their maiden speeches in the first session of a new Parlj.ament).
It4embers have not been inclined to heed the ad.vice of the :.967
Standing Orders Commi-ttee that:
the traditional repetition of congratulatory
references made at the commencement of speechesin this debate tended to eat into the members'
time and to become tedious and might well
be confined to the Leaders.35
More experienced members may structure their contributions by
maintaining a theme or returning to debate the virtues or
defects of the Governmentrs past actions or proposed policies,
In this respect ttre debate departs from the traditional natr.rre of debate
as it occurs in the United Kingdom. The trnttern there is for a general
debate on tfie mverffnent's programre to be follorcd by debates on OP-
position anerdnents to the proSnsals. bbert Borthwick, "QLresLlons ard
Debates", in S A Walkland (ed) llhe House of @nnrcns in ttre T\rrentj.eth
\-eu* lEnbers of
trDSSlJf,re rn
14) ((J)<rorxt:
Zealand to
ar
Proqs,
rrnve an amenfrnent for the addition of rrrcrds to the proposed address,
but this ourse of action is nct always resorted to. H N tollinrrre, E
Parlianent of Nevrr Zealand and Parlianent House revised ed (Wellington:
"Organisation ard Procedure",p.363. The roving of tfie anenftrent rury encourage nenrbers to address tltsrr
selves to the reasons for the lacl< of confidence in the Coverrrrent but
does rpt really affect the free-ranging natr:re of the debate.
A,J.H.R., I.14 (1967) , p.6.
34.
35.
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but more usually the debate degenerates into a wearying rep-
etitj-on of the same formaliti-es, details about constituencies
and multifarious meanderings across policies, issues and
other matters.
The debate used to continue over six or seven sitting
. 36days,-- but in 1971 and 1973 it ranged respectively over 9
and 1I sitting days in early segments of the session. In 1979
13 days were spent on the Address in Reply debate. Its length
has been extended in part by the increase in the size of the
House. In some sessions all members present, with the exception
of the Speaker, speak at length within their time limits in the
debate.
The other set debate is regarded as the main debate of
parliamentary session. Following the presentation of the
budget address, the second reading on the Appropriation Bill
takes place in which each member has the opportunity to speak
for 30 minutes. The broad nature of the financial questions
and policies raised in the Budget permits members a wide scope
in their speeches. It is possible to touch on almost any
aspect of the Government's administration, although items on
the Estimates cannot be discu=""d.37 In the Lg73 session the
Speaker disallowed two motions by the Opposition for the ad-
journment of the House in order to d.iscuss matters of urgent
public importance, because the Budget debate (to be continued
on the same days) offered members the opportunities to raise
the i="rr.=.38
36.
37.
38.
H N Dollinore, Ttre Parlianent of Ner,y Zealand ard Parliarent House(Wellingrton: Co
N. Z.P.D. 383 (June 26, L973) , pp.l635-6.
N.4P.D. 383 (,:une 26t 1973), pF.I63I-2; and 384 (,:ufy 10, 1973),
fr12r-:
L42
Amendments may be moved during the debate but unlike
amendments which are proposed in the Address in Reply debates,
they have the effect of limiting the debate to the provisions
of the amendment. Until the motion is resolved by a decision
of the House members would be expected to address themselves
to it, and then return to the general debate.
The Opposition in 1973 (and also in L974) chose to move
an amendment when about three-quarters of the debate was com-
pleted and nearly all Opposition members had spoken. This
permitted members who had already contributed to the Budget
debate to speak for another 30 minutes on the subject of the
amendment. As one Government member noted on thepenultimate
day of the J-973 debate, the Opposition extended the potential
time of the debate from the possible 43 hours or so if the
86 members spoke, to a possible 86 hours. The Speaker reported
to the House that 12I speeches were delivered during the debate.39
The debate
or eight sitting
for the bill was
on 1B different
speak nearly all
continued on 17
was nornurlly conducted over two weeks on seven
days. In this respect the 1973 debate differed
finalty read a second time after being d.ebated
days. of the 86 members in 1973 e1i9ib1e to
chose to do so. In L979 the Budget debate was
40sitting days durlng a five-week period.'
Private Members and Scrutiqy.
Of all the post-war committees on Standing Orders the
Algie Committee (L962) gave most attention to the private
39.
40.
N.Z.P.D., 384 (Ju]-y 17,
See d.iscussion N.Z.P.D.,
1973) , pp.2350 ard 2392.
425 (septerber 5, 1979), p.2798-9.
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member. To a considerable extent subsequent reports have
modified procedures first introduced then. Its report ex-
presses the desire of the committee "to extend the rights
of the private member" because
the gradual extension of State activities and
the ever increasing volume and complexity ofparliamentary business has made it necessary
for more and more time to be taken by the
Government for the introduction of its business
at the expense qf the legitimate claims of theprivate *-"mbet.41
The wide seope of its recommendations covered question time,
debate on private members' motions, private members' bills'
discussion of papers and adjournment debates. The last two
can be dealt with briefly because they were not successful.
The Committee urged the Government to provide more fre-
quent opportunities to discuss parliamentary papers, particularly
those published. in the Appendices to the Journals' Governments
since then have rarely allowed occasions to debate parliamentary
papers, and the Committee's wish that greater interest in
government departments should be promoted was not ful-filled
through this *".rr".42
',One of the most valued rights of private members" in
other Commonweatth parliaments was, according to the Algie
Committee, the daily half-hour adjournm"rrt.43 This opportunity
provided a safety valve for members dissatisfied with ministerial
replies or wishing to call for the redress of a grievance ' A
10 orclock adjournment debate, a modification of the British
practice, was subsequently introduced on Tuesdays and Thursdays'
A.J.H.R. , r.L7 (1962), p.18.
ibjd., p.10.
4r.
42.
43. ilcid. , p.18.
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Notwithstanding the virtues whj-ch these occasions had
elsewhere, they did not work in the New Zealand context. fn
the first session of its operation, Harrison observes that
deficiencies were already apparent for "in contrast with
British practice most of the matters raised are general
political rather than local or personal" and the debates
were frequently poor.44 The 1968 Report observed that the
debate had not fulfilled the intentions of the 1962 Comrnittee
by being used to discuss questions of local and topical in-
teresti on the basis of a reconmendatj-on in its Interim Report
these special debates were abolished.45
Prior to L962 questions were delivered orally without
being subject to the screening of the Speaker and notice was
not given to the minister of their content. Written replies
were made available on Supplementary Order Papers on Wednesdays
and could be discussed by members following the adjournment of
the House. The procedures provided for all questions to be
open for debate at the same time. Members were able to speak
for five minutes wj-thout the option of supplementary questions
or the expectation that the minister would r."pond.46 The
L962 Standing Orders Committee concluded that this system
was unsatisfactory and recommended a new system modelled on
that of the House of Commons.
Under the revised procedures there are four types of
questions: questionsfor oral answer, questions for written
44.
45.
46.
Harrj-son, "Onganisation and Pnocedure", pp.278 ard 284.
A.J.H.R. , I.I4 (1967) , p.4i A.J.H.R. , I.l4 (1968), P.5.
Ihe pre-1962 question tilne is discussed in nore detail b1z: Kelson,
Prirrate lEnber, pp.69-70; llarrisonr "Organisation ard Ptocedure",
W, {rfrt NeiI Dollirrore, "Parliarentarl' Questions", EtteParlisrentarian, L (July 1969) , pp.241-3. See also Ro,b1m !!o.n!in-ElilGEons in tjee House b-t nepresentatives", (ulpuff isneapolitiial-Scierce research paper, Victoria University of Wellington,
1967) .
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answer, urgent questions and questions addressed to a private
member. A daily question period was introduced which was
thought:
would increase the accountabil-ity of Ministers toParliament and with the introduction of limited
supplementary Questions would ensure a much more
effective means of seeking information or pressingfor I'{inisterial action in relation to public matters A-7for which Ministers were administratively responsible.='
Notice is now given of oral questions which allows
ministers to prepare replies and the Speaker to scrutinise
their content, The period for question time was set at 30
minutes and they became a regular feature by occurring on
most days of the parliamentary session. The system was ex-
tended in L967 to incorporate an element of the former question
procedure. Written questions and answers, and such oral and
urgent questions as ordered by the House, were transferred to
a supplementary order paper and discussed for one hour on
alternate Wednesday afternoons.
Supplementary questions from any member are permitted
during question time. For the initial months of the new
system the number of supplementary questions was approximately
egual to the number of question". 8 An average of two supple-
mentary questions were asked for each original question in
1970 and a figure of 2.7 supplementaries per question was
derived for Lg73.49 If itcanbe assumed that these averages
prevailed for aII question times in those years about 4398
questions r^tere asked in 1970 and about 5554 in 1973.
47.
48.
49.
Report, A.J.H.R., I.I7 (1962) , p.B.
Harzj-sonr "Organisation ard Ptrccedure",
Based on tlre first se\ren guestion tines
p.266.
in eactr of tlpse years.
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Supplementary questions continued to present difficulties as suc-
cessive committees sought to devise guidelines for the Speaker
in an area where discretion rather than rule was thought neces-
sary. The 1-967 Standing Orders Committee suggested that three
supplementaries should be sufficient for important questions.
But as the practice developed of each question being followed
by three supplementaries, the I974 Committee recommended that
numerous additional questions should be allowed on a question
of major importance in the hope that minor questions would not
attract a supple*"rrt.ry. 50
Because of the interest in asking questions extensions to
the time available became common. In both the 1970 and 1971
sessions a motion to this effect was moved on about 40 occasion".51
The House finally acknowledged the demands on question time by
extending the period to 40 minutes in 1974.
Question time has been a successi since L952 the number
of written and oral questions asked in Parliament has increased
dramatj-ca1ly. In the first two years of the new system an average
of 613 questions was asked. During the term L975 to L978 a total
of 7590 oral and written questions was asked. For oral questions
this represents an increase from 545 in 1962 Lo a mid-term peak
of 1819 in 1977. Increasingty oral questions have had to be
transferred for written answers because they could not be asked
in question time (they numbered 47:-. in L979).
In the use they make of guestion time members' behaviour varies
between those who ask no questions to those who ask more than 100 in a
session. ft is not always clear what motivates members to par-
ticipate in question time. The "King of Quiz" has been a "tit1e
50. A.J.H.R., t.L4 (1967), p.5; I.19 (L972\, P.7; I.14 (L974), P.5.
51. N.Z.P.D. , 382 (I\4arctr 7 | 1973), p.543.
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unofficially awarded by the press and fellow members to the
MP asking the most questions in a session. ivlr P Blanchfield
was reported as producing eight questions on the last day of
Parliament in 1972 in order to win the "title" with 73 ques-
tions from his colleague IvIr iI Hunt with 70. Dr I Shearer
claimed a "hat trick" for asking the most questions in three
successive sessions including 158 in Lg7g.52
There is some doubt as to whether the best use is being
made of this time. Government backbenchers have made increasing
use of their ri-ght to ask questions; in fact the most frequent
questioners of recent years have been Government l"lPs. There is
a tendency, particularly with supplementary questions, for the
period to be used for attacks on and defences of the Government
rather than ef f ective scrutiny. A former senior lvlember of
Parlj-ament has criticised question time for providing "a plat-
form for departmental platitudes" rather "than subjecting
Ministers to searching scrutiny of their competence and grasp
of their job". He attributes this in part to the failure of
oppositions "to come to grips with the tactic of supplementary
questions" but mainly to restrictions imposed by the Speaker
on the relationship of the content of the supplementary to
the original .r"rur.53
Following the inLroduction of a discussion in 1962 of
private members' notices of motion a massive increase in the
number of motions has occurred. Successive Standing Orders
52. Otago Daily Tines, October 23t 1972,
18, 1979, p.10.
Hon Dr A M Finlay, sutmission to thepp.5-6. Ttre Report of the trubliciQr
served that the "inspired question",
of Questj-ons and Ansvers for use intice, bottr i.tr our Parliarlent and in
r.14 (1969), p.6.
p.4; Otago Daily Tirres, Decernber
1979 Starding Orders Oormitt€e,
Division Oomrlittee of Inquiry ob-
"tlre preparation by departnents
tJ:e House is an established prac-
tlre Hor:se of Connpns". A.J.H.R.,
53.
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Committees have been exercised by both the form of the
debate and the nature of the motions moved. ft became
necessary to impose restrictions on the debate, a limit
of one hour per motion (and a reduction in the lengrth of
members' speeches) , which had the advantage of allowing
discussion of two motions on Wednesdays and L4 (rather than
seven) during each session. In I974 it was recommended
that debate on each motion be halved, and the time of members
(other than the mover and the next speaker) hras cut to five
54mLnuEes.
The content of the motions has posed a more intractable
problem for reviewing committees. Already by L967 the order
paper had "become overloaded with a large number of motions
which, though they might have a publicity or propaganda value,
could never in fact be reached for discussion".55 The LgTg
Report reaffirms the importance of the notices of motion as
a "vehj-cle for critical examination by the private member of
the actions and decisions of the Executive" and for the op-
portunity it provides for a short debate, but criticised the
content of notices. A set of rules drawn up by the :-.974
Committee was amended with respect to the form and content
of the noti..=.56 rt remains to be seen whether regulation
by Standing Orders (rather than self-regulation by lvlPs) can
improve the motions. In the view of many observers the
right has been misusedi aceording to one they have become
a "grotesque burlesqueu .57
54.
55.
56.
57.
A.J.H.R. , I.L4 (L967) , p.6; A.J.H.R. , t.IA (L974) , P.7.
A.J.H.R. , I.14 (1967) , p.6.
A.J.H.R., I.14 (L979), p.15.
Hon Dr A M Finlay, subrlission to tlre 1979 Standing Orders
Cormittee.
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Private members' business is given precedence on
Wednesdays and Thursdays until the Government takes pre-
cedence for its business. Members have been inclined to
use these limited opportunities for continuing the partisan
debate (with some notable exceptions in relatj-on to private
members' bills) . The present arrangement whereby two types
of private membersr debates - on ministerial replies to
questions, and on notices of motion - are held on alternate
Wednesday afternoons, \das endorsed by the latest Standing
Orders Committee. Private members bitls have more recently
increased in number, and the 1979 Report recommended changes
in order to provide for a "concentrated" debate on their
58introduction.'
Prior to 1962 there was no provision for regular parlia-
mentary scrutiny of delegated legislation by select cornmittees,
although a special recess committee had been appointed in L947
to examj-ne the retention of wartime regulations,59 and the
Goldfields and Mines Committee occasionally reported on mining
or petroleum regulations.
In L962 the House accepted reconmendations of a Delegated
Legislation Committee, established for the purpose of intro-
ducing some form of parliamentary control. Although select
committees in the United Kingdom and Australia had been em-
powered to examine delegated legislation, the committee rejected
the necessity for this in New Zealand because of its satisfaction
with the staff concerned with the drafting of regulations. The
58. A.J.H.R., r.t4 (1979) , p.5. Private nenbers' bills are consideredlnEapter 6.
John E Kersa11,(Iordon: Stevens59. Parlianen of lation
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Committee acknowledged the desj-rability of making regulations
available for debate and proposed that they should be tabled
in the House, and that the Statutes Revision Committee should
assume the role of scrutinising delegated legislation referred
by the House during the rece==.60
The extraordinary aspect of these provisions is that
virtually no use has been made of them; between L952 and 1976
this procedure was used on only one occa=iorr.6l This is not
solely a question of laxity on the part of governments for
the procedures governing referral of regulations provide pos-
sibly the only opportunity for oppositions to formally initj-ate
public business for a select committee. Standing Order 379
requires the Committee to meet if a requlation is referred to
it with the support of five members.
Public concern with the growing use of regulations by
.62governments-- has created more awareness on the part of
members of the need for scrutiny. The Statutes Revision
Committee reported to the House on two regulations in both
1977 and 1979. The Road Safety Committee has given some
attention to regulations as part of its policy reviews. The
role of the Statutes Revision Committee has been enlarged to
allow it to initiate its own inquiries,53 and already in
1980 the Committee has reported twice.
62.
Itre Retrnrt failed to note that by cornrention the Statutory Instn:nents
Conmittee of the House of Connpns in the United Kingdom has an @posi-tion rnenicer as Ctrai-rrnan. Harrison, "Organisation and Procedure", p.305.
In ttre reantirre the successor to Goldfields ard Mines, the Labour and
Mining Cormittee, crcntinued to receive regulations for consideration,
but at a rate of less ttlan one per session.
For details about the use of regulations in Nenr Zealand see Palner,
Unbridled Povier, Chrapter 8.
60.
6I.
A.J.H.R., I.14 (L979t, p.13. Ttre Prine tfixister recently obsenred tiatTE-6-nscioris effort has been rnade ttris year by ttre Attornq$eneral to
rerrDve tlre dead vrood anung regulations"-. N.Z:P.D_., 428 (Oecerrber L4, L979) ,
p.4837.
63.
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The procedure for discussing the Estimates has regularly
been the subject of reviews by Standing Orders Committees.
Apart from giving the Government the right to take precedence
for the Estimates twice a week, the main changes have been
directed towards improving the debate by fixing the number of
days allocated for this purpose and expanding its scope. The
1967 Standing Orders Committee noted the differences between
the House of Commons and the House of Representatives. In the
former House members were permitted to discuss matters of policy
and a fixed period was allotted for the discussion (although
not all classes of Estimates couLd be discussed within the
allotted time). The Conrnittee favoured continuing the New
Zealand practices of allowing every class of Estimate to be
discussed and excluding policy matters with the exception of
references to the annual reports of government departments
where relevant.64
The subsequent Standing Orders Committee adopted the
procedures its predecessor had rejected. Sixteen days were
allotted for discussion of the I'lain Estimates and the Opposi-
tj-on was given the right to choose the classes of Estimates
it wished to discuss; those classes not covered in the debate
were to be passed at the end of the allotted time. The Com-
mittee also recommended that members should be permitted to
discuss policy during the Estimates debate.65
according to the L979 Standing
the debate:
This latter
Orders Committee,
change has,
transformed
(1967) , p-1.
(19721, p.Il.
64.
65.
A.J.H.R., r.14
A.J.H.R., r.19
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ft was thought at the time that this was a
relatively minor change which would enable
Committees of the whole House to carry out
their examination of the Estimates without
continual interruptions for points of order
on the scope of the debate, but the effect
of the change has been more marked. It has
changed the whole character of the Estimates
debate from an examinatj.on of items of expen-diture to a general discussion, ggnging from
items of detail to broad policy.bo
The Committee declined to revert to the more restricted
debate because it would rej-ntroduce disputes on points of
order. In proposing the continuance of the present procedures
(apart from confirming the right of the Opposition to terminate
the debate on each vote) it exhorted members to give proper
attention to expenditure and departmental work.
Conclusions
The main emphasis of the procedural changes reviewed in
this chapter has been on adjustments to parliamentary time.
The growth in the busj-ness of the House, particularly legisla-
tion, has been at a faster rate than could be accommodated by
streamlining measures. For this reason the length of the
session will continue to expand and the extra-sessional work
of members will increase.
A number of reforms had unintended consequences largely
because members are primarily concerned with debating differences
between the Government and the Opposition. Items of business
(such as parliamentary papers or regulations) which have not
provided means of continuing this debate, have been ignored.
Private members' time has been utilised for party strategies
A.J.H.R., r.14 (1979), p.10.
p.4285.
66. Cf also N.Z.P.D., 42L (October 6, 1978) |
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in the House. The detailed scrutiny of Estimates votes becomes
an occasion for debating PolicY.
One major effect of developments in parliamentary business
in the post-war period can be seen in Table 5.7 . Between L956-7
and Lg76-7 Parliament's time, in percentage terms, has been re-
d,istributed frorn some types of business to others. It would ap-
pear that the absolute time devoted to some forms of business has
not changed much. The extra time available in the longer sessions
of recent Parliaments has been taken by the growth areas.
The most significant trend has been the rise in the
amount of time spent on legislation from 27 per cent (1956-7)
to 45 per cent (Lg76-7\. The time lirnits on members' contribu-
tions to the two fixed debates have contributed to the declining
proportion of the category "general government policy" as the
length of the session has expanded. According to Palmerrs
classification, the time Spent on questions and answers doubled,
and, after legislation, was the most important business of the
House, With the fixing of a time limit on the days allotted to
Estimates, the expenditure category has fallen between 1966-7
and 1976-7.
The figures for private members' bills are probably
atypical for the last two Par]iaments.6T Palmer notes that
preliminary figures for 1978 indicate "a reduction in the amount
of time spent on legislation, but a corresponding increase in
time devoted to private members' bills".68
67.
68.
See (hapter 6.
Palrer, Unbridled Pcn'rer, P.47.
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There is every reason to assume that the trendsdiscussed
so far will continue. In the first session of the 39th
Parliament (1979), the House recorded the largest number of
meeting days (113) of any first session in the post-war period-
New records for questions and notices of motion should be
established for already in 1979 3381 oral and written questions
have been asked and members have moved 780 notices of motion.
The highest nurnber of petitions since 1970 was presented
during the year (although this may reflect the nine-yearly
peak previously noted). Somewhat fewer government bills were
introduced and passed than in 1976 but with the relatively high
number of, local and private bills, a record number of bills
was before the House in L979 for a fi-rst session in the post-
war period..
The length of the session is unexceptional in itself'
but when placed in relation to the size of the legislature it
assumes a special significance. This can be shown by relating
the number of members to the hours of the session in comparison
with other legislatures. It would seem apparent from the
length of sessions in post-war Parliaments, that between 400
and 650 hours would allow members a reasonable opportunity
to take part in the proceedings.
The extent to which these opportunities exist in New
Zealand was first suggested by a comparative survey of 24
Iegislatures which calculated the amount of time per member.
Countries with the Brj-tish parliamentary system formed the
group with the highest amount of time per member. Jamaica and
New Zealand were distinguished within this group as the two
which gave more than four hours per member. New Zealand's
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position at the top of the list was more exceptional because
the figure which the average member would have at his disposal
if the total time of the House was evenly divided, amounted
to al-most seven hott".69
The more recent details shown in Table 5-8 show that
New Zealand is still well ahead of the field. The legislatures
based on the British parliamentary system have longer sessions
in relation to the number of members than do the other
assemblies. The rank order for sessional time in the par-
liamentary system conforms with that for their relative s izes,
with the New Zealand session (using Hermanrs figures in Table
5.8) equalling 82 per cent of the Australian, 62 per cent of
the Canadian and 38 per cent of the British legislatures.
The average time per member exceeds that for Australian MPs
by 1.1 hours, canadian l4Ps by 3.3 hours and British lvlPs by
4.4 hours. Notwithstanding the increase in the number of
members to 87 in the New Zealand Parliament the total session
time averaged per member was sti1l close to seven ho,.tt".70
The most conspicuous failure in relation to the utilisa-
tion of time has been in the manaqement of the flow of business
during the parliamentary session. The sessional pattern is
first for the Address in Reply debate and then the Budget
debate to be disposed of, leaving the remainder of the year
largely for the Government's legislative programme.
J Blondel, Con[nrative Legislatr:res, p.59. About half the total tire
in parliaren be taken b1r mi-n:isters (p-70) .
Ttre figr:re for Nen Zealand in tie Table appears to be the average for
tlre years Lg6g-l1973 and therefore inch:des tlrc election year sessions,
traditionally ttre shortest in the parlianentarlz cycle' Ttre average
lengttr of the sessions for the L97O-72 term rms 608 hours and for tlre
L973-75 term was 652 hours or Per capj-ta averages for nenbers respec-tively of 7.25 and 7.5 hours. Cf also tJle postruar figures in Table
5.4 .
69.
70.
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EAEIIE 5.8 Trlne Ber Member in $eJ-ecte€ Legislature,s
Length of fime Per
N,umber of Session Meldber4tgrtrbers (Hours) * (Hg:urs) *'
Australia
Belg.tun
CanadE
Denmark
Fintarrd
France
Gerrnanlt
ISrael
New Zeaiarad
Sweden
united- Ringdom
Un,ited States
L27
2LZ
264
r79
?00
490
518
120
87
350
635
435
720
307
942
30r0
307
51,0
313
425
588
504
Ls28
766
5.7
L.4
3,6
r.7
1.5,
1.0
0.6
3.5
6.8
L.4
2.4
L,8
Based on a\reraEe nunber of hours of, meeti.ngs in eac'h of
last five years a,s at Septeuiber l, 1'974.
Souree: Membesship and le,ngth of session, derived f,'rorn
Parliarnents of the Id: A Reference ComPendium'
prepared by Valent Ilerman for tlle Inter-
Parl iarnentarlr Union,
Tables 1 and 24.
(London; I'tacMillan, L9761 ,
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Considerable emphasis is placed in parliamentary politics
on making things difficult for opponents. Governments withhold
information about their plans for parliamentary business and
introduce bi1ls at short notice. With scant resources, the
minority party must employ tactics designed to delay a bill or
to spring a debate on the Government. The poor relationship
between the party leaders during the last six years has not
encouraged co-operation. While the planning of governments can
be upset by oppositionsr utilisation of their rights to oppose,
governments have not been committed to the proper management
of sessions. As Jackson observes:
The real difficulty is that it may suit a government
to let Parliament fritter alray time in the early
stages of the session and then have less time to
attack controversial legislation later on. rt is
not that governments cannot plan parliamentary time-
tablesrpetter, it is that it does not suit them todo so. ''
The end-of-session rush continues to be a feature of most,
parliamentary years. The Government pushes through its legis-
lation by taking urgency and extending the sitting hours after
10.30 pm. While hours sat after midnight have normally fluc-
tuated between sessions, the last six have all recorded con-
sistently high figures. Late sittings are particularly apparent
in the closing days of sessions.
It is too soon to evaluate the effects of one positive
step undertaken by the National Government: the assignment
of the role of Leader of the House to a member other than the
Prime lvlinis ter .
Keith Jackson, New Zealand: Politics of Change (Welliagton: Reed
Education, tgT3 legislation
i.:rclude the Contraception, Sterilisation ard abortion Bill 1977
and ttre National Developnent 8i11. 1979.
7]-.
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The parliamentary parties now dj,verge markedly in their
viewsas to the form the session should take. The National
Government has reverted to what the Prime l{inister ca1ls the
traditional arrangements in which select committees are able
to rneet and ministers and departments prepare legislation in
the first part of the year. He arques that inter-party ar-
rangements, such as limited-time debates, would produce im-
provements in the schedule of wotk.7z The Labour Party favours
a "balanced session" as the first step towards an i.mprovement
in the transacti-on of business, which j-nvolves the Ilouse sitting
on three days in a week for three weeks in a month and nine or
10 months of the year.73
72. N.z.P.D.,428 (oecenber: 13, 1979), p.4813 and 428 (Decenber 14, L979) ,p:m; Ihe vierus of a National MP vfio sr44nrts dranges to ttre Qpe
of Snrlianentarlr session farioured by her party are e)q)ressed in:
Marilyn Waring, "Revitalisation of Cabinet, Parliarent. ard Parties" jn
.T Stephen Hoadlqr (ed) Inprovjlg Ns* Zealardrs Denocraqr (Auck1ard:
Nerv Zealand fOr:naation .
N.Z.P.D.,428 (oecenber l.4, L9791, p.4839. See also 428 (Deoenber 13,
i94 pp.4811 and 4821.
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Chapter 6
LEGISLATION
The government's domination of the legislative process
has been an established fact since the grip of the political
parties on the proceedings of the House was strengthened
earlier this century. While it can be held that the legis-
Iative function today departs from traditional conceptions
of this role, legislation remains central to the work of
the House. Parliament continues to provi-de a medium for
publicly testing goverrunent legislative proposals. For
these reasons the legislative process warrants more atten-
tion than it has hitherto recei-ved from political scientists.
Several opportunities exist for Opposition MPs (and
Government backbenchers), either in select committees or in
the House, to scrutinise legislation, but there are dj-fficul-
ties in determinj-ng the extent to which their behaviour in-
fluences outcomes during the legislative process. The
contributions of backbenchers in select committees may
di-rectly lead to the amendment of legislation or their
actions in debates may indirectly produce amendments to a
bill at a later date. rt is difficult to evaluate system-
atically the relative roles of Government and Opposition
(and other participants) in the proceedings of meetings
whose deliberations are private or not recorded in detail
(although this information can frequently be obtained for
particular bills through the case study approach to the
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legislative process) .1 Three dimensions of the legislative
process which are amenable to systematic analysis are the
initiation, modification and the passage of public biI1s.
Public bills may be introduced by the Government and
private members. The frequency with which private members
have sought to initiate legislation forms the first part of
the chapter.
Secondly, it is possible to consider the Opposition's
role in relation to each bitl by measuring the extent to
which it seeks to amend Government measures. These actions
are unequivocal-; they are recorded in the parliamentary
records. The central part of this chapter examines the
pattern of Government and Opposition behaviour towards
public bills in the Committee of the whole House. Because
of the size of the task it was necessary to linit the analysis
to two Parliaments. The six sessions of the 1970-2 and 1973-5
Parliaments were chosen because both parties had the roles of
Government and Opposition during those terms. In the first
Parliament the National Government was in its final term of
a continuous tenure J-n power since 1960, while the Labour
party had become the "institutionalised" Opposition. The
37th Parliament had a new Government and Opposition, which
offered the possibility of variations in behaviour from their
predecessors. From the pattern of responses of the two
Opposition parties to Government biIls, it is possible to
Ftank Wiley has str-rdied the relationship betrreen erzidence presented
to 10 @rmittees ard the amertrnents wtrich resulted: "Iegislative
Select Ccnanittees", Political Science, 2I (oecsnber, 1969), pp.3-17.
See also l{argaret Lee]TheffiEtrts Ccnnr:ission - A Case Study
in Legislative Influence", (unpublished research paper for
A&ninistrative law, LLM, Victoria University of V'tellington' 1978) .
1.
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assess their roles in relation to the modification of legis-
lative outcomes, and to comment on the nature of the legis-
lation introduced for consideration in the House.
While the minority party may not be able to prevent the
passage of a bill, it is possible for parliamentary and public
opposition to force a Government to drop or postpone a legis-
Iative proposal. Alternatively, the Government may have
second thoughts about a bill following its introduction.
The analysis is concluded by reviewing the fate of legislation
introduced by the Government.
Initiation of Legislation
The initiatives of private members in introducing legis-
lation, which had been so prominent earlier in the history of
the House, had dwindled in frequency prior to the post-war
period. Governments' control of the legislative process and
their unwitlingness to a11ow these bills to progress, acted
as a disincentive to backbenchers.
Time has continued to be allocated to private members
by the Standing Orders of the House but the extent to which
this is utilised depends on the three factors, The Government
may choose to appropriate private members' time with the leave
of the House. The leadership of the Opposition may prefer to
occupy this time with other types of business. A third
factor is the interest of private members in promoting bills.
Kelson's analysis of private members' days from 1950 to
1956 shows that of the 33.5 days available most of the time
was either taken by the Government or used for questions
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and special debates; only 3.75 days were used for debates
on private members'bills and they hrere confined to three of
the seven years. Much of this time avai-Iable to private
members was lost because they did not have bills on the
.2orqer paper.
In the 30th and 31st Parliaments 10 and 11 private
members' bil1s respectively were introduced (Tab1e 6.1).
But for the actions of l4ason, who v/as responsible for eight
bills during the 30th Parliament, the Opposition members
would not have made use of this mechanism (and six of his
bills introduced between 1951 and 1956 were on the subject
of Decimal Coinage). A Government IIIP, Duncan Rae, rej-ntro-
duced his Historic Places Trust BiIl of 1952 in 1953 and
Anderton's Crimes Amendment Bill of 1955 reappeared in
1956.
Between 1958 and 1963 the private members' bill seemed
to be on the verge of disappearing for only seven were intro-
duced. A revival of interest has occurred since and their
number has increased up to the 39th Parliament (although
the figures include several which were introduced in more
than one session) .3 It is also apparent that Government
backbenchers have made more use of their opportunities to
introduce bills; new members from the Government parties
contributed eight of the 12 bills in the 38th Parliarnent,
and aII six in the sessions 1976-78.
2. Robert N Kelson, lttre Private !4snber of Parliament ard the Forrmtion
of Pr:blic Poliqf , 4-7.
lbst notably, Ira-I4adonnell's Clean Air 8i11.3.
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TABTE 6.1 Public Bills Introduced 195I-54 to 1976-78
Frirrate lffierst BiI[s
Parlianent Years Gorre* @verrrlerrtBilLsa rcnbens @positionlffiers Tbta-L P!$1leBills
3o
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
3E
390
248
236
303
272
287
'272
2T3
327
5
2
L2
6
I
l"t
4
3
15
16
32
35
19b
IO
r.1
4
3
t5
2L
34
4V
25
40,'0
259
240
30,6
288
30,8
30 5'
329
352
1951-sr!
1955-57
1958-60
r-961-63
r964-56
1957-69
L970,-72
r.9.73-75
L976-78
z
dr E*cludes bAl1s derived fr,orn Statute Amendment Bills 1955-7to 197'6-8 aud other bilte derived by the same process for 1973,-5to 1976-8.
b.. fnclude.s ttaree introduced by the Social- Credtit MB.
Source: Joutnals of, the Eor,rse o,f Representativ'es
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Opposition parties are making more use of private
members' bills as a means of debating policy differences to
the Government. Such "Opposition" measures are not new to
the House; the Labour party made use of them prior to 1935,
and in 1954 and 1965 reverted to this earlier practice by
promoting bills which "were integrated into a party campaign
rather than remaining as qenuine individual initiatives".4
That fewer private members' bills are recorded for the 38th
Parliament is partly because two in 1976, and five in 1978,
were not formally introduced (although a debate occurred in
several cases on whether they should be introduced). The
Government refused to support their introduction on the
grounds that it opposed their content. The subjects of the
bills covered such matters as Foreign Trave1 Tax Repeal (1976)
Nuclear Free Zone (1976) , Election and Polls (1978) 
' 
General
Wage Order Amendment (1978) and Voting Rights Amendment (1978)
Private members' bills have become more cormnon and
been assigned a more prominent place in the business of the
House. They may be referred to select committees and receive
a second reading debate. In view of the time taken by debates
on motions to introduce private members' bills, revisions to
the Standing Orders were introduced in 1979 to limit the
debate on the introduction to two hours.
A limited number of private members' bills on unconten-
tious subjects have influenced Governments. The link between
a private member's actions and legislation subseguently intro-
duced by the Government is not always clear for the latter may
4. Austin ldtchell, @errurent lV partyt parfialrctt ald politicsin
Ner,v Zealard (Chri-s ; p.65.
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not give full recognition to the backqround reasons, while
the former may introduce a bill in anticipation of Government
legislation. Rae's Historical Places Trust Bill is a good
example of a bill which caused the Government to produce
legislation. More recent examples of private members'
initiatives which were acknowledged to have had some effect
by ministers were lr{r Downie I s Door to Door Sales Amendment
BilI Ig73 and Dr Bassett's Motor Vehicle Dealers Amendment
Bill Lg73. Mr East's Criminal Justice Amendment BiIl of L979
was discharged but then incorporated as a clause in Government
legislation. ft is rare for a Government to adopt a private
member's bill as its own legislation, but a recent case has
occurred: Mr l{clay's Evidence Amendment Bill introduced in
Lg76 was passed the following year by the Government. In
each of these cases the member belonged to the majority party'
only two private membersr bills have been enacted in
the last 40 years, and both were exceptional. The Property
Law Amendment Bill was introduced by Mason in 1950, referred
to the Statutes Revision Committee' and then passed in 1951
with the support of the Government. It was described as a
technical 1ega1 bill concerned with the machinery of govern-
ment and having as a main purpose the restatement of the law
contained in two acts so as to make them more accessible and
comprehensible.5 The second successfur bi}1, Dr wall's
Hospitals Amendment BilI of L975,.was on a question of con-
science; while it was not adopted by the Government, it was
allowed to proceed through the legislative process. The
procedural problems which arose from "a situation almost
5. N.Z.P.D., 296 (Oecsrfer 6, t95I), P-14-
l-67
unique i-n our history, in that a private member's bill j.s
receiving the serious attention of the committee with a
6view to its ultimate passage into law", " make it unlikely
that this will occur acrain on such an issue.
Notwithstanding the increase in the number of private
bills in recent Parliaments, the introduction of legislation
continues to be predominantly a Government role. In most
Parliaments the initiation of legislation which can be expected
to pass through the House is an exclusive function of the
Government.
l"lodification of Legislation
Procedures for Amending Legislation
The provisions for proposing amendments during the
plenary stages of the legislative process vary between
parliaments based on the British model. rn Australia
members are able to propose amendments at any stage during
the passage of legislation. In the House of Commons (and
also the Canadian Parliament), members may propose amend-
ments on the details of government bills during the report
stage, and amendments to defeat bills during the second and
third readings. New Zealand appears to have more restrictive
provisions governing amendments for they can only be moved
at the committee stage of the proceedings in the House.T
The differences between the House of Commons and the
House of Representatives derive in part from different pro-
6.
7.
N.Z.P.D., 397 (May 1, 1975), p.1082.
Details of other legislatr:res cone from Hernan,
World, (Iondon: I.!acl,1il1an, L976), Tab1e 52.
Parlianents of ttte
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cedures adopted for bills in the middle stages of the legis-
lative process. In the House of Commons public bills are
committed to a standing committee unless the House decides
otherwise (in which case it is committed to a committee
of the whole House, a select committee or a joint committee
of the House and the Lords) . At the report stage bills that
were amended in the committee of the whole House, and bills
from standing committees, regardless of whether they were
amended or not, may be the subject of debate, although there
are procedural differences between the stages. In the first
case it is felt that if the opportunity to amend the bill was
not taken in the Committee of the whole House, it is unneces-
sary for the House to reconsider the bill at the report stage.
fn the latter case, the report stage gives members who were
not a party to the proceedings of a standing committee the
opportunity of participating in the debate, and all members
have the chance to reconslder the bill and to move amendments.
A significant dlfference between the stagres underlies the
amendments moved. A far greater proportion of amendments
proposed at the report stage come from the Government. Ac-
cording to Griffith, a broad distinction is that "In committee
the Government is very much on the defensive, countering
arguments, giving explanations,sometimes meeting points. On
report the Government puts forward its proposals for change".9
In the New Zealand House of Representatives there is
only one stage in the legislative process during which sub-
stantive amendments may be proposed to public bills. In the
8. J A G Griffith, Parlianentary Scrutirry of Governnent Bi,lJr. (Iordon:
C;eorge Allen & Ur,r
q friffith, Parlianentary Scmtiny, p.146.
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second reading the question put is "That this BiIl be now
read a second time" and amendments must relate to this motion'
such as the omissi-on of "now" and the addition of "this day 3
months" or another specified time. Any other amendment must
be ,,strictly relevant to the BilI".10 Prior to Lg72 members
could propose and discuss amendments at the report stage but
the current Stuanding Orders now specifically preclude amend-
ments or debate on the motion that the report be adopted.ll
The Standing Orders covering amendments at the Third Reading
are similar to those of the Second and are determl'ned by the
question under consideration: "That the BilI be now read a
third time". This question may only be amended by the
omission of the word "now" and the addition of a specified
time such as "this day 6 months". At this point the bill
can still be recommitted, amendments of a verbal or formal
nature can be made, and clerical or graphical errors can be
corrected by the Chairman of Committees.l2 The Government
has one final- opportunity to amend the BilI before it receives
the Royal Assent. A Governor-General's messaqe can be sent
to the House in order to obtain its agreement to the amend-
ments before the Bill- is "printed fair".
Bi1ls may be referred to select committees but they cannot
amend, them or delay their passage by failing to report. The
powers of committees are limited to reporting their opinions to
t0. Starrdirrq Onders 226, 227 arrd. 228. An exception exists for the Inprest
Supply eiff urd the tlain Appropriation Bitl dlich provides that arend-
rrEnts relating to pr:bIic affai-rs rmy be noved to the question for tlte
secord reading.
Standing Order 245. In any case the retrnrt on a Bill to the House was
norrnally taken follovuing i-ts aetivery b the House. Accordhg to R J
Harrison the "futr:re dat" provision was no-' used in 1960:
"Organisation a.d procedurl j1 t5e New Zealand Parljanrent", (r:npr:lctished
PLrD dissertation, Ohio State UniversiQr, 1964) , p.226'
Starrdinq Orders 241 , 248, 250 ary] 253. ltre last Appropriation BilI of
Ure JesEion ii o<cepted As stated' jrr fmtrpte 10 '
1r.
L2.
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the House which may include instructions to the Chairman to
move in accordance with their report. The amendments that
they bring forward for consideration in the Committee of the
v.{role House are grouped (although they may be taken separately
if the consent of the House is not given for their incorporation
into a bill) . Moreover, select committees have received less
than half of the bills introduced: 41 per cent between L97O-72
and 48 per cent during the 37th Parliament (Table 6.2).13
Smaller proportions of bitls were reported on to the House'
and fewer still were passed.
In effect, it is only in the committee of the whole that
amendments may be formally made to a Bil1. There is no record
kept of the discussion that takes place during the proceedings
of the Committee of the Who1e, but the amendments moved plus
the proposer and the outcome, are recorded in the Parliamentary
Debates and the Journalsof the HquEe ef Representatives. All
bills are committed to a Committee of the Whole after they have
been read a second time or following the report of a select
committee. Any clause may be altered in the Comrnittee provided
the amendment j.s relevant to the subject matter of the bilL. According
Lo Harrj-son, "within this limit of relevancy they may extend
the scope of the BiIl, even, if it is auxiliary legislation,
amending the main Act".14
Amendments to Government Bil1s: 1970-1975
There are three forms amendments can take; they may
propose omi-tting certain words, omitting certain words in
See Ctr,apter 7 for denreloprents sirce then-
Harrisonr "Organisation and Procedr:re", p.22L-
t3.
14.
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@vernment Bills Referred to Sqlect Corurnitteeg
and their Outcome r 1970-tr975
TABLE 5,2
1970
1971
L972
A',reragre fote
36th ParLianisot
BilIs
rntrcfrpeaa
97
I0-8
81
Bills. referred to-
i+escr*inffieesa
Nf
38 39.2
46 42 -6
33 40.7
Bills &-*
trnrted on*
Ngc
28 28.9
38 35.2
25 30.9
Bilts
Passedtr
N*c
26 25.'8'
36 33.3
2'4 2:9.6
40 .9 3r. I 30.r
1973
1974
1975
Avuage for
37tI Par:tidlent
100
114
106
52
47
53
52.4
4L.2
r50 .0
4L
31
34
4L.0 28 28.0
27 .2 28 24,6
32 -L 32 30.2
47 .5 33.1 27.5
a. Includes biLls carried ovelt frorn previOUs sessior,ls.
Excludes Brivate rnernbels t bi]ls anA tie bilts derived
f,rom Statule Anendment Bills.
Bills no,t reported on were held over to the next
session or lapsed.
Perc,entagies of bills introduced'
gtource,: Journals of the tlouse of Represen
b.
c.
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order to insert or add others, or inserting or adding totd".l5
Providing the amendments fulfil the conditions prescribed in
the Standing Orders as to form and relevancy, are made in
writing (unless the Chairman agrees that they are "simple
amendments or amendments of established formula"16), and are
seconded there appears to be no restrictions upon the moving
of amendments.
An amendment proposal in the committee of the whole
reaches a resolution in one of several $/ays. The amendment
may be withdrawn by the mover with the leave of the House.
The Chairman of Committees may rule an amendment out of
order, more usually on the grounds that it involves an
appropriation. Other reasons for ruling out of order a
proposed amendment include that it was: not competent for
such an amendment to be moved in a Committee of the Whole;
outside the power of the Committee; in conflict with the
provisions of the bill; or simply in the words of the
Chairmanr "irregular" r "trifling" r "impractical"r "vexa-
tigus", "redundant" or "frivolousrt. OtherwiSe the queStion
is put, usuallyintheform "that the amendment be agreed to"r17
and is resolved in the affirmative or the negative by a voice
vote, or by a division if the minority does not agree wj-th
the Chairman's opinion of the outcome.
Amendments moved in the Committee of the Whole on public
bil1s can be distinguished according to whether they are moved
aS a group or individually. Most grouped amendments are
15.
16.
L7.
Standing Order 124.
Standirg Onder 125.
Standing Order 132.
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incorporated into a bill without being moved by a member, and
without discussion of the amendments together or separate1y.lS
A statement is recorded that: "With the unanimous consent of
the Committee the amendments made by the [select committee
concernedl were read into and deemed part of the biII". No
further information is recorded in the Journalsor Parliamentary
Debates about the details of the amendments agreed upon by
members in a select committee. If the recommendations of a
select committee are not unanimously accepted by the Committee,
they may be accepted with exceptions notedr oI they may be
formally taken separately by the reading of the clause number
but not the amendment itself.
occasionally the committee unanimously consented to
amendments contained in a Supplementary Order Paper. In the
few cases where Supplementary Order Papers contained amend-
ments proposed by ministers, they were changes that did not
warrant separate discussion in the Committee of the Whole.
In the six years between 1970 and L975, groups of amendments
were accepted by the House on respectively 2L, 30, 27 , 2A , 36
and 29 occasions.
A perenni-al case which falts into this category is the
Statutes Amendment Bill. This annual "washing-up" bill, which
has been described as "a unique New Zealand institution",19
consists of clauses which are subdivided during the committee
A procedure adopted in Lg72 authorises the Grainnan to take a biILirtoto insteadof by individual clauses if , after mnsideration by
a select conrnittee, it has been relnrted back to the House without
nrajor anenrtrent, aDd no nelrber objects to the procedure.
Coffrqg Palner, Uribridled Power: An Interpretation of Nel'r Zealand's
Constitution and ),
and'Washing-Upr Bills"-, the=-Tablei JolIlI*-
6t Ulre Society of Cterks-at-tlre-fab1e i:r Connoru,realtl: Parlialrents, )OC(\ZII
(1968) , pp.27-9.
18.
19.
L74
stage into numerous separate bills. The resultant bills
must amend statutes, be non-controversial and contain only
two-clause amendments. Should any member have an objection
of substance to a clause, it will be deleted at the committee
)istage.-" The six Statute Amendment Bills for the sessions
between 1970 and L975 produced an average of 62 bills. The
relative unimportance of this legislation can be gauged by
the amount of time devoted to the bill by select committees
in 1979. The Statutes Revision Committee spent one and a half
hours on it while the Lands and Agriculture Committee disposed
of it in 15 minute".2l
The bill is annually the subject of two or three amend-
ments, one of which is procedural (and divides the Bill into
numerous other bills). The other two propose grouped amend-
ments, the second of which introduces new clauses (but is not
moved j-n every year). They are moved by the Minister of Justice
and unanimously accepted by the Committee of the Whole. In
L974, a similar procedure was adopted for the Finance Bilt No 2.
The discussion about amendments at the Committee stage
will relate to the amendments that are moved separately for
it j-s here that the bare details are recorded about the pro-
ceedings of the Committee of the Whole.
A total of 365 amendments were proposed on public bills
in the Committee of the Whole by members during the 36th
Parliament, and 605 during the 37th Parliament. The fate of
20. N.Z.P.D., 380 (Septerber L3t 1972) , p.2547iffi!, p.5231.
N,Z.P.D. , 428 (Decenber L4, L979), p.4868-9.ffiion in uribridled Pcn'rcr, pp.89-91.
N.Z.P.D., 388 (Novenber
See also Palnerrs2r.
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amendments moved in the Committee for the 36th and 37th
Parliaments are shown in Table 6.3. Only one amendment was
withdrawn during the first three years, and eight in the
second Parliament. About 9 per cent of amendments were ruled
out of order in both Parliaments by the Chairmen of Commj.ttees'
the proportion rising in 1970 and L974. A slightly larger
percentage (12 per cent of amendments) were negatived by the
House in the 36th Parliament and more than double that pro-
portion in the following Parliament. Most outcomes were
settled by a voice vote. Divisions were more common in 1970
when the House divided on 29 occasions (although they were
mainly confined to a few bills), and j-n L974 when 73 divisions
occurred.
Most amendments were agreed to: B0 per cent for the
36th Parliament and 65 per cent in the 37th Par1iament.Zz The
opposition won a division in the 1970 session by a majority
of one on the Trustee Savings Bank Bill when by chance govern-
ment members were absent. This amendment was later recommitted
by the Government and negatived with its majority on another
division. The lower proportion of successful amendments in
the second term under consideration reflects the greater
number of Opposition amendments.
The movers of the amendments are distinguished according
to whether they are ministers, Government private members or
Opposition members. The extent to which they proposed amend-
ments is shown in Table 6.4. During both terms of Parliament,
Ttre gnotped anerdrents based on re@mllprdations either of select
connLittees or rninj-sters in Supplenentarlf Order Papers, rnculd if
included, increase ttre prolnrtion of anerdnents agreed to in
Table 6.3.
22.
trABI,E 6.3
TV6
Amendments Mo-ved in the Coqtnittee
of the Whole llouse
L970 1971 L972
36th Farlj,ament.
Anerdrcnts
Xbtal
NS
Agreed to
Wl.ilrdliarm
tuLed out
ilfegatived
90 7L.4
2L L6.'1
15 LL.9
163 84.9
1.5
'9 4.7
19 9.9
91.3
1 2,L
g 16.7
292 79.8
1.3
3l_ 8.s
42 r1.5
39
aqpndtrcnts tr-t3\rcct l_26 100.0 rge 100.0 48 100.0 366 r00.0
37th Farliament
nlert ts L973 L974 L975
f,btal
NT
Agreed to
witidratun
Rrled out
!@atived
r34 83-8
10 6.3
16 10.0
L47 54.2
2 .,:l
35 Lz.g
87 32.L
110 63i..2
6* 3.4
I 4.5
50 28,'.1
391 64. 
-6-
I 1".3
53 8.8
153 25-.3
eqenftErr.ts !u/ed 160 100.0 27L 100.0 174 r00.0 505 100.0
* Ineludes two which lapsed.
Sour,ces Joarnals of the House Q,t Repres'entatives
L77
most of the amendments were moved by ministers (78 per cent in
the 35th Parliament and 6I per cent in the 37th Parliament) .
Government backbenchers (or ministers acting as private members)
proposed only LZ amendments in the six years. Eight of these
amendments were moved on "free vote" billS. Of the remaining
four I{r O'Flynn has the distinction of moving three, all
successful. Opposition members moved 77 amendments (21 per
cent of the total amendments) in the 36th Parliament and 226
(37 per cent) in the 37th Parliament.
The outcome of amendments moved by members of Parliament
is also shown in Table 6.4. A11 ninisterial amendments were
approved by the Commi-ttee of the Whole. HaIf of the amendments
moved by private members on the Government side were successful
including four by Labour backbenchers on Government bills in the
L973, Ig74 and 1975 sessions, Approximately the same proportion
of amendments proposed by Opposition members were successful in
both Parliaments 0 per cent). But amendments moved by
Opposition members as a proportion of total amendments passed
was double in 1973-75 (4 per cent) the percentaqe for L970-72
(2 per cent). Four of the 2L successful Opposition amendments
(p1us two by Government I{Ps) during the six sessions were j-n
"free vote" contextst in the other cases the Government ac-
cepted the proposals of Opposition members. Amendments moved
by Opposition members accounted for nearly all those listed
in Table 6.3 that were not agreed to; they were usually
negatived, sometimes ruled out by the Chairman' and occasionally
withdrawn.
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Amendments varied considerably in their length and
significance. They ranged in substance from minor changes in
the wording of bills (sometimes involving only a single word)
to the addition of lengthy clauses. The few successful amend-
ments proposed by Opposition members (other than those on free
vote bills) included: the insertion of the words "to Her
Majesty", the substitution of "gtreater" for "other", and the
substitution of the expression "2 months" for "6 months". One
Opposition member did succeed in having a clause dropped from
the Statutes Amendment BiIl 1973 under the convention which
obliges a minister to withdraw any clause to which a member
has an objection of substanc..23
During the two Parliaments a total of 258 bills were
amended during the Committee stage in the House. Amended
bills formed 48 per cent of bills passed in the 36th Par1ia-
ment and 56 per cent of bills passed in the succeeding
)AParliament. o-
The Opposition's Role
It is extremely difficult, without an exhaustive study
of the details of each amendment in relation to its context,
to determine the impact of the process on the legislation. It
is however possible to comment indirectly upon the nature of
legislation introduced into the House by examining the behaviour
of members in New Zealand in comparison with other countries.
There are obvious difficulties in making comparisons between
23.
24.
N.Z.P.D., 388 (lbvsrilcen 20, 1973), p.5234.
These calculations include the six Statutes AnEn&nent Bil1s and the
370 bil1s into vihictr tJ:ry were subdivided.
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the activities of Iegislatures. The size and importance of
bitls may vary considerably. Nevertheless a number of studies
have found it profitable to draw comparisons by replicating
the approach used het".25
With respect to clauses j-n Government bi]Is, New Zealand
has the second highest average of the six countries with a
figure comparable to that for the United Kingdom (Table 6'5) '
Opposit5"on MPs in New Zealand are more successful in achieving
acceptance of their amendments than three of the five countries
including the United Kingdorn.26
Two sets of figures are presented for bills and opposition
amendments. The figures in brackets exclude the bills derived
from the subdivision of the Statutes Amendments Bi-lls for the
six sessions in order that a more realistic appraisal may be
made of Opposition inj-tiatives 1n relation to bil}s. It will
be seen from Table 6.5 that their exclusion does not make
much difference in New Zeal-and's position relative to the
other legislatures.
opposition members moved an average of .35 amendments
to Government bills in the House between 1970 and 1975, and
were successful in -02 cases. These figures provide a striking
contrast with those from the other countries: Opposition
amendments were far more numerous in their legislatures '
A number
the contrast.
interpretations could be offered to explain
is possible that many Opposition objections
of
It
25. Ttre nethod was first r:sed by J Blondel, et al, "Legislative Behavior:r:
Sone Steps lltx^rards a fross-National rcasffi-nt", Goverment ard=@posi-.
Lion, S (Wirrter, Lg6g-7O) , pp.67-85; a1d later bnz ffieppe Di Palrna,
S.rrrrini:rg With""t.qo""r"i::gi-t]," Italian Parties in Parlianent (Berkeley:
Ttre New Zealard figir:res include tl.to successful @position anenfrrents
novea-in a free vote on a Goverrrrent bill.26.
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TABLE 5.5 Opposition Amendments to Government BiIIs'
Proposed and Approved in selected Legislatures
Bills passeda 4s 28 25 41 Is 863 (493)b
193s1671520Average nurberof clausesc
@position
ansr&rents
per bilf
Percerrtage of
aren&rents
passed
Q4nsition
anenrtnents d
trnssed per bill 0.I8 0.20 0.10 0.49 0-3L 0'02- (0'04)
a. The figures for countries other than New zealand are
derived from samPles.
b. The total public bills passed L97O-75 minus a private
member's bill. The sufhiviaed Statute Amendment Bills
have been subtracted from that total to give the figuresin brackets.
c. The New zealand figures are calculated from bills passedin 1971.
d. The number of opposit.ion amendments moved and passed isless three propbieO on a private member's bill, two of
which were successful.
Source: Blondel, "Legislative Behaviour", Tables I and 4i
and data in Tab1e 6.3.
United Kingdcrn lreland Srreden Ftance India f'letp Zealard(1966-67j (Ie6s) (1e65) (Ie66) (1966) (1e70-7s)
4.4 3.0 3.3 3.5 10.1 0.3f (0-6r)
3.9 7.0 2.9 13.6 3-1 6.3
IB2
to legislation are resolved in the more consensual atmosphere
of sel-ect committees and are incorporated in the grouped amend-
ments contained in the committee reports to the Committee of
the Whole. This may account to some small extent for the
relatively low number of amendments, but given the adversary
nature of the New Zealand Parliament, it is unllkely that the
Opposition would forego opportunities to question Government
policy by moving amendments.
A second possibility is that the sheer volume of legis-
lation and the demands on members' tj-me prevents them from
formulating more amendments. The average number of amendments
per Opposition member would certainly appear to be higher in
New Zealand than the other legislatures. But an average of
about eight amendments per Oppositj-on member spread over six
sessions is still not particularly high.
The explanaLion which most plausibly accounts for much
of the difference would appear to be the nature of the legis-
lation passed by the New Zealand Parliament. Legislatj-on which
reflected policy differences between the parties could be expected
to attract amendment proposals from the Opposition as would other
bills on which the Opposition could hope Lo project its role of
scrutinising and opposing Government measures. The comparisons
in Table 6.5 suggest that not only does such legislation arise
proportionately less frequently in New Zealand but that most
bills are of such marginal significance that they do not attract
the interest of the Opposition.
The analysis can be taken one step further by examining
all public bills passed during the period under review, and the
activities of the Opposition in relation to them. The Opposition
183
moved amendments on 70 of the bitls passed between 1-970 and 1975
(including amendments on nine bills during the 36th Parliament
and on three bills during the 37th Parliament which were not the
subject of amendments by the Government). This behaviour of the
two oppositions affected only 8 per cent of all bills passed
d.uring the period (Table 5.6) . The Government amended a majority
of those bil1s and also a further 24 per cent of public bills
passed. The six amended Statute Amendment Bilts accounted for a
further 43 per cent of enacted legislation. One quarter of bills
passed was not the subject of amendments by either the Government
or the Opposition.
prima facie, three hypotheses can be tested. First, the
new Labour Government would introduce more bills which reflected
policy changes (and therefore differences between the parties) '
and these would attract more amendments by the Opposition than in
the previous session. Secondly, the Labour Government, because
of its relative inexperience in office and with major legislation
to introduce, would be obliged to amend bills during thei'r passage
more frequently than its predecessor. Thirdly, because Opposition
behaviour in both Parliaments was confined to a small number of
bills, it must be focusing on legislation which they were ac-
tively opposing by movingf numerous amendments '
The first hypothesis cannot be supported by data in Table
6.6. The Opposition moved amendments on only a slightly higher
proportion of bills between Lg73 and L975 compared with the pre-
vious term. However, there was some support for the second
hypothesis. The Labour Government amended 34 per cent of bills
(excluding the bilts derived from statute Amendment Bills) com-
pared with 27 per cent for the National Government.
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The behaviour of the Labour opposition between 1970 and L972
would lead to a rejection of the third hypothesis: 7 4 per cent of
the 34 bills in Table 6.6 were the subject of a single amendment
and a further IB per cent received only two, three or four amend-
ments. A larger number of amendments were moved on only three
bills: seven on the Racing BilI 1971-, 10 on the Stabilisation of
Remuneration I97l and 19 on the Payroll Tax BiIl 1970 ' Partial
support for the hypothesis can be derived from the activities of
the National Opposition between 1973 and L976. Five bills were
the subject of numerous amendments: L2 on the Private schools
Conditj-onal Integration Bill Lg75, 22 on the Local Amendment Bill
Lgl4, 30 on the New Zealand Export-Import Corporation Bill L974,
41 on the Commerce BiIl ]1975 and 46 on the New Zealand Superannuation
Corporation BiIl 1g74. But these five bills only accounted for 14
per cent of the bills which the opposition sought to amend' with
42 per cent of the bills only one amendment was moved' of the re-
maining 16 bi1ls (44 per cent) between two and six amend'ments were
moved.
To summarise then, Governments amended 264 bills, plus the
clauses of the statute Amendment Bills, in all 73 per cent of
legislation passed. The two opposition parties in the respective
Parliaments confined their amendment initiatives to either tl or
12 bills on the average each session. It is difficult to imagine
an oppositi-on party not taking advantage of opportunities to dis-
agree with the Government on policy legislation. The most obvious
conclusj-on is that most legislation was not worth their attention'
ButSpercentstillappearstobeanextraordinary
low proportion (bearing in mind that 57 per cent of the bills
on which oppositions moved amendments were the subject of
only a single - often perfunctory amendment attempt) ' It
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may well be the case that the opposition discounts the value
of the Committee of the Whole. The outcome of the proceedings
must favour the Government which as a rule prefers not to ac-
cept opposition amendments. The deliberations of the committee
are not record.ed in the Parl.Lgnentary Debates or the Journals '
but evaluations of the proceedings have been published' The
LgTg Standing Orders CommiLtee observes that the "debate during
this stage of a Bill's passage through the House has tended to
become less relevant to the purposes of the committee stage" ' 
27
That the Committee found it necessary to propound in detail the
form which the debate should take suggests that members have
been inclined to depart from examining the details of bills in
their contributions to the committee stage. For the Oppositi'on'
therefore, the only stage in which substantive amendments may
be proposed has become a ritualised phase in the legislative
process. In each session, o[ the averdg€r less than I per cent
of legislation passed was the subject of concerted opposition
by the minoritY PartY.
It has been apparent that the legislative behaviour of
the Government and opposition parties diverges markedly at
the committee stage. The Government in fact gives the appear-
ance of undertaking the scrutiny function itself at this stage'
Most of its legislation is amended between introduction and
enactment.
Rejection of Legislation
There are two possible outcomes for legislation introduced
into the House: it is either passed in an amended or unamended
form or j-t lapses at some stage in the process (either because
2t. A.J.H.R. , T.LA (1979) , P.5.
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it has been withdrawn or the Government has decided not to
proceed with it) . A short term option is to hold legislation
over from one session to another. Indeed bills may be intro-
duced late in the session in order that they may be considered
by recess committees of the House,
The data in Table 6.7 indicates the extraordinary high
success rate of Government legislation, About 95 per cent of
Government bi1ls was passed in most Parliaments during the
posL-war period. In view of the unlikelihood of Government
legislation being rejected by a vote in the House, these
figures may seem unexceptional. But the legislative process
also involves the exposure of proposals to the conmunity and
the potential exists for Governments to accede to public
opposition to a measure. That few bills are actually dropped
reflects two factors. fn the pre-legislative Stage, consulta-
tions with groups and other persons and agencies affected have
already resolved many potential problems. Secondly, much
legislation is inconsequential because it is concerned with
amendment to the details in existing stat,rt"".2B
The figures in Table 6.7 overstate the number of legis-
Iative proposals which actuallylapsed, for some biIls are not
designed to be enacted but serve as means to other ends.
From 1955 a Statutes Amendment Bill has been used annually
as a vehicle for introducing to the House minor, non-
controversial amendments to statutes.29 As many as 73 bills
28. For the views of oonstitrrtiornl lal',ryrers on the quality ard quanlity
of legislation p:oduced in New Zealand see Csffrey Pa1ner, 'tle Fastest
Lavnakers in the West", NZ Listener, ll|3Y 28, 1977 
' 
pp.I3-15; Palner,
Unbridled power, drapter-?lE-X ,f Keith, "A La*yer Iooks at Parlianwtt",
ffilf (ed) lltre Reform of Parlianent (Wellington: New
Zealand Institute of pgbli pp.26-47 -
A Statutes Anerftrent Bill was wed i1 I95I ard earfi-eE, -but- 4rot in the- -forur-i! sr:Usequentf' -too[.".ee 6flincle-"N& Zeal-nd''Washing-r4>' Bills'pp.27-9
29.
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Outcomes of Government BillsTABLE 6.7
30
31
32
33
34
35
35
37
38
1951-54
1955-57
1958-60
1961-63
1964-65
L967-69
r97Q-72
L973-75
L976-78
3e0(-)
343 ( e5)
364 (128)
447 (144)
402 (130)
470 (r83)
474 (202)
446 (r73)
52L (194)
18 (4.6)
L4 (,1.1)
24 (6.6)
24 (5.4)
L7 u.2)
20 (4.3)
LA (3.0)
t3 12.9)
23 (4.4)
to.zr
(0.5)
(1.7)
(4.e)
(r.7) -
372 (95.4)
329 (95.9)
340 (e3.4)
423 (94.6)
382 (9s.0)
448 (95.3)
452 (9s.4)
4LL (e2.2)
489 (93.9)
3
2
8
22
9
The figures in brackets show the number of introduced bills
which are derived from subdividing Statutes Amendment bills'
For Lg73-75 the Finance Bill (uo 2), which was subdividedinto five bi1ls, is also included, For L976-78 six otherbills similarly divided are included.
From :-967-69 to Lg76-78 figures include bills held over fromprevious parfiiments; bilis held over between sessions within
a Parliament are counted once-
Includes two bills withdrawn' and one (the Health Amendment
Bill on which there was a free vote) deferred for 12 months'
Source: ,Journals of the House of RePresent
IB9
have resulted from the subdivision of a Statutes Amendment BilI
(the numbers for each Parliarnent are enclosed in brackets in the
column for introduced bills) ' AIso included is the Expiring
Laws Continuance Bill which is read pro forma a first time at
the beginni-ng of each session (and i-s therefore counted twice
in 1954, 1958 , Lg63 and Ig77 when there are two sessions) '
once these bills are excluded an average of about four
bills per session remain that were actually dropped. The
main departures from this figure have occurred because bills
carried over from one session to another have lapsed followinql
a change of Government.
Ithasbeenpossibletosustainthislowrateofrejec-
tion (and in fact to reduce it) by the increasing use of the
procedure of holding bills over between sessions. In the
earlier part of the period all bills not passed automatically
lapsed, although they were referred to select committees and
reappeared in the parl-iamentary records for the following
session. From the mid-l-960s such bills have been recorded
in the Journals as having been herd over. rn L973 a procedure
was adopted that bi1ls not passed during a session would be
held over and proceed in the next session at the stage they
had previously reached. It was designed to overcome the
',perennial criticism of Parliament" about "the rush of legis-
Iation at the end of the session" .30 The frequency with which
bills are carried over between sessions within a Parliament is
2'l
not shown in Table 6.7, buL has involved as many as 28 bills'--
30.
31.
fhe
r.14
The
rpt
praclice was(1974), p.5.
figure of 29
corroborated
retrnrted
fu other
orrfirmed by a Starding Order in L974' A'J'H'R''
in t}e Schedules of Business for 1974 is
Schedules i:r the Journals.
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Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter has attempted to provide
a clearer picture of Government and Opposition roles in the
introduction, modification and rejection of legislatj-on.
apart from the established fact of the Government's domination
of the legislati-ve process, three general observations can be
made. While Parliamentrs role in the legislative process is
dominated by the Government, it has continued to provide a
means for testing legislative proposals. Secondly, Opposition
initiatives have not been substantial, although they have j-n-
creased in some respects. Thirdly, private members' bilIs and
the discussion in the Committee of the whole House have often
been occasions for debating policy differences between the
parties rather than the purposes for which they were designed.
Parliament clearly does modify legislative outcomes. It
provides the arena in which the Opposition may scrutinj-se legis-
lation introduced by the Government, and Lhe latter ilaY, after
assessing public responses to proposals, amend bi}ls, delay
their passage or al1ow them to 1apse.
The opposition has been seen to play a minor role in
the modification of legislation. It was anticipated that the
minority party would be unsuccessful in having most of its
amendments accepted. More unexpected was the limited initiatives
of the Opposition in relation to most bills during the Committee
stage in the House. The moving of amendments to Government
bills does at least provide tangible evidence of Opposition
disagreements with their provisions. The similarities between
the behaviour of the two Oppositions acting under the different
circumstances of the 36th and 37th Parliaments lead to the
1,91
coaclusion that most legislati.on was not Fufficienttrlt i.ltportant
enoggh L.o warnant response.s in the form of amendlnent ProPosals.
targely by defaul-t ttren tbis stage o;f the legisl-ative Procte,ss
f or mo"st. bilt s becomes an occasion for the Goveri,lnent to amend
i-t,s own volu'nrino-us measures.
The eoffiItittee of the whole ttrouse which has f,eatured
priorainently in the anaLysis of ttre 35Lh and 3'7th Parliaments 
'
Iras sLnce had its role calLed lnto question. This is partl]i'
because the 'nuts and bolbsn work has been inoreasingly utader-
taken by Setr eet eomnittees, buE il,so, becaus.e the debate in
the conrni.ttee stage has been more partisan and less, gollc,€f,r.I€d
with tbe detai.led exanination of bi].ls. (sj.utilar:Iy' bills
introduc:ed, b1r the nemliers of the rninority party have beeR
inclined tO b rtOpBosition" measures. ) With continuing
expans,ion of, the work of, sel,est co6mittees, the role of ttre
eoqmitt'ee of the Whol.e inay wel-l b.e furtfuer di:niu-islued '
ChaPter 7
THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM
The House has appointed numerous committees to assist with
its activities since the first session in 1854. For this reason
the committee system has given the appearance of being fairly
developed (certainly by comparison with the British House of
Commons),1 with a range of permanent committees for different
purposes, and an annual output which has in the past numbered
several hundred reports to Parliament. Nevertheless, in com-
parative terms, New Zealand has "Weak committees" so defined
because of the structural characteristics of the parliamentary
system, the role of political parties, and the position of
committees in the legislative process.2 rh"y form only part
of the network of small group contexts in which members par-
ticipate, for caucus committees play a prominent role in the
work of a parliamentarian and matters are usually debated there
prior to their consideration in select committees.
During the post-war period there have been a number of
changes in the roles and activities of the committee system'
This review covers the structural changes introduced as a
conseguence of reviews by the House, the "output" of committees
during phases of the years 19 52-8, and other developments during
this period. The main concern is with the committee system
t. For o<anple, R J Ha:rison, "Orgartisation arrd Procedr:re in the Neul
zealard Parlianrent", (unpublisfiedPhDdissertation' Okrio State thri-
versier, 1964) , p.234; austin ltit hqll, c"Ygt*9t,,?v_lT$_ 
-_(ctrrisichurcrrt vO"itont"e & tlonbs' 1956) , p.Jz' These autrprs v'Ere
lvriting before the npre recent ctranges to tle conrnittee systen in
the trrited Kingdom.
I{aloolm Shatr, "Conclrrsion", in &nmittees in ve
Anatysis, John D Lees ard lrtalco ,( versityiffirglg1 , p.ant and KeitLr Jackson, "Nevy ZeaLand parlianerrta4r @nr
- 
rrv /tr^-il ]O?Q\ n Q
2.
;,ifi:;:'i]ifw="ro *lil,ffl*rt't n6ii-iffi*i*, Lrx (April 1e78) , p-e[-
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rather than individual committees although some attention as
given to the latter particularly those which are exceptional
for the orientation of their work'
six types of committee have existed: committees of the
whole House, select committees, ad. hoc committees, joint com-
mittees, caucus committees and sub-committees. committees of
the Whole House (that is the Committee of the Whole' and until
their abolition in 1968, the committee of supply and committee
of ways and Means) comprise the full membership of the House
and are excluded from the analysis because they do not con-
stitute small task-orientated groups. Joint committees with
the Legislative Council were appointed until its abolition
just before the beginning of the period considered here' sub-
committees are not included in this survey for only the Pub1ic
Expenditure committee has had the power to establish them and
this review of the committee system does not extend to such
details. The party caucus committees fa1l outside the com-
mittee system of the House, although their importance in
policy-making processes is considerable' 3
The analysis concentrates on the committee system, the
permanent select committees appointed at the beginning of each
session (or more recently each Parliament) and within that
group more interest is expressed in the committees concerned
with either public policy-making or specific types of committee
business. The ad hoc committees are also considered because
of the special roles they have performed'
An inter-cauctls gtror4),
fr:rntioned but has no
the },bnlcers Senrices @nmitt€e, ha^s a-lso
forrnal parlianenta-tT status.
3.
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Structure
The traditional committee system has comprised three
types of committee which are permanent and have been auto-
matically appointed at the beginning of each session (or
Parliament).4 B"tt"en nine and 12 commj-ttees have been
concerned with spheres of public policy of which two have
had a "horizontal" terms of ref,erence covering either
financial matters (Public Accounts and its successor Public
Expenditure), or matters of a "technical legal character"
(Statutes Revision Committee). The others deal with special-
ised areas of public poticy which have covered j-nter alia
foreign affairs, education, Iabour, mining, defence, lands'
agriculture, conmerce, Maori affairs and social services.
These committees may have a variety of matters referred to
them including tocal as well as public biIls, petitions'
regulations, parliamentary papers, estimates and speCifiC
questions for investigation-
A second group Of committees concentrates on particular
types of business, Local Bills (although the committee also
receives public bills) , Private Bills or Petitions. Domestic
or household matters are attended to by the House Committee
(charged with the "comfort of members") and the Li-brary
committee. To this latter group may be added the committee
concerned with the privileges of the House, although its role
is rather different.
tormittees required to be appointed under standing.orders-at the
coIIrIEnceIIEnt of each session (or Parlianent) have jncluded:
cormittee on Bil]s, Lardsand Agaricultr:re, Local Bil1s, Privileges,
Public Enperditure and Statutes Revision.
4.
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In ad.dition to those which form the permanent committee
system, ad hoc committees are frequently appointed tO consider
a bill or undertake an extensive inquiry into a question of
public importance. Their existence terminates once they have
reported to the House (unless their term is extended) ' Apart
from the standing orders committee which has reappeared on
a number of occasions, these committees are defined in terms
of the matters referred to them. some examples taken from
the last 30 years will illustrate the range of their subjects:
constitutional Reform, Ivlinisters' Private Interests ' wine
Making Industry, Decimal currency Bill, New zealand superannua-
tion BiIl and Violent Offending. Until they were discontinued
in 1980, the Island Affairs and Road safety committees had
acquired the character of permanent committees because they
had come to be regularly appointed along with the others at
the beginning of each session or Parliament, but they were
not part of the original committee structure'
The committee system has not remained constant in the
post-war period; changes to the structure have come in three
waves Lg62, Lg72 and 1979 in each case after a review by
a Standing Orders Committee.
Inthel0yearspriorto1962therewere2Icommittees
with workloads which ranged from appointing a chairman to the
consideration of numerous bills (Table 7'1) ' AIt committees
had I0 members with the exception of Bi11s, Selectj'on (Private
sills),PrivilegesandStandingordersonPrivateBills(five),
and External Affairs (12), a total of I92 positions' not
including the ad hoc committees'
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The L962 report of the Standing Orders Committee attempted
to rationalise the system by recommending that as a general rule
each member should serve on only one select committee, the
commj-ttee membership should be reduced, and "Some measure of
amalgamation" should occur to reduce the number of committees.
Its proposal to reduce the number of policy committees from 12
to eight was not accepted by the House and the result was the
merger only of Agriculture and Pastoral with Lands, and Labour
Bills with Goldfields and Mines (Table 7.1).5
Its most important proposal was to convert the role of the
Pub1ic Accounts Committee, "merely an ineffective Estimates
Committee", into a new committee which would also examine the
public accounts.6 The report envisaged that its sessional
function would be to consider the main and supplementary
estimates while its recess function would be to examine the
audited accounts and to make other inquiries as it saw fit.
The new Public Expenditure Committee was given the power to
sit during the recess and appoint sub-committees-
One other structural change was the amalgamation of the
Public Petitions A to L and M to Z Committees into one.7 Tto
committees acquired new titles: Public Health became Social
Servj-ces and its terms of reference were changed to include
both health and social matters; Industries and Commerce was
renamed Commerce, and overseas trade was specified as one of
Not inplenented were its reonnendations that D<ternal Affairs ard
Oefence be arnalganated ard a Social Services Conrn-itt€e be created
to mver education, pr:blic heal-th, sociat securitlz and war ;:ensions.
A.J.H.R. I T.I7 (L962), P.17.
A.J.H.R., I.L1 (1962), pp.20-22.
In add.ition, Bills Conmittee and Standi-:ng Orders on Private lknbers
Bills were no longer autornatically appointed. at the begbrdng of
each session, although ttre fonrer c-ontirrued to be requi-red LD/ a
Standing Order.
q
6.
7.
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its subjects in addition to those contained in its original
tit1e.
There was one other innovation at this tj"me resulting
from the recommendations of a special Comrnittee on Delegated
Legislation.S th" terms of reference of the Statutes Revision
Committee, previously confined to the technical legal provisions
of bills, $rere enlarged to cover regulations. In order to give
effect to this change, the Committee's powers were incorporated
in the standing orders, and included the powers to sit during
an adjournment or recess and to require departments to submit
memoranda and provide witnesses to assist in elucidating
regulations under consideration.
No alterations were made by the L962 Standing orderS
Committee to the size of committees; the existing range of
five to 10 members was retained. The actual reduction in the
total number of committee positions was partly offset by making
an exception of the Public Expenditure committee by allowing
it 12 members, and by extending the practice of enlarging com-
mittees with the leave of the House to L2. Previously only
External Affairs was fixed at that size; that committee, plus
Maori Affairsr9 continued to have 12 members, and Statutes
Revision acquired an extra two members in 1967. They were
shortly to be joined by another l2-member committee, because
Island Territories, first appointed in 1964 during the session
as a special committee with the power to sit during the recess'
subsequently reappeared in Lg67 as a committee regularly ap-
8.
9.
A.J.H.R., r.18 (1962) .
rtre l,laori Affairs Conrnittee had previor:sly been regarded as a-special
case but i:r 1951 the governnent had i1rsisted on 10 nembers. see E M
rcGuy, "political Ad1arent About Represegtation: l1tre Case of the
l4aori Seats,,, Politicif Stuai"s, :Onftlt (MaIdI, 1980), pp.52-3'
Le9
pointed at the beginning of each session.
The number of committee positions (not counting ad hoc
committees) were initially reduced by 36 to 156, but with
these additions, the number of positions on public policy
committees was by Lg67 egual to that prior to the changes'
This ensured that the objective of the Standing Orders Com-
mittee of one position per member could not be met, although
the effect in practice was reduced by the irregularity of
some committees I meetings.
A different approach was adopted by the 1972 Standing
Orders Committee which "decided that no worth-while amalgama-
tion was practical, but that a reduction in the size of
existing committees should result in the more effective
functioning of the committee system".I0 The only adjustment
was the coupling of mining with collunerce, leaving the labour
sphere as the sole concern of one committee'
The main contribution of the committee's review was the
reduction in the size of existing select committees - A
majority of the committees had their membership set at seven'
Selection and Privileges continued with five, and the more
popular or important committees were assigned 10 (Local Bills,
Lands and Agrj-culture, Public Expenditure and Statutes Revision) '
or11(ForeignAffairsandMaoriAffairs)members.oneother
minor variation in procedure was the decision to appoint com-
mittees for the duration of a Parliament rather than at the
beginning of each session.
10. A.J.H.R., I.19 (L972), P"11.
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The l,gTg Standing Orders Committee gave the most attention
in its report to the select committee system of any of the re-
views but concluded that "fundamental changes to the present
select committee structure are not needed".Il The changes im-
plemented at the end of the 1979 session were as follows:
Education and Labour were amalgamated with the size of the new
committee set at l0; rsland Affairs disappeared, such matters
now being referred to Foreign Af f airs,' Road saf ety was dropped
from the list of permanently constituted select committees;
and Statutes Revision was empowered to initiate its own en-
quiries into regulations, and to establish sub-commj-ttees'12
Other adjustments included a change in t'he title of Socia1
services to Health and welfare, dD enlargement of the terms
of reference of commerce and Mining to include energy, with
recognition given to the change by the substitution of that
word for mining in the title, and an increase in the member-
ship of the Public Expenditure committee to 12 members.
Duringthelast20yearsthecommi-tteesystemhasbeen
rationalised by changes which have reduced their number and
size. The housekeeping and specialised committees have been
least affected apart from the merger of the two original
petitions committees into one. The changes to the structure
have been concentrated on six of the original policy committees'
four of which, after various functional shuffles, eventually
became the Labour and Education, and Commerce and Energy
committees in 1979. The Road safety and Island Territories/
11.
L2.
A.J.H.R. , I.LA (1979) , P.Lz.
It tlrereby joirrs ttre Pr:lc1ic Elpenditure comdttee as
with por,ve-rs to set up sr:bonmittees. The tedlnical
was the reason giverrfor creating a secrcnd exception'
tJ:e only ccffirLittee
natr:re of its u,ork
201
Affai-rs Committee were introduced as the need arose and have
since disappeared.
of the public policy committees, Defence, Foreign Affairs
and Maori Affairs remained almost unchanged for the period'
Their policy spheres, plus those of Lands and Agriculture and
Labour and Education were not formally increased. The Commerce
and Energy, and Hea1th and Welfare Committees have experienced
minor additions to the scope of their work. The Statutes
Revision Committee acquired one additional role which was not
utilised for most of the period. The most significant innova-
tion was the conversion of the Public Accounts Committee into
the Public Expenditure Committee'
A lack of specialisation has been apparent in the dis-
tribution of committee positions among members. In L97L, 4O
per cent of the Mps were assigned to three or four committe.=.13
For much of the session this was not necessarily a problem, for
some committees met rarely, if at all. But because of the
tendency to fit committee work in between the sitting hours
of the House, members inevitably encountered conflicts in the
scheduling of meetings.14 This was symptomatic of the status
of committees in the parliamentary system.
The 2l committees of the pre-I962 period have now become
15 while the number of committee positions has been whittled
from 192 to L26. With 12 more members in the House, it could
be argued. that the 1980 committee system was approaching the
goal of one committee per member espoused by the L962 report.
R M Alley, ',Oolmlttees of ttre House" Seminar Paper, Can Par:lianent Sr:nrirre
Without Reform, Depa-rtIEnt of llniversity bctension, Victoria llnirre::sity of
13.
Wetli:rgton, October 1971, P.4-
Austin Mitckrell, Coverrurent by Party, p.78; . Keith Jackson, New Zealard:polirics of chutrgffi 'shu"ation, 1973), p- I27iS;-EryT-
ffi p"[itI"*, the onbr:dsrnan and Political ctrange in Ner'r
14.
Zealand,', politicat St.raies, )O(tI (Septerrber 1974), PF.338-9.
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Bus iness
The measurable output of the committee system is the
reports made to the House. Of the various matters referred
to select committees - public, private and local biI1s,
petitions, regulations and parliamentary papers, and tasks
for special investigation - no committee receives the full
range; most do not constantly receive more than two types
of business.
By their order of reference, based on a standing order
or tradition, a committee may concentrate either on a par-
ticular policy sphere or a particular type of business, oE
both. Petitions, selection and Local BiIls specialise in
types of business, but the latter committee is not exclusively
concerned with local bills; it has also considered petitions
(which may have been a preliminary step to introducing a
local birl) or public legislation affecting local government'
Lands (later Lands and Agriculture) reports on policy matters
coming under those heads, but it has also been required to
examine local bills affecting Crown Lands '
Themajorityofpetitionshavebeenreferredtothe
Petitions Committee (or, prior to 1962' the two committees
on petitions) but public policy committees have also con-
sidered a good proportion of them. Private Bills are confined
to the Selection (Private Bills) Committee and special com-
mittees on bills. A11 local bills have been referred only
to the committee of that name, with some also going to the
Lands and Agriculture committee. Regulations and parliamentary
papers have been considered by only a sma11 number of cOmmittees'
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Few committees have engaged in special investj-gations; they
are usually Ieft to specially constituted committees. Most
public policy committees have received both petitions and
bills for consi-deration -
over the last three decades a series of changes has
taken place in the work of the committee system and the dis-
tributj-on of business. The business of committees may fluc-
tuate between sessions or Parliaments, but there are nonethe-
less clear trends over the period. These can be shown by
considering the reports of committees for the phases between
each review of the committee 
"yste*. 
15
In the 1950s, 2L select committees were regularly es-
tablished each year at the beginning of the session. The
existence of many of these committees was based more on the
possibility that matters might be referred to them rather
than a predictabte demand for their services. The workload
was concentrated in particular committees which consistently
received numerous referrals of business. The committees
specialising in non-public matters \^rere responsible for more
than half the reports made to the House. I'he Local Bills
committee made 24g and the petiti-ons committees a total of
203 (Table 7 .z',) . The more heavily utilised public policy
committees for 1952-61 were Maori Affairs (107 reports) '
Statutes Revision (g7) and Land's (71)' OnIy one committee
could be regarded as having a relatively heavy commitment to
public legislation; the statutes Revision committee reported on
public bills on 95 occasions during the period and produced 45
r€ports by conmittees concernilg eitkrer access of the nerrrs nedia
to neetj-ngis or elq)ressiorrs of appreciation for Senrices rendered'
are errcruded fronr- the arnlysis beror. see_apperdix for furtherdetals. rhe d.LIi;6;i9?9 gi"-*it incluii-ed bgtSgpg.ttreg couldfrt66""tte"'tiea-gnti-f-*r-.foqrna1 for that year was prrrasnecr'
15.
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TAB!E_!' ? Coln$,ittee Reports, 1952-61
rrr$.L-ic Non-Pr$lie Otjrer Mis@L-petitionE Eills tsiUs SrbLic lqqeous xwal
Public Policy
.egricultural Arl:l
Pas'@a1
Defence
Rlucabiorr
netemr Af,fairs
aoldfields & M:ines
Irqdustries, e
@ilnerce
Labor,rr Bills
Ldnds
lhori .Affai:cs
Fr&Iic Aceunts
Fub-lia Xleal.th
Statlrtes B\rision
SPeeial,ised
IJoeaf Biltrs
Pr$Lic PetitionsAtoL
Fublic Petitions
&!rbu
,seitection(privae bills)
Standing orderc cn
Priwrte Bills
Dogest1o
Ilolise
f,ibra4"
Frivlleges
.Ad Hoc (16)
L2
L7,
10
1
1
4!8
r00
103
7
15
3
7
.t .t
1T
159
1,9
L7
2's
4
L2
2
3L
7L
107
I
30
97
I
I8
f,0
t:
L7
2,
I
L3
3'4
2I
13
95
6
4
32 ' 249
1,03
31
t1II
3
91
l_1.
3
16
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per cent of the total reports by the policy committees on such
matters. That committee plus Lands and lr{aori Af fairs accounted
for 72 per cent of the reports on public bills.
of the other nine public policy committees, two averaged
three reports per year for the period, four averaged one or
two reports per session, while three committees, External
Affairs, Industries and Commerce and Public Accounts, made a
total of only seven reports to the House in the 10 year period.
only five of the 12 (Labour Bills, Lands, Maori Affiars, Publi-c
Health and Statutes Revision) reported to the House in every
session of the period, while at the other extreme, Public
Accounts reported in only one out of 10 sessions'
Reports do not provide a fult indication of committee
activity (although they are the only tangible measure of output)
for a few serve different functions and report rarely (External
Affairs Committee) or never (House Committee) - Frequency of
meetings gives an indication of unreported activities and
some idea of whether number of reports and type of busi-ness
reflects the actual distribution of workoad. fn 1956, for
example, of 72 meetings held by the public policy committees,
40 were concentrated in three committees (Public Accounts,
Education and Labour Bills). The other nine committees averaged
3.6 meetings, and in one of these cases the only item of busi-
ness conducted at the single meeting of the committee was the
election of a chairman.
For the Lg52-6I period, petiti-ons were not only considered
by more committees than any other type of business, but overall
comprised the major type of business transacted.
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Between Lg62 and 1971 the pattern of activity of the
previous I0 years was maintained but there were two major
changes. There was a substantial growth in the number of
reports to the House, with the increase involving legisla-
tion referred Lo committees. Secondly, the number of reports
on petitions dropped substantially with much of the decline
being accounted for by the Maori Affairs committee.
public bills continued to be sent in a similar proportion
to the Statutes Revision Committee as in the previous period'
although their number had increased by about 50 per ""rrt.16
But with the greater volume of legislation being referred to
select committees, other committees were handling more bills'
Nevertheless the workload of the committee system remained
unevenly distributed with Local Bills (329 reports in the 10
year period.), statutes Revision, Lands and Agriculture and
Petitions bearing much of the burden (Table 7'3) '
The number of reports understates the work of committees
such as Public Expenditure, which was producing comprehensive
annual reports covering a range of matters, or External Affairs'
which often met frequently (on 18 occasions in 1965) to receive
briefings but did not produce any repott".17 Cornmittee records
for 1965 indi-cate that frequency of meetings was otherwise
The trrcssibility of establishing a second Statutes Fvision Oonmittee was
"""i$r"Gd fi 1956. N.z.P.D:, 346 (Jr:ne 10, 1966) , pp'396-7'
ltlre Foreign Affairs conmittee has functioned as a nedir-rn for ocnnn:nicati:lg
infonnati6n to its nernbers wlrich is not for pr:b1ic collsuq)tion. lltre aonr
rnittee presr:rnably would have considered the petition and bi1ls referred
to t}re Islard Territories Conrnittee if ttre titter had rpt been established'
For ttre role of tjre cormr:ittee, see Janes L Kerber, "Foreign Po1iry and
the Legislatr:re: Select Conmittees on Foreign Affairs"' in Stephen Levi:re
l"a), ioiitcs in Nsnr Zeafard (Sydney: Ceorge $_1* & Urrrrin, 1978) , pp'143-l4g; a'd peter w=ffi"i"'iq" Afr"j-ts ard Parlianent", Nev,r zeala'.l
International Reviss, w (SePtenrber L979), PP'5-6'
15.
l-7.
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TABLE 7.3
--
Dis'tribution of Business L962-L97L
PubLic usn-Pr&.lic other lollscel-Fetltions ar11s BiUs t|rbl f lb
EsEUs-EsIiss
Ocrnneree
Def,erse
Educafiion
ktelrral Aff,airs
Island Territoriesl
Affeiits
Labsur ard lllning
r€qtds e Agtrisulfirge
I,IaEri. affairs
Publfu Ependitelre
Social Servis€g
Statrrtres Reqision
gp_geiefeEqa
Lccal Bills
Petitions
SelecLion(Friv.ate Bilfs)
Bi 1l-s
Domesbic
Hqrse
r,ilrary
Frivileges
RdJoe (16)
2
23
13
9
16
25
28
5
13
3
I1
30
s3
22
3;
19
L42,
2,40
7
11
4
15
30
,:
5'
46
l.r3
47
14
e7
t_51
349
165
45I
5
3
27
I
4
33
[65
2
10
45
1
54
5
3
5
* The special earonittee appointed, in 1964 is included under
ad hocs.
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related to the level of business. The total number of meetings
(196) was approaching twice that for 1956'
rn the third period, L972-78, the statutes Revision com-
mittee continued to receive the most public bills of the public
policy committees but proportionately fewer than 1962-71 be-
cause the spread of business among committees was greater (Table
7.4) . A number of committees continue to show very little
visibte output. The three committees associated with external
relationships, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Island Affairs'
were not actively engaged during this period with matters
referred by the House.
More ad hoc corunittees were
period and produced 20 reports.
at about the stlme rate as in the
appointed in this shorter
Petitions l4rere reported on
previous period.
The changes in type of business conducted by committees
during the years L952-7 B are summarised in Table 7 .5. During
the earlier sessions more reports were produced by select
committees on petitions received from individuals and groups,
than any other type of business. Public and non-public bills
accounted for similar proportions of reports, but other public
questions were the subject of relatively few reports. It'lost
committee work was concerned with matters emanating directly
from the communityl- 70 per cent of reports concerned
petitions, local biIls and private bills.
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TABLE 7.4 Distribution of Business 1972-78
Petitions
Non-h:blic
BiJ-ls
other Miscel-Prrlclic laneor:sPr:lc1icBil1s Ilotal
Public PoIicY
Ccnnerc€ & Mining
Defence
Education
Foreign Affaj-:cs
Island Affairs
labour
Iands e agriculture
l4aori Affairs
Public $penditure
bad Safetlr(L973-79\
Social Se6/ices
Statutes Revision
Specialised
I-ocal Bil1s
Petitions
Selection(Private Bills)*
Bi11s
Domestic
House
LiJrrary
Privileges
Ad Hoc (21)
23
2
15
I
4
25
85
2L
10IO
7
I
I
7
22
1
I
I
4
20
54
t:
2
16
82
29
1
5
24
6
I
ll8
40 to:
25
2
8
I
4
10
46
87
L52
118
25
2
I
L2
20
L2
special committees appoiltea !v tle committee of selectionto deal with private Bills maa6 20 reports- Although thesedetails are now included in the Journlts they were not for
""tf i"t periods, and the reportsaEEErefore 
omj-tted from
the table.
TABLE 7.5
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Distribution of Committee Business Period
PeLitions
Public
Bills
Non-Pttblic
Bills
Other
Pr:blic
ltiscel-
Ianeous Tbtal
L952-79
Period
19 52-61
L962-7L
L97 2-7 B
z
45.2(420)
30 .1(322)
30 .4(200)
9o
26.6(247)
34 .1
( 364)
4r.6
(27 4)
z
24 .4(227)
30 .9(330)
2A.8(137 )
z
2.2(20)
3.3
( 35)
4.7
( 31)
t
L.7(16)
1.6
( 17)
2.4(16)
B
100.0(930)
100 .0(1068)
100 .0(6s8)
In the following decade a larger number of reports emerged
from the committee system with the increase involving legisla-
tion. The highest rise of any category of business was public
bilts although local bills were also reported on in greater
numbers. The number of reports on the subject of petitions
droppedsharply.Thismaybeonlypartlyattributedtothe
establishment of the Ombudsman's Office at the beginning of
this period for the l"laori Affairs committee experienced the
main decrease in Petitions.
Achangewasalsoapparentinthenatureofpetitions.
According to Hilt, two-thirds of the petitions reported on
by the Petitions Committee(s) for Lg57-67 were from individuals
while for 1968-72 they accounted for one-quarter of the total '
In the latter period the mean number of multiple-sj-gnature
petitions increased and petitions were more concerned with
public policy.18
IB. Hill, "Parlianentar1 Petitions" , p.34L-2'
2TL
Durj-ngthelasteightyears,publicbillshavecometobe
more prominent in the work of the committee system with their
reportsaccountingfor42percentofthetotal.Reportson
petitions have continued at the same rate as in the previous
period, while those on local bills have dropped sharply' Com-
paring the first and third periods, it is evident that reports
on ,,other public matters" have increased although continuing
to form a sma1l proportion of the overall output'
Ad Hoc Committees
Special committees have played an important role i-n
supplementing the work done by the permanent committee system'
Between Ig52 and 1979 52 ad hoc committees were appointed and
all but one (the Meremere Power Station CoaI Supply Committee
met on at least one occasion but no report resulted), reported
to the House. Included in this number are three permanent
select committees which were delegated special recess functions:
Statutes Revision Committee (195I-2) ' Local Bills (f959-60) and
Lands and Agriculture (1963-5). Since the latter occasion
permanent committees have not been distinguished for this
purpose, although they may still undertake inquiries in the
recess. The Public Expenditure committee is the best example'
but its recess work is part of its order of reference' Island
Territories has been included for l964 despite the generality
of its terms of reference and the Road' safety committees ap-
pointedin1965-6and1967-3arealsoregardedasspecial
committees.
The
according
ad hoc committees have been grouPed in Table 7 '6
work. The ParliamentarYto the nature of their
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and procedural category covers the five standing orders com-
mittees constituted during this period (with the exception of one
limited to private bills) plus two committees concerned with
either parliamentary papers or Parliament's role in delegated
Iegislation. Also included are three committees established to
inquire into questions relating to ministerial responsibilities '
More than one-third of the committees were constituted to
examine a public bill referred by the House (although several
committees also reported on related bills). This function has
become more important; such special committees in the 1970s
were solely concerned with a single bill, often a major and
complex piece of legislation.
The most important function, in terms of the number of
reports, has been the inquiries of special committees. Their
investigations normally spanned two sessions and in some cases
three or four. The scope of their briefs often involved a
comprehensive review of a sphere of policy; for example, the
wine-making industry, irrigation, national library, road
safety and women's r-',-ghts. They often resulted in impressive
reports (for example the Inquiry into the Structure of Local
Government) or sometimes a series of reports (the voluminous
output of the Fishing Industry Committee between 1969 and L972L
A significant dimension of many of these inquiries was
the review of a particular policy sphere in conjunction with
existing legislation with a view to generating proposals for
government action. As a part of the investigative process
the views of persons affected were received and taken into
account. special committees have consequently played a Pre-
2r4
legislative role in the policy-making process which has
influenced bitls eventually introduced into the House.
Other Developments
A series of other developments in procedure and practice
has occurred in the past two decades as the work of the com-
mittee system has expanded. As a consequence of the relaxation
of some of the limitations on committees and the introduction
of other changes, their role in the parliamentary system has
been enhanced.
one convention has been more closely adhered to: the
House has maintained the rule that select committees should
not meet during sittings of the House (Standing Order 351).
While exceptions were not freguent there were more occasions
in which committees were granted leave to sit while the
House was meeting prior to 1962. During the last two Parlia-
ments, leave was given to only one committee (in 1976) and
the Opposition opposed the motj-or,.19
It is also necessary under the standing order for the
House to give leave for committees to meet on days the House
is not sitting. During the 1950s the committees given such
permission were usually undertaking a specific inquiry. Since
then the permanent select committees have been given leave
more frequently and a larger number of committees have met in
the recess. In Lg7O, for example, I0 of these select committees
were granted leave to sit during that period-
The Hon Dr A M Fi-nlay argued, in opposition to the nntion,that such
neeti:rgs of conrnittees interfere with the n:nning of the House and
have pieviou.sly been disrupted because nernbers have-been-olliqeq
to return to tlre ctranber. N.Z.P.D., 408 (Novernber L7,L976\, p'3973'
19.
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committees might also meet d.uring adjournments of the
House after the opening of Parliament. To enable this, the
House would pass a motion suspending the Standing Order which
prohibited such meetings. This practice became more common,
and during the 1960s short adjournments of the House were often
arranged in order that committees might catch up with their
work.
In the 1973-5 and l-g76-B Parliaments, respectively 26 per
cent and 22 per cent of committee meetings, were held either
during recesses or ad.journments. These figures may well under-
state the actual hours spent in these meetings for when the
House is not sitting more time is available.
During the last two parliamentary terms, committees have
held, on the average, more than 300 meetings each year (Table
7.7) . Two dimensions of committee work which are not reflected
in the number of reports made to the House is the involvement
of the policy committees in the estimates and the time spent
in hearing representations on matters before committees '
Since L|TZ select committees other ttran the Public Expen-
diture Commj-ttee have been assigned the role of examining the
estimate votes related to their terms of reference. Of the
total time occupied by select committees' consideration of
the estimates in the last two Parliaments, 42 per cent was
spent by these committe.".20 In LgTg 11 committees, other
than public Expenditure, examined 23 of 45 votes,2l which
20. Calculated from figr:res in A F von Tunzelrnann, "llhe Pr:blic E>perditure
@nmittee and parliamentarlr @ntrol of Pr:blic $cperditrrre" , 
-gqbo5l3Universiq, of Wellington Gw Rerriew, t0 (February 1979) ' P.30.
A.J.H.R. , L-Lz (f979), p.5.2L.
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TABLE 7.7 Conmlttee Actinittr in Sessions L973-79
riear:inge submissions Uade
btal Ptrblic Bil1s OPen to orr aIL BiUs
P,alclXarent Session [betings Fferi:ed lEvlg ]tsdia Wrted to Houqe
OEal l{ritten
na
nEl
ira
nil
Da
na
35
28
37
54
5I
44
1973
Lg14
1975
37
39
37
L8
5:2
43
25
38 L976
L97V
1978
1979
313
358
2s5
324
385
27,9
422
295*
408
193
343
385*
7s2
290
1590606639
'The figgres do not j.nclgde d,etajls for the last three
weeles o,f the s,e,ssiolts.
Source,s: ilournals I9?3-19?9 ; N.Z.P,D. L973'L979 (Worksffifcs of CormirEEET-; necords of Select
Gornnr.'ittee Meetings .
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meant that all permanent public policy committees other than
Island Affairs participated in the work.
There is a long tradition of committees receiving rep-
resentations on the subject of matters before select committees.
Ivlajor activities of committees in the past, petitions and local
bilIs, have been inspired by individuals and groups j-n the com-
munity who may wish to submit their views either in writing or
in person. Committees have also conducted hearings in relation
to special inquiries. The incidence of submissions in past
sessions is not known but it can be assumed that the number
has grown with the increase in legislation. t'lost bills con-
sidered by select committees during the last four sessions
were the subject of submissions (the exceptions including
"washing-up biIIs") . An ind.ication of the interest in legis-
fation is shown by the number of oral and written submissions
made in relation to bills before select committees during
those years (Table 7.7) . The number of submissions varied
greatly between bills with the Town and Country Planning Bill
Lg77 (253) , the National Development Bitl (335) and the Family
Proceedings BiIl (861) both in 1979, accounting for a large
proportion of the written submissions in those y"ut".22
A further develoPment has
ceedings of select committees'
accredited members of the news
was given to the Press on onlY
been the oPening of the Pro-
other than deliberations, to
media. In the 1950s access
one occasion after 1951, the
ltre infonrration on sulcmissions is derived from the ans^ters to a cailF
posite r^rritten question asked annually by llr C R Irh.rshall for the years
lglA-g. Ttre Family Proceedings BiII, first introdr:ced' i11 1978' was
"seapped" and t"pL"ea by a nfamlly law Srackagr.e" corrsisting of fourbills-- eccording to the -cotrmittee ctnirnrart "since tlte first bill was
introduced, the fo*nitt"" had spent nearly 150 hor:rs hearing sr:lxnissions
22.
and deliberating on them". ffrJOorninion, Augr:st 8' 1980, P.1-
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hearing of a petition by the Education Commj-ttee in 1956.
The House granted the petitions committee the right in 1960
and 1961 to admit the press for hearings on three petitions.
The practice was then extended to localbills (the two bills
on the proposed Auckland Regional Authority) and public bills
in 1962, and to other matters of public interest in the
succeeding years (for example Constitutional Reform 1963'
News lr[edia Ownership BiIl 1965, Road Safety L966, Sale of
Liquor Bill L967, Personal Injury Compensation 1969, Ivlanapouri
Petition L970 and Equar Pay Bill L972) ' Although it became
usual for at least one committee to have open proceedings
each session, most committee business was not affected: by
1972 only four committees had their proceedings open in
relation to five matters.
A major change occurred the following year when the
Labour Party extended the frequency of open meetings. The
effect of this change can be seen from the figures in Table
7.7. fn the 1973-5 Parliament the meetings on 67 per cent
of public bills referred to select committees were open to
the news media. In the following Parliament, the proportion
climbed to 78 per cent and in the fi-rst session of the present
Parliament to 91 per cent.
In the meantime the powers of the Local Bi1ls Committee
had been enlarged to allow it a measure of independence from
the House j-n its functioning. An increase in the number of
local bills appears to have been the reason for granting the
Committee the right to sit during any adjournment or recess
2r9
and to receive bills when the House was not in session. The
Committeers consideration of bills between sessions, which
attracted local interest, led in 1974 to a departure from
the normal practice of requesting the approval of the House be-
foreadmitting the news media. It became the only committee
with the power under Standlng Orders to order that its pro-
ceedings, other than deliberations, be open to the news media.23
One other innovation of i-mportance for the development
of the committee system was the appointment of permanent
professional officers to advise and assist eommittees. The
organisational arrang'ements and cLerical services for each
committee had been provided by a committee clerk (usually a
retired public servant) Government departments supplied
advice and assistance, and freguently one of their officers
was attached to the committee for an investigation. With the
acceptance in the 1970s of the need to improve members' services
and facititi 
"r,24 and the initiation of a number of extensive
investigations (including the work undertaken by the Public
Expenditure Committee), attention was given to augmenting the
resources of committees.25 An advisory service for select
committees was created in the Clerk's Office consisting of two
officers, with the provision for the appointment as the need
arose of special advisors.
23.
24.
23.
Ttre ctranges resul-ted from reconn:erdations of Starding Orders Cormitt€es
i:r 1967 (A.J.H.R., I.L4, p.8) ard 1974 (A.J,H.R., I.14, p.8).
See Glapter 8.
An e>perinent witJ: a special adrrisor, appoilted to take an active rolein the investigation bf a special conmitteeinbpersonal accident corr
pensation, had already established the value of sucLr assistance. See
"Nev,r Zealand: Notes on the Establishnent of an Advisory Service for
Se1ect Cormittees", Itle Parlianentarian, LV (July L974), pp.208-9.
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Since then the service has not expanded in order to
meet the needs of. the cornmittee system. A recent report by
a sub-committee of the Public Expenditure Committee observes
that its present staffing is inadequate in relation to the
work it should be undertaking. It proposes the appointment
of two full-time support staff in addition to the present
two (a part-time advisory officer from the Legislative
Department and a full-time person seconded from the Audit
)Aoffice) . -"
The procedure for referring bills to select committees
has been the subject of two changes. The first was not one
of substance although it can be regarded as a symbolj-c gain
for the committee system. Prior to L972 the formal rules
required bills (with some exceptions stated in Standing
Orders) to be read a second time before being sent to a
select committee. The usual practice followed was for bills
to be given a pro forma second reading and then to be re-
ferred to a committee. The second reading debate subsequently
occurred on the formal motion for committal. The procedure
was thought to be confusing and a simple adjustment to
Standing orders allowed bills to be referred by a resolution
of the House, once they had been read a first ti*e.27
The second chanqe had more significance for the status
of the committee system. Consideration of legislation has
always been an important role of a few commi-ttees, but in the
Iast few Parliaments public bills have become the main pre-
26.
27.
A.J.H.R. , r.L2
A.J.H.R., r.19
p.13.
(1979) pp.16-17.
(1972), pp.9-10. See also A.J.H.R., I.LA (1968)
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occupation of the committee system. During the 37th Parliament
an average of 50 public bills were referred to committees in
each session. The number dropped in the following Parliament
to 40 but rose to 66 in the first session of the present
Parliament. The legislative orientation of committee work
was confirmed by the decisions in 1979 to refer automatically
all Government bills (other than those either of a financial
or budgetary nature, or of an emergency or urgent nature) to
select committees following their first te.ding.28 Committees
can be expected to play an increasing part in the parliamentary
work as a result, and already in 1980 the effects of the in-
novation are being exPerienced.
There has also been a move towards a greater recognition
of the reports made by committees to the House. The procedure
in the Committee of the Whole has been to discuss the original
bill in conjunction with the amendments recommended by a select
committee (rather than a draft resulting from the committee's
deliberations as is the practice in other parliaments based on
the Westminster model ) .29 The work of committees was acknow-
ledged in l g72 by a "streamlining" measure whereby bilts
reported without major amendment could be taken in toto in the
Committee of the Whole House if there were no objections from
members. Otherwise the committee's "opinions" would continue
to be considered as clauses were discussed individually'
Amendments to bi1ls recommended by select committees continued
to remain as proposals until moved in the commj-ttee of the
whole. The LgTg stand.ing orders committee decided that for
28.
29.
A.J.H.R. , T.L4 (1979), pp.7-8.
Valentine Herman, Parlianents(Iondon: Macllillan Press,
of tfre t'lbrld: A &ference
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government legislation such amendments should be deemed to
have been made by the second reading of the bi1l. Deletions
from a bill made by a select committee would only be debated
if moved as amendments in the Committee 
"t"9..30
The present committees with their jurisdictions are
shown in Table 7.8i an ad hoc committee on Electoral Law was
also functioning in mid-1980. While the spheres of the policy
committees coincide with or cover the responsibilities of
some departments, there are a number of important omissions '
The estimates retained by the Public Expenditure Committee
for its consideration because no appropriate committee existed,
provide one indication of the gaps. In l-979 they included
Broadcasting, Housirg, Railways, Tourist and Publicity and
Works and Development.3l The LgTg Standing Orders Committee
considered converting the Road Safety Committee into a
Transport Committee but rejected that option because it
felt insufficient legislative work would be avail-abl".32
With the extension of the roles of committees to include
both estimates and most legislation, the potential work for
extra policy committees is growing-
Roles of Committees
Committees have
parliamentary system.
portance, involved aII
played six main roles in the New Zealand
These roles have not been of equal im-
committees, or been constant over time'
30.
31.
32.
A.J.H.R., r.19
A.J.H.R. I T.I2
A.J.H.R., l.I4
A.J.H.R. , r.I4 (1979), P.8.(L972), p.10;
(1979) , p.6.
(1979), p.13.
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The committee system for much of the post-war period
has acted largely as a recipient of demands and requests
made by members of the community for the satisfaction of
what were mainly specific interests. Most committee rePorts
were on the subjects of either Iocal and private bills or
petitions. The House played a relatively minor role in in-
itiating work for specialised consideration of committees '
In two of the three post-war periods non-public bills were
the subject of almost as many reports as public bills.
The historicat role of committees in considering
petitions was maintained in the post-war Parliaments ' That
there had been a decline in this activity since the early
part of the century is solely because fewer petitions were
received. If the House had not continued to refer petitions
to select committees there would have been little reason to
retain several of the public policy committees for much of
the post-war period. This function is now apparently unique
to the New Zealand parliamentary system for:
It is not the custom of other Commonwealth
Iegislatures to refer petitions to Select
Committees for investigation and to empower
them to secure departmental reports, to hear
evidence, or to make recomme4dations toparliament concernj-ng them, 33
Scrutiny of legislation has been a major role of committees.
Bills can be polished and sometimes amended in content' With
the increasing number of public bills referred to committees'
Ftrnrt of the Starrding Orders Cormittee l;967 , A.J.H.R., I.14 (1967)p.'g. A parlianentariin's case for tle role islffited by ttre_ Rt
fion .f R l.,larshall in "The Indiwidual- and Coverrurent: Ttre bLe of
Parlianentary Ccnrnittees", Pulclic Iecture Series, L973, Faculty of
Iaw, VictorG hiversity of Wellington, L2 Jr:ne 1973'
33.
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qovernment legislation has become more prominent in their
work. Decisions taken in 1979 will ensure that this function
predominates in the future.
Loca1 bills are the only category of legislation which
may be referred to a select committee when the House is not in
session. Public legislation, in conformity with the "weak
committee System" used in New Zealand, is referred to the
select committee after the first reading stage in the House'
The opportunity may now exist for departures from this rule'
The Public Finance BiII passed j-n 1977 was referred to the
public Expenditure Committee prior to its formal introduction
in the chamber. The success of this experiment led the L979
Standing Orders Committee to commend pre-legislative considera-
tion of draft bi11s where they are of a technical nature.34
Governments had made the practice of withholding bills
from select committees which in the Oppositionts view warrant
such consideration.35 Three reasons for non-referral of bil1s
in the past, "lack of an appropriate committee lack of
legal complexity [and] Iack of outside interests anxious
to testify,,,36 served to limit the rol-e of the committee
system. Another proposal, which was implemented in 1980' was
to refer al-I bills (with the exception of "money bills" and
bil1s of an urgent nature) automatically to select committees '
The work of committees will not increase in the same proportion
as the higher percentage of bills referred, for many whose
34. A.J.H.R., I.14 (1979) , p.5.
35. Ibr exanple, the New Zealand SecuriQr Intelligence Service AnerdrentBiIl 1977. Arcordilg to a subrnission rnade by tJ:e Clerk's Office to
the 1979 Starding Orders Conrnittee, five of the bills not referred to
select conmitteei in fgf8 i-nvolved significant e>rpendib:res-
of36. bbert N Kelson, The Private lvpnlcer s5 p6aliqry:nt and ttre Forrnation to
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Passage has
in content.
broaden the
been confined to the House have been insubstantial
Nevertheless, this decision will undoubtedly
role of committees in the legislative process '
An important role of committees in relation to legislation
was often an extension of the pre-occupation with relationships
with the community, which characterised non-public business.
Committees have served as a mechanism for recej"ving and hearing
representations from individuals and groups on qovernment bills
which attracted public interes t.37 In this respect they may act
as a thermometer for gauging public reactions to policy changes'
This role was not confined to legislation; committees have
received submissions on a range of matters on which a government
has been contemplating actj-on.
A fourth function of committees has been that of task
groups for undertaking investigations on public policy questions '
This activity has been mainly undertaken by speci-ally appointed
committees (although the recent reports of the Road Safety
Committee indicate one significant exception), but propor-
tionately fewer such committees have been appointed in the
last few Parliaments. The increasing use of the periods when
parliament j-s not meeting, for consideration of bills held over
from one session to another, frdY well have contributed to this
decline. The manpower resources which once were committed to
consideration of policy problems as a preliminary step towards
producing legislation may now be channelled, following the
adoption of the recommendation of the L979 Standing orders
Committee, into examining proposals already introduced into
37. See for e<arn5rle, Austin lvlitctrell, Coverrurent by Party:= Parll'?g.ent E*Folitics i-rn Nevy Zealard (Christctrurch: l{hitmnbe & Ibil)s' I9bb), p.tr.
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the House. The reconrmendation of that Report for committees
to examine draft bills involves a later pre-legislative stage
than that of the ad hoc investigations, and is confined to
technical matters. If this proves to be the case, the modest
role of committees in generating public policy may well be
diminished.
rnvestigations may form part of another role, that of
administrative oversight. This function has been mainly
confined to the Public Expenditure Committee and within that
committee's orbit, has emphasised financial manaqement.
While this committee provides a continuous investigative
capacity which was lacking in the committee system prior to
L962, its operations are circumscribed by its resources. In
effect, 10 members are resPonsible for this function within
the committee system, and while specialised sub-committees
have been used, there are limits to the investigatory work
that can be achieved by a few members' particularly when
staffing resources are inadequate.
It is difficulL to evaluate the impact of the committee
system with regard to its financial role of examining the
estimates for no records are maintainted. The Public Expenditure
Committee has clearly performed better in this respect than its
?apredecessor.Jo The practice of referring estj-mates to spec-
ialised public poticy committees is an important step in the
development of this function (although it has not always been
?q
successful. r' Bnt th" impression remains that it was designed
See Alan l"tcRobi-e, "ParlianrentarT tControl' of Pub1ic $rpenditure",in StepLren tevjne (ed) PoliticJin Nervr Zealand (Sydnqf: Ceorge^Allert
& tlnwi;, 1978), pp.lls-@, "Pr:lclic Brpenditure
Conmittee", pp.19-43.
l,bbbier "ParlianentaaT Control", p.120 .
38.
39.
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to relieve the presSure on the Public Expenditure Committee
rather than to foster specialised scrutiny by committees.
In L97g for example, the Social Services Committee considered
the Social Welfare Vote but not that of Health. Land and
Agriculture received the Land and Survey Vote plus three
other minor votes, but not that for Agriculture and Fisheries.
The terms of reference of the Commerce and Mining Committee
explicitly cover the Trade and Industry Vote but the Votes of
the Post Office, State Insurance and Energy and Earthquake and
War Damage were considered instead. The spheres eovered by
the committee system in 1980 can be seen in Table 7 .8.
Committees also perform other functions of which two
should be mentioned here. They are a means of reducing the
demands on the House; the collective membership splits into
small groups to consider specialised areas of business. The
work of committees, particularly in relation to bills' saves
the time of the House which might otherwise be occupied in
the Committee of the Whole.
Secondly, committees provide an informal and bipartisan
context for members of both parties to work together. Members
have frequently commented upon the satisfaction they receive
from committee work, or as one commented: "a spirit of meeting
and working as a Committee of Parliament rather than as members
representing either the Government or Opposition".40 In this
context, the Opposition member should' according to the Hon Dr
A M Finlay:
(Jurre 11,
Hon R D ltuldoon, N.z.P,D. , 342r/1965),p.366. Accor{ing to one surrrey
rrenbers preferred-ffiItE6e work to other aspects of parlianentaaY
roork. Alr.stil lrtitctrell, Politics and People in Ner"r Zealand (Christchurch:
Whritonbe & Ibnbs, 1969) , p.268.
40.
reconcile himself to the fact that the Government
wilt ultimately prevail, and that the Bill will be
enacted. His reiponsibility, behind the closed
doors of a committee's deliberations, should be to
make the best of a bad bargain, and co-operate to
produce legislation that will work in practi"",
however ofiensive in principle it may be'4r
Conclusions
A number of conclusions may be drawn from this survey
of the committee system in the last three decades. Although
the composition of committee work has changed and committee
work has increased enormously, relatively little use has been
made of the committee system for much of this period. There
are several reasons for this.
First, the parties, when in office, have frequently used
caucus committees for considering policy problems and under-
taking reviews of policy 
"phet"=.42 These committees may
report to the minister rather than caucus and receive the
assistance of departmental officials. An extension of this
role is the elevation of the status of the committee to that
of an official inquiry into a public question. The National
Government appointed a Fishing Committee in the I950s whose
report appeared in the Appendices of the Journals of the House
4? i J __-^_!
of Representatives.{J During the last two Parliaments a serl-es
of caucus committees has conducted inquiries and their reports
have usuarry been tabled in the House and pubrisned.44
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N.Z.P.D., 4L7 (l/lay 30, 1978), p.391. See also N.Z.P.D.,421 (October
E ffi), p.4299.
see Austin Mitchell, "caucus: The Ner,v Zealand Parlianentary Parties",
Journai of Connpreyealth political Studies, \|f (March f968), PP'I1-12'
Report of ttre Caucr.:s Fisheries Conrn:ittee' A.J.H.R.' H.f5A (1956) '
Sone exanples are: Proposed Law ftrforcenent, L973i tilrxiow Anjmals
Oorrtrol and Flated ttlaiters , L974i Translnrt, L974; l'lisr:'se of Drtrgs,
1978; Revierrir of the A&njsistrative Structr:re of National Parks and
Reserves Artninistration by the Deparfient of Lands and Sr:nqr, 1979;
Accident Conpensation' 1980 .
4L.
42.
43.
44.
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Secondly, members have more usually been concerned
with the particularised interests of individuals, groups or
localities because Parliament has preferred Lo confj'ne public
deliberation on policy to the chamber. The consideration of
the details of bills has been reserved for the plenary meetings
of parliament in the committee of the whole. Rather than
delegate responsibilities to an agency of the House, the col-
Iectivity has been occupied with the clause by clause examina-
tion of legislation by members who might otherwise have
considered these bills in a select committee'
Thirdly, the executive may prefer to handle a guestion
without utilising Parliament's committees. Kelson notes that
only a smal] proportion of bills introduced between 1945 and
1955 by Mr Holyoake, the Minister of Agriculture' were referred
to the Agricultural and Pastoral Committee'
ThereisatendencyfortheMinistertofeelthat,ifhecangetthebepartmentandthepressuregrouPs
to agree on a particirtar piece of legislation, there
isno-needforanyfurtherconsiderationofthe
matter . q f,
Notwithstandingthechangesdescribedabovethegeneral
rules governing the powers and constitution of committees as
a whole have remained largely the same' They continue to be
appointed by the House and to exist for the duration of a
Parliament. A committee may adjourn from place to place'
meet during the sittings of the Housen and admit the news
mediatoitsproceediDgS,onlywiththeleaveoftheHouse.
Committees may only report their opinions to the llouse, and
45. Kelson, Private lFrnber, P.86.
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these cannot take the form of a minorj-ty report' The
governing party nominates the majority of each committee's
members and its chairmanr46 although about harf the com-
mittees can be regarded as predominantly non-parti".rr.47
While the number of committee positions per member has been
substantially reduced, continuity of personnel between
meetj-ngs of a committee can still be lacking'48
A striking example of the status of select committees
was recently provided by the fate of the State Servi-ce
conditions of Employment Bill 1980. In what was described
as a "political somersault" the bill was reported back to
the House without amendment by the Labour and Education
Committee (after considering evidence on the subject) and
immediately discharged by the Governme"t'49
Theinvestigationofspheresofpublicpolicyhasbeen
largely confined to the occasional ad hoc committee and to
the Public Expenditure committee. The opportunities for
specialised consideration in a less partisan context of
public matters, whether controversial or not, was largely
foregone.
The relationship which the House has maintained towards
the committee system as a whole has also prevailed in relation
to the single committee with the potential to investigate
46. Itre only departures, t.he sulc-conmittees of the Pr:blic epen*iture
Cormittee, mu.st receive endorsenent for tlreir reports from ttre full
mnmittee.
Jacksonr "Parlianentarlz conmittees", p'98'
lrlote for exanple the nurber of changes to the-nenbership of : tlle 1979
Starrdi-ng Orders Conmittee, A.J.H.R.-, T.LA (f979) , P.3; and tbe Oormittee
on tlre Electoral f.,aw,e.,f.H.n-,T.tZ (1980) , pP.4L-2. See also N.Z'P'D.'
42I (October 6 1978) , p.4299.
Evenirtg Post, Au$rst 20, 1980, P.8-
47.
48.
49.
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public expendi-ture. The House did not refer any matters to
the committee between l-973 and 1978 and has chosen to debate
only one of its reports between 1968 and 1978.50
Nevertheless, the powers gained by individual committees
have conferred on them a measure of independence. A number of
practices which were once exceptional have become the rule,
and select committee consideration of bills has become "a
normal stage in the passage of Government legislation" which
is prescribed by standing otd"t".51
Austin Mitchell observed in 1966 that
perhaps the most convincing testimony to the
importance of [some] committees is the fact thatpressure groups, instead of largely bypassing
Parliamentr or working through individual members
as they have in Britain, are anxious to go before 52
committees whenever their interests are concernect.
This is even more true today, particularly when the government
foregoes the consensual approach of the past. The National
Development BilI emerged from the National Party caucus without
prior consultation with the wide range of interests affected
by its provisions. Consequently, the select committee stage
of its passage through the House, was a focal point for op-
ponents to the legislation.
A problem now being encountered with complex or contro-
versial legislation is that many persons or groups wishing to
50.
51.
52.
Von Tr:nzelrnarur, "ttre Pgblic Experditgre Conmittee", PP.28' 30 ard 38.
A.J.H.R., f .l4 (1979), p.14. Starding Order 221, Standing OrderF-=of
e House of Represerrtatives (weUington: Goverrurent Printer, L979) .
IrLitche]I, Coverrurent blr Party, p.73.
make oral submissions have
the submissions originally
and Country Planning BilI,
Development, were taken as
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been unable to do so. Thus 34 of
intended as oral on the L977 Town
and 27 of those on the National
written submissiorr" .5 3
one limit to the further development of the committee
system is the possibility that the meetings will become more
politicised. When one member entered the House 30 years ago!
Voting in committees was rare. Unhappify, itis becoming more common, but it is stil-l the
exception rather than the ruLe. My experienceis that there is still some degree of voting
across party lines-in committees, even on non-
conscience issues. ){
One indication of party differences in committee deliberations
is the appearance of references to the majority view in the
reports of select committ""=.55
The L979 Standing Orders Comnittee was mindful of the
possible conseguences of altering "too radically" the "balance
of work between the House and the committees u.56 In its report
the Committee observed that the role of Committees of the whole
House had been called intoquestion to some extent because of
"the increasing amount of work being channelled through select
committees in recent years".
5.3.
54.
55.
N.Z.P-D , 416 (Decenber L6, L977), p.5483; N.Z.P.D., 428 (UtecenberM.IF9il, p.4868.
N.Z.P.D., 4I'7 (May 30, l-978]', p.39I-
Se for o<anp1e tlre relnrt of t}te Conmitt€e on Electoral Laul
A.J.H.R,, I.l7 (1980) , W.29 and 30. It should be noted that
the fuller discr-rssion of conmittees' deliterations in tlreir
reports is one rea^son this infortnation is ncry available.
A.J.H.R., I.14 (f979) , p.7.56.
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Thecarefulscrutinyofthe.'nutsandbolts''
oflegislats.oninalargelynon-partisanatmos-
phere is nowadays less titefy to be experienced
inCommitteesorthewholeHousethaninaselect
committee. This committee nevertheless remainsfirmly of the view that to abolish committees of
theWholeHousewoulddoParliamentagraved'is.
servi-e by shifting vehement political and policy
debates flogr^the fioor of the House to select
committees.5u
The considerations rejected (or not proceeded with) by
various Standing Orders Committees are as revealing about
the nature of the committee system in the New Zealand Par1ia-
ment as the developments reviewed above. The 1968 report
noted the interest of some members in the recently established
,,specialist" committees in the United Kingdom which held public
meetings and took evidence from ministers and public officials '
and the suggestions of members of the Public Expenditure
Committee that its order of reference be extended to a1low
parliamentary scrutiny of bodies such as the marketing boards
and the wool commission. The committee declined to make
recommendations on these matters, preferring to leave them
for further consideration-59
The most comprehensive statement of the views of a
Standing Orders Committee (frorn which Opposition members later
dissented in the House) r{tas that contained in the L979 report'
The two major questions discussed were the extensj'on of the
scope of committee work and the enlargement of the powers of
select committees. Two proposals made to the committee which
involved significant departures from the present arrangements
were: a system of departmental select committees (such as had
58.
59.
ibid., p.6.
A.J.H.R., I.14 (1968) , P.L2.
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been recently introduced in the United Kingdom) each with the
,,power to examine all aspects of the policy, administration'
and expenditure of the departments 'allocated' to it"; and
the extension of the present scope of committee work to in-
clude government administration and expenditure and powers to
initiate investigation, while retaining the "subject"
orientation of the sYstem.
The Committee concluded that "fundamental changes" to
the structure were not necessary and rejected both options
for change. Instead, committees should continue to look
at legislation or specific problems, and remain "strictly
creatures of the House" without the power to initiate in-
quiries. Nor should committees have the right to appoint
sub-committees(withtheexceptionofthePublicExpendj.ture
and, since lg7g, statutes Revision) for that power "is not
one to be conceded lightlY"-60
The length at which the Report reviewed issues upon
which it did not intend making recommendations suggests that
it felt obliged to defend the acceptance of the status quo
in the face of submissions made to it and trends in other
Commonwealth legislatures. The arguments in defence of its
conclusions read rather unconvincingly in the light of
d.everopments elsewheru. 51
A.J.H.R., t.I4 (1979), p.13.
See "IJnited Kingdom: Watchdog(October L979) r PF.248-9; and
tary Cormlttees", PP.99-I00.
60.
61. Conmittees", &9 Parlianentaria4. IX
the discussio
Chapter I+
IVIEIVIBERS OF PARLIAI4ENT AND THEIR RESOURCES
The functioning of an institution depends in large part
on the nature of its personnel and resources. The recruitment
of members is not controlled by Parliament or solely by the
parliamentary parties. The rate at which new members enter
the House is largely a result of electoral contests, while the
type of member elected depends on broader recruitment processes'
Variations in the turnover and changes to the backgrounds of
members have had important consequences for the institution;
they are considered j-n the first part of this chapter.
The growth in the volume and complexity of members I work
has, in the past, produced heavy demands on the limited resources
of the House. A number of important decisions have been taken
which have altered the level of services and facilities and the
personal resources at the disposal of members. Important
changes affecting members' remuneration date from the end of
the second world war, but the main developments in both
salaries and services have taken place in the past decade.
Members of Parliament
Turnover and Backgrounds
The membership of the House has been
most l4Ps had been in a previous Parliament'
members' tenures have been less secure and
members has added a dynamic element to the
relatively stable;
In recent terms
the influx of new
institution.
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The size of Parliament has been increased three times
within a ten year period. The first change in the number of
members since 1900 occurred at the 1969 general electj-on
when 84 seats were contested. The membership was subseguently
increased to 87 in L972 and 92 in 1978. These increases,
though sma1l, have been more significant because of their
association with major oscillations in the political fortunes
of the parties. The tendency of the electoral system to in-
flate small changes in voting preferences into significant
exchanges of seats has resulted, in a period in which the
electorate's behaviour has been more volatile, in large gains
and losses by both parties in several elections '
Two conseguences have followed from the adjustments to
the size of the House and electoral behaviour- First, the
intimacy of the House has been reduced somewhat and the party
groups have been enlarged. In the 37th 0973-75) and 38th
(1976-78) Parliaments the effect was lopsided, for the opposi-
tj-on parties, in both cases with 32 members, were the smallest
since 1951, while the government parties, both with 55 members,
were the largest since 1935. The situation was somewhat re-
dressed by the results of the 1978 election which produced the
largest opposition in the twentieth century, and a government
caucus of 51.
The second consequence has been the effect of the turnover
of members on parliament. It is difficult to extract any short
term patterns from the ,ilata for turnover discussed in Chapter
2, except that it normally fluctuates and a high turnover
occurs every few elections. By taking general election
resul-ts in groups of five, a decrease in the turnover is
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apparent during this century. The proportions of new members
elected at the general elections of 1908-1922 averaged 24.0
per cent, and for 1925-L938,22.3 per cent.. The decline con-
tinued into the post-war period with percentages of L7.3 for
1943-1954 and 15.1 for I957-L969. The results of the last
three elections produced a reversal to this trend, with an
average turnover of 24.2.
while a large renewal of the membership of the House
has normally been followed by a small turnover, in the five
elections between 1953 and L975 the turnover increased at
each election, the only period in which this has occurred
during its history. This (and also the relatively high turnover
in 1978) can be attributed to both the enlargements in the size
of the House and volatile electorates. Between 1965 and 1978
the number of new members elected at general elections equalled
the size of the House in the latter year. The combined turnover
for the two eleetions Ig72 and 1975 was the highest for any other
pair of elections for more than 50 years -
Associated with these higher turnovers have been changes
in the demographic composition of the House. The changes ap-
pear to be part of longer-term trends which have received an
impetus by the recent high renewals of the membership. It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to account for these trends'
although it should be noted that in the recruitment process
rather different types of persons have been seeking nominations,
and the approaches of the party organisations to the selection
of candidates have emphasised individuals with particular
attribut"".1
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It is necessary
in the characteristics of I4Ps
having an increasing impact on
to document the major changes
for the members concerned are
the proceedings of Parliament.
The average age of Members of Parliament tended to in-
crease in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries until
a peak was reached in the 1925, L928 and 1931 Parliaments.
An over-50 plateau was maintained in all parliaments until
1960. But since 1951 a decl-ine in the average age has oc-
curred; the mean for members elected at general elections
in the 1950s was 54, for the 1960s 49 and for the last
decade 48.'
The reason for this trend is, of course, the lower
average age of new members. With the exception of the L957
election, the mean ages of new members remained constant at
44 or 45 between 1951 and L969. In the three subsequent
elections during the 1970s, the average ages dropped res-
pectively to 4I, 40 and 39.3 These new members differed
from those elected in the previous decade in that their
average ages departed more from the mean for the House (40
compared with 48, as opposed to 44 compared with 49) -
For ecanple, Alan Robinson obsenred that Labour responded to the 1966
election results by "increaslngly vigorcus parlianentary activiQr at.d
the seletion of l.*q"r candidales, including a nurber of professional
men, for the L969 election . . . " . "Continuing Political Change: the Nev'r
Zealard Case", (paper presented at the Eighth llllrld Corgress of the In-
ternational political Science Association, lt:nictr, Septerben 1970) 
' 
p.
16. See also Douglas C Webber, "Ttade Linions ard the Labor:r Partlz: The
Death of Working<lass Politics in Nerl/ Zealand", in Stephen fevjne (ed)
Poli-tics in Nerr'r Zealard: A Reader (Sydney, Corge Allen & tlr[^tin' 1978) ,
Leicester Webb, Governnent in Nsr'r Zealard (Wellington: Departnent of
Internal Affairs ; Austin l'lirctrell' "Itte Nsiv
Zealand Parliarents of fg:S-60", Political Science, 13 (March, 1961) pp.
40-41; ard Adrienne rr'on n:nzelrnarur@ the Neur zealard Parlia-
nent: A Stgdy of Corditions 1854-1978u, (r:np:blished research paper for
Iulaster of pr:btic Poliqg, Victoria University of Wellingrton, L979), Table 7.
Von Tr"rnzelmnn, "Ns.r Zealard Parliafilgntr', Table 7'
t.
2.
3.
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There has also been a tend.ency for members to have reached
a higher educational level. The proportion who have not pro-
gressed beyond primary school has declined from 41 per cent
(1935-49) to 26 per cent (Lg4g-60) , and to 6 per cent on the
average for members elected in the general elections 1969 to
rg7g.4 rn the latter year just two MPs were known to have
received only a primary school education. The proportion not
progressing beyond a secondary school education would appear to
have risen from 31 per cent (1935-49) to 42 Per cent (the average
for the last four general elections), but this latter figure
obscures the actual decline in this category which has occurred
with members returned at each of these latter elections (from
52 per cent in 1969 to 30 per cent in 1978) '
The university or tertiary category has been constantly
rising from 22 per cent (1935-49), to 3t per cent (f949-60) and
more recently to 5I per cent (the general elections 1969-79\ '
That each of the last four elections has shown an increasing
proportion of tertiary educated MPs (from 4l per cent in 1969
to 62 per cent in 1978) indicates that this category has gained
at the expense of the others. The higher education of lvlPs is
particularly marked in the backgrounds of members first elected
in one of the last two elections; 67 per cent of MPs elected
in 1975 and 59 per cent in 1978 had a tertiary education.
The third background characteristic, which in some respects
is the most significant, is MPsr occupations prior to entering
Parliament. Persons from the farming and business sectors have
Ttre data on educational backgirourds conres frcm l*litchel1, "Nertr Zealardparlianents" for t1.re trnc perloar 1935-49 ard 1949-50 (table V) ard fr.6gn
VOn Tr:nzelmann, "Nenr Zealard Parlianpnt", for recent general 
-elections(Table 4) . IrcIuded in the percentage calculaLions are MPS for whont
there was rro infornation.
4.
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continued to form approximately half of the members, although
since the 1969 general election their relatlve proportions have
declined respectively ftom 27 per cent to 22 per cent and from
32 per cent to 26 per cent.5
The gains have been made by a single occupation and an oc-
cupational category. Lawyers composed 17 per cent of members
following the 1978 general election, compared with I per cent
in 1969. Professionals are now represented by 22 per cent of
MPs compared with L7 per cent in 1959 (and a mere 8 per cent in
the 1935 Parliament).6 L"*y"t" are commonly regarded as pro-
fessional persons and can therefore be grouped with the other
professional occupations. This produces a combined total for
professionals of 31 per cent in the 1975 Parliament and 39 per
cent in the 1978 Parliament. since the latter election three
further professionals, including an academic lawyer, have en-
tered parliament via by-elections-
Von Tunzelmann also comments that:
an equally significant trend is the 'professionalism'
of other occupation groups represented in the House,
that is, an appreciating sophistication in the nature
of the i"b appiying tg even the more traditional of
members' occuPations.'
Consequently, the personnel of Parliament are now younger'
more educated and more professionally orientated than at any
other time in the twentieth century.S Parliament has become
stratified to some extent between older veteran members rep-
resenting the traditional occupations and more usually with
5.
6.
7.
8.
Von I\:nzelrnann, "New Zealard Partianrent", Table 2'
iirid.
ibid, pp.34-5.
Von Tunzelnann obser:rzes tlat tl:re Parlianent elected in 1978 has an
occupational 
=ttt t"t"-""neutune to ttrat for the period lB54-7I'ibid, p.34.
242
secondary education, and younger trained professionals who
have recently entered the House.
These new members have not trickled into the House at the
rates of the past to be socialised in small batches into the
mores of parliamentary life. They have entered in large numbers
and upset the stability of Parliament's socialisation processes
because they have constituted groups without the same pressures
to conform to the traditional modes of behaviour. In the L973-75
parliamentary term, the Labour government had 16 members elected
in the previous general election. The succeeding Parliament in-
cluded 25 new National members, which together with the five
elected in 1972 constituted 55 per cent of the caucus.
The members in these Parliaments have been more active in
the proceedings and in some cases less deferential to eodes of
behaviour and the party leaders. They have been less disposed
to remaining as spectators while senior members of both parties
debate the issues of the day, Their scope for participating
has been limited (particularly when they formed part of a large
government majority) by the structuring of parliamentary pro-
ceedings in terms of government business and the roles allocated
to experienced members. Nevertheless, where it has been pos-
sible for them to display independent initiatives, they have
taken advantages of these opportunities. The statistics on
parliamentary business for these years, presented in the pre-
vious chapters, reflect in part their behaviour'9
The emerqence of groups prepared to assert their views,
is more likely in a larger caucus. Label-s have been assigned
g 
. Exalrples previor:sly cited are private nrernbers' bills and questions
to ministers.
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to informal groups of MPs within each partyi a left-wi-ng
group in the Labour Party was referred to during the third
Labour Government, and more recently an active "free enter-
prise" group has asserted an influence on National policy.l0
In one respect, Parliament has not changed; it has re-
mained a male-dominated House. From a total of three women
MPs in the 1950s their numbers grew to six in the latter part
of the following decade, but dropped to four in the present
Parliament.
Remuneration of Members
until recently, the salary of a member of Parliament was
neither an incentive nor an adequate recompense for his work'
The profession was afflicted by an ethos that sanctified
service to the nation as a sacrifice which should be reflected
in their ,'honorarium". This attitude could only be associated
with a view of politics as a gentlemanly avocation for persons
with alternative means and time to attend to private occupations,
but was certainly inappropriate for parliamentarians as a whole
by the 1960s. Some members chose to maintain outside interests
to keep their hands in or through force of financi-al circum-
stances, but the job was increasingly requiring a full-time
commitment. Austin Mitchell observed at this time that "the
New Zealand l"IP is poised uneasily between the professional
politician common in more complex societies and the part-time
It nratrr rpt be a coincj-dence tlnt the largest nr-unber of neur rnernbers
"r,p"oi..r.ed by any 
party in t5e trnst-r^aar peniod priol to 1972 pro-
arrceA ttre "Yor:ng i\:rks"-in 1961. R D lthrtdoon, The Rise and FalI of
a Young Turk (Wellirqton: Reed, L974), p.45.
I0.
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amateur of the nineteenth century colony".11
Fear of public reaction was a factor which reinforced
members' reluctance to accept meagre increments from succes-
Sive Royal CommissionS. Many members subsisted, never free
from an overdraft or financial difficulties, and frequently
on a salary below that of their previous occupations, or in
the case of ministers, their administrative counterp"tt".12
Until 1950 salaries were determined by Parliament and no
allowances were paid, but under the Civil List Act for that
year a Royal Commission was to be established from time to
time for this purpose.I3 Following two Commission reports
the Act was amended in 1955 to provide for triennial reviews
by Royal Commissions following each general election. The
review process was only partially removed from the political
sphere for though the RoyaI Commission would make recommenda-
tions, their implementation was stilI dependent upon approval
by parliament, and for statutory effect, dD order in council-
The process was stil1 not sufficiently insulated from
what the Lg/3 Royal Commission described as "transitory
pressures,'. Thus in 1958 and 1967 Commissions deferred their
reports for 12 months because of the prevailing economic con-
Austin l\ti-tcherl, politics and p@, (christctn:rch:
Wtritconbe I norbsl-T6T, p.fl
Ttre 1968 Royat Conmission observed that "npre than half of all nsnbers
have virtua-Ily no incone other than their parlianentary sa1an1r", that tlre
largest grrogpwith alternative sources (farners) nn:st enploy a ltEmager or
other statf and that those with a profession could de'rote ninjmaf tinE to
tlreir practices. Cf }titchell, politics ard People, P.25. Flor-exalrples
of nenbers' dif ficulties see tttea Salaries in
Nesv Zealard,,, Ilre Parlianentarian Lll (Jarn:aqr 1971) , pp.39'42-
A contriJrutory superannJation schsne for nernbers had been jntroduced in
L947.
u.
L2.
13.
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ditions. Parliament in 197I and L972 declined to accept
proposed increases without first submitting the recofllmen-
dations to the Remuneration Authority, which lead to reduc-
tions in the salaries awarded. In L973 Parliarnent
postponed the implementation of the recommendations of the
Commission until L974.
As early as 195I a Commission had recognised that the
job was "fu1l-time professional workrr but until 1968 reports
maintained the need for a measure of self-sacrifice and the
reward,s of potitical tife.14 By Ig73 Royal Commissions had
established four fundamental propositions:
(a) that the occupation of a member of Parliament
should be regarded as virtually full-time and pro-fessional in nature;
(b) that it' should be assumed that a member of
Parliament has no other income;
(c) that it should be accepted that members are
married with familY commitments;
(d) that regard should be had to the sacrifices
of a member and his wife (or husband) in respeg!
of their enjoyment of leisure and fanily life'r)
One observer has described 1970 as the year of the "break-
through" in which parliamentarians attained a salary formula
more comparable with other employees after almost 2l ye.ts.16
The House approved substantial increases and passed the Civil
List Amendment Act to allow annual reviews of parliamentary
salaries.
L4.
15.
16.
Ttre 1968 byal Conmission also clained to represent tJ1e ccnnn-rrity' and
took into arcount tne p:blic resentnent vshich it believed lrDuld rasult
frcrn sr.:bstantial increases. A.J.H.R. 
' 
H.50 (1968) , PP.l3 ard 15.
A.J.H.R., H.2 (1973), P.6.
I'tMill-an, "Parli-anentarlz Salaries", P. 39.
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The Royal Commission of 1973 broke most unequivocally from
its predecessors in its stance towards remuneratlon. The Com-
mission observed (as had previous inquiries) that there had been
a substantial increase in the members' workload. especially with
regard to select committees and caucus committees, but further
commented that there was:
a growing tendency towards a new approach in
determining the salaries of parliamentarians.
The o1d attitude that there should be an element
of sacrifice inherent in the discharge of publicduty and service is, in our view, Do longer ac-
ceptable in view of the long hours of work and
the pressures and strains to.,ryhich a member of
Parliament is now subiected.''
The Commission concluded that MPs were entitled to a fair
remuneration for the job and recommended a 45 pe cent increase
for ordinary members, the largest in the history of the Royal
Commissions. ft was observed at the time that with salaries
ranging from $1I,000 for MPs to $27,500 for the Prime Minister,
"parliamentarians joined doctors and lawyers as the highest
paid in the community".lS
However, the government through a miscalculation managed
to discredit the increases - It first postponed the increases
in 1973 in deference to its Economic Stabilisation Regulations
but then granted the increases before the expiry of the restric-
tions in L974, and backdated them for a period which more than
covered that of the wage-fr.""..19
The stage was then set for the final step in removing
parliamentary salaries from the control ox influence of
politicians. Later the same year a Higher Salaries Commission
L7.
18.
t9-
A.J.H.R., ,
Editorial,
For public
H.2 (1973) , p.7.
Ihe Dorninion, August 5 1974, p.4.
reaction see llre_E\rening-Post, l4arch 3 L974, PP.l and 2.
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was established to determine and give effect to salaries and
allowances of parliamentarians (along with other senior
government officials) . In L977 the Commission was given a
statutory basis and its reference was altered to take into
account "the need to achieve and maintain fair relativity
with the private sector in the levels of rates of salaries " .20
Services and Faciliti-es
Working Conditions
A similar tardiness has characterised the development of
the services and facilities of the legislature. The working
conditions of members, outside the Chamber, were inadequate
Iargely because of the limj.tations of the assortment of build-
ings used for parliamentary purposes. As late as 1948 one
member entering Parliament "had shared an office containing
two desks and one telephone, and the only piece of equipment
he personally had possessed had been a telephone directotytt.2l
Over the succeeding decades the facilities have gradually
improved. But it was only in recent years that each MP acquired
a separate room and the physical location and quality of this
accommodation improved. The pressures on the present Parliament
Buildings have been relieved by the movement of government
departments to other accommodatj-on and the recent shift of
ministers and the Prime Minister's Department to the new
executive wing.
EVeninq Post, I\bvenrber Lg 1977, P.9. Details of the Conralssionrs+-ro$'ffffgigher Salaries Corrnission, C;eneral Revie$t as at I April
L978, (Weltinqton, 1979),
20.
l,blr{illan, "Parlianentany Salaries" , P.42. See also N E Kirk, "ltle
Irbnber oi partianent", Fublic edministration lig^tsletter, 81 (October
1962), p.I; and H J Wal- Polilical
2L.
gcleqrqe, 15 (Septerber 1963) , P-44-
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Following the 1955 Royal Commission a single typist was
assigned to each party. In the early 1950s, when this number
had been doubled, members r^Iere still obliged to type or write
most of their letters because of the demands on the typists'
services.22 The number was raised eventually to five per party
and then determined on the basis of a ratio of members. The
current allocation is one typist for two members plus five
more for each party, and the role of such assistance has been
enlarged to that of "secretary-typist"-23
Party Research Unj-ts
Until 1970 research for MPs was undertaken on a limited
basis by party-appointed research officels. The National
Party developed a modest research capability earlier than
Labour because of its long years in opposition during the
1930s and 1940s. llartin Nestor took on a research function
following his appointment as Private Secretary to the Leader
of the opposition in 1943, and became the chief Research
Officer of the Research Department established the following
year. At the time of his initial appointment he found that
the National opposition suffered from a double disadvantage'
It was hopelessly outnumbered and while:
22.
23.
24.
It would be untrue to say that the National MPs
were invariably inferior to Labour lvlembers in
debates t-he occasions on which they gained
an upper hand were few and far between, and this
was 
=ofefy ane to the lack of informgfion aboutmatters which came before the House.-=
R J Harrison, ',Organisation and Procedure in the Ne,v Zeal-ard Parlienent",(r:npr:blished' Ph. D: dissertation, Ohio Stat€ lJniversitlz, L964), P' 75'
Von T\:nzeLnann, "Ir@rbership of the Nsrir Zealard Parlianent", pp'110-111'
I\4artin Nestor, "Itre Iblle of ResearcLr in Nel'r Zealand Politics", Politi-calScierre, 15 (Septerber 
' 
L963), p.55.
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Nestor remained in his position for 30 years, supported
usually by one other research officer (although at its peak'
the last year of National's long period i-n opposition, the
department had four research officers).
The Labour Party's research capacity was never developed
even to the modest extent of Nationalrs, despite spending most
of the 1950s and 1960s in opposition. A research staff of two
existed in the 1950s, one of whom was the party's Assistant-
Secretary. With the departrre of the full-time research
officer in 1960 the responsibility for research was assigned
to a single individual who also had other demanding functions
and no research qualifications. It tended to rely on people
within the party who emphasised research for the movement
rather than for MPs.25
The research services provided for MPs in the 1950s and
1960s $/ere relatively limited (notwithstanding the productivity
of Nestor on the National side), were funded by the party
organisations and were based at the party headquarters (aI-
though the National research officers moved to Parliament
Buildings d.uring the session).26 The Labour Party was par-
ticularly concerned about its weak position' compared with
the governing party, dt the time of the 1970 Royal Commission
on Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances for it had been in
opposition for 10 years and did not have the funds to establish
a proper research capacitY.
25. Kent M Weeks, "political Party Persorurel in Ns,l Zealard" (unpulclished
tvA ttresis, Victoria UniversiQr of Wellington, 1961) , W.24 and 146;
Harrison, "Organisation and P:pcedr:re't , p.77 -
Weeks, "Polilical Partlr Person:rel", PP.26 ard 82-26.
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The 1970 Commission responded to the representations made
to it with a typically New Zealand solution to the needs of
private members. It recommended: "two separate full-time
research units, one for the Government party and one for the
Opposition party" funded by the public but under the control
of the senior whips. The General Assembly Library reference
service was not thought suitable for assisting with the pre-
paration of material for partisan debates: "l'lembers need
background material on legislation seen through political
eyes The work needs to reflect the members' political
interest and not be confined to an anti-sePtic gathering of
facts u .2-l
The party research units were established with an in-
itial staff of six, which was later increased to ten (following
another Royal Commission but by a decision of a joi-nt-caucuses
committee). Their size has remained at that level despite
proposals for appointing additional staff.
of the ten, seven of Labour's and eight of National's
staff are research officers, usually with academic qualifica-
tions. The research officers have specialised responsibilities,
but the degree of specialisation is reduced by the need to
cover a range of policy spheres, and one member of the National
unit is on first call to the Leader of the Party'
The main concern of the units is the production of in-
formation for the use of all MPs. The first priorj-ty during
27. A.J.H.R., H.50 (1970) , p.13.
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the parliamentary session is the servicing of membersr re-
quirements for the debates in the House, but other types of
background papers are also prepared. The difference between
parliamentary work and the development of party policy is
sometimes blurred, particularly in election years when the
units are more likely to depart from their originally
designated functiorr=.28 The function of the units depend
partly upon whether their party is i,n opposition or govern-
ment. fn the 1-973-75 session, the depleted parliamentary
membership of the National Party was particularly reliant on
the services of their unit. At such times the research
officers may be most influential as extensions of the party's
limited manpower resources in the House.
Another major function (possibly the key role in the case
of the National Research Unit) is the serving of caucus com-
mittees. While in opposition, each member of the small National
caucusvesassigned the role of spokesman for a sphere of polity,
and research officers were allocated policy areas and worked
closely with spokesmen and caucus cornmitte 
"r.29 The role of
caucus cornmittees has since become more significant (a develop-
ment which was encouraged by the large numbers of new members
elected in the last two elections) although the party again
provided the government. The Government Research Unit provj-des
both research and secretarial support to caucus committees and
acts as the co-ordinator of their activities.
28. See for exanrple, National Busiless Reviel'r, JanuarT 29 1975, p-6; and
transcript oi che .
National Business Reviar'r, Jamrary 29 1975,
this tirre are in
Post, Decernber 3 1974, P.8.
p.6. F\:rther details of
itris article and ltre E\zenilg29.
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The Labour Party Research Unit has become most effective
in its operation in 1980. This is attributed to the new caucus
structure (described in Chapter 4) and the ability of members
(particularly the newer MPs) to utilise research services. A
new director with a background in political research was also ap-
pointed this year.
It is only in the last decade therefore that the parties
have developed proper information services for members. Not-
withstanding the existence of this capacity, the private member
has not necessarily benefited. The trend noted by the 1973
Royal Commission that "there is an increasing tendency for the
main efforts of the units to be directed towards the needs of
the party rather than towards those of the private member for
whom they were established" has continued.30 The order of
priorities in the National Party Research Unit has been the
Leader of the Party, Whips (for information to be generally
circulated), caucus committees and finally individual membet=.3I
Although subject to limitations as a basis for generalisations,
a recent survey of a small number of lvlPs indicates that some
find the research units inadequate (younger, more highty educated
new members) and prefer to use the services of the library.32
In summary, the contrast between the nature of research
assistance provided today and that supplied prior to L970 is
marked, particularly in the case of the Labour Party. Party
funded research assistance based in the organisation has been
30. A.J.H.R., H.2 (1973) , p.15.
31. R C W Storart, "Ttre Parliarentary Researclr Officer: A Personal
Assessfientr' (r:npulclished LLl"l t]resis, Victoria UriversiQ' of
Wellington, Wellington, 1976), p.lB.
32. Von TurzelfiEnn, "Nglr Zealand Parlianent", Table 17 and pp.116-7-
2s3
replaced by publicly financed services consisting of a range
of relatively specialised, fuI1-time staff located in Parliament
Buildings. ft was a logical extension of the New Zealand par-
liamentary system that research units should be under the con-
trol of the respective parties and have a partisan orientation.
The ernphasis in New Zealand has been on servicing caucus rather
than the private member. The individual MP is more likely to
use the service as part of a team, whether of caucus or caucus
committees.
General Assembly LibrarY
Since the General Assernbly Library was absorbed into the
National Library of New Zealand 1966,the library services
of the legislature have been a responsibility of the executive
although their administration has remained with the Library
Committee of the House of Representatives. The primary pur-
pose of the Library is that of an information, reference and
research service for the House, although non-parliamentary
roles have prevented a ful] commitment to the development of
this objectiv".33
The 1970 Royal Commission opted for party research units
rather than expanding the non-partisan research capability of
the library, or developing a general information system, al-
though it did foreshadow the possibility of an increase in the
reference staff. The limited service that could be provided
in the early 1970s (a reference staff of seven including one
person with specj-alist training) was acknowledged by the
Chief Librarian in his annual report of 1973 when he observed
"that until there is a massive increase in staff New Zealand
33. Ihe Librar1l has housed oollections of national inportance nudr of wktictt
canrpt be 'transferred r:ntil ttre National LiJcrarY building is mnpleted'
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members of Parliament will not get anything like the service
their Commonweal-th counterparts receive from their libraries".34
In his following report, Ivlr Maclean advocated a selective dis-
semination of information (S.D.I.) service "which would analyse
and summarise material coming into the library, according to
individual users' specified subject interests". He concluded
that "without such a scheme, the great bulk of the library's
information resources will continue to have little or no impact
on Parliament's deliberations at all". One further proposal
was for an independent non-partisan research service to be
developed by the library for the needs of private members and
select committees. Thi-s would ensure that the backbencher
had access to research resources which were not subject to
party prioriti"".35
These objectives (and also that of an integrated informa-
tion system discussed later) are still far from being realised.
The 1973 Royal CommissJ-on supported the need for an irnprovement
in the research and information services of the library, but
only recommended further investigation by some form of committe".36
An inter-party committee approved two extra positions solely for
the purpose of assisting the party research units. Their role
was limited to that of a traditional reference service and did
not involve processing the information, An incipient S.D.I.
service was also introduced "insofar as any one Person can be
said to provide such a service".37
34.
35.
36.
37.
A.J.H.R., G.13 (1973) , p.I4
A.J.H.R., c.13 (1974), p.9.
A.J.H.R. , H.2 (1973) , p.15.
H de S C l4acl-ean, "Services in the GeneraL
Zealand) ", Itre Australian Librarlz Jourrnl,
A.ssenblY T,'iha6aY (119w
24 (,lr:ne 1975), p.198.
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During Ig76 the Library Committee finally committed
itsel-f to the development of "a modern and efficient legis-
Iative information service", and a reduction in the non-
parliamentary use of the library. TI^/o new Services were
j-ntroduced in 1977: a computer service with access to the
data base in the Statistics Department; and facilities for
the recording and playback of radio and television progranrmes.
The latter service does not extend to the transcribing and
filing of recorded material.
The administrative d.ifficulties arising from the library's
status are illustrated by the delay between the approval by
the Library Committee of proposals for a current information
service (the term now used for S.D.I') in September 1975 and
the appointment of the first staff member five years later'38
The service is designed to notify members of new publications
(articles, reports and books) pertaining to their interests.
A pilot project, involving two new positions, is at present
testing the use to which members and parliamentary staff
might make of the service.
The reference staff is still only nine in number (a
growth of two in the past decade) and only one of these
positions (a statistician who also operates the computer
terminal) is for a specialist who can provide research
assistance.
Ttre proSnsal was first presented to tJ:e Conmittee in 1973 but it
aecfined to act on a favcurable reconnendation from tie joj:rtraucuses
crurmi-ttee on the grourd.s ttrat the party researdl units \,\Duld be under-
mined. H de S C lrbclean "Research Assistance to Parlianentarians:
Individual and ParW Research Aides on Centralised Li-brarlz Infornation
t delays arose from tl-e circu:ltous
poliqg-lrnking process i:rrrolving the National l,ibf1w 
"$."uIi9Y:ioinist"rs. $ee the anrn:a1 rep5rts of the C'eneral A,ssenbly LiSra:1r,
a.j.i.n., c.13 (1976), pp.17-I8 ard A.J.H.R., G.13 (L977) pp.1?-18'
38.
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Information Services
Important developments have occurred in the services
provided to members during the last decade which make it
?opossible to refer to an information capability."- Their
significance lies in that members have moved from a heavy
reliance on their own resources to the extensive use of
professional services provided in the House. Nevertheless'
one hesitates to talk of information systems in relation to
the New Zealand House of Representatj-ves for the utillsation
of modern technology and professional staff has barely
. 40Degun.
Much of the work undertaken by the library and party
units could not be termed research. The work of the units
remains orientated toward fulfilling a range of roles: the
immediate needs of members for the House, caucus committees,
monitoring of debates and the media, and preparing background
papers and speeches. Notwithstanding their titles, the units
are not able to devote much time to proper research (although
this is beginning to receive a greater emphasis in the Labour
Party unit). A handful of research officers is unable to give
adequate attention to the range of policy areas. The de-
ficiencies in staff numbers are particularly felt by a party
in opposition for it lacks the information resources of the
government.
39. Arottrer irurovation, tlte provision of an advisory service for select
onmittees is discussed in Gnpter 7.
See for ocample, John A Worthley, "Legislatufes ard Inforrnation
Systers: Cnitenges ard. RestrDnses in the States", i11 Abdo I Baaklini
uin .f.rres J Heapfrqr (eds) Coryarative LegiPlatiye Reforms ard Inrpva-
tions (Albany: State UniversitYTWz.
40.
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The pattern of usage of both the party research units
and the library cannot be fu1ly determined for no records
have been kept by the units and the published statistics of
the library are not particularJ-y revealj-ng. Some indication
of library usage can be derived from the annual reports.
Between Lg76-7 and 1979-80 the number of reference enquiries
increased from 3529 to 48A4,4L but beyond a break-down in terms
of time reguired to answer reguests, no details of the users
are published. The library has, however, prepared information
for the last two sessions from the job sheets for the more time-
consuming jobs (Table 8.1). No other systematic information
yet exists for either the research units or the library'4z There
is little doubt that these services are fuIly utilised and under-
manned, and that the more leisurely atmosphere which existed a
few years ago has disappeared.
TABLE 8.1 Distribution of Work of Librar Reference Staff
Job Sheet Totals L978-79 1979-80
Members of Parliament
Private Secretaries, etc.
Research Units
Parliament Building Staff
Other
546
72
203
26
57
863
11r
275
36
76
904 1 ,36I
41.
42.
Colrpare fign:res for U:e referelce service retrnrted by Austllyritcfreff oi rzgS inqLr.iries in 1961-2, 1601 in 1962-3 and 1704
in 1963-4. Governnent by-Party: Parfi= rpn!=
Zealand (ftri 1966) 
' 
P'89'
A questionnaire sunzqg was oonducted by the liJrrarf in 1977 but
apfarently does not piovide a basis from vfrictr to nrake generalisa-
tL-ons. S-imil-arfy, r7it Tr:nzelrnarur's sanq>le (see footnote 32) is
limited in size l"a *," socpe of the research is rpt broad ernugh'
It is opected ttrat inforrnalion will shortly be available on ttte
types of r,rork undertaken by opposition research officers.
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Notwithstanding the high demand for the services it is
uncertain how effective the three operations have been. The
former Chief Librarian has, in a series of articles, presented
the difficulties arising from introducing arrangements that
were not properly conceived in terms of the relationship be-
tween the party units and the library services. For example,
he observed in 1973 that "unless the units themselves are pro-
vided with a service from the Library they cannot deliver the
goods to the membersrr for:
it turns out that $tith a significant number of
the questions put to the Library by the units,
the units are in fact simply acting as messengersfor the members with no intention of processing
the infgrmation provided in any way before passing
it on.43
with improvements in both the calibre of staff in the
units and the working relationships between the library and
the units, the arrangements are certainly more effective than
in the early years of the experiment. But it still falls far
short of Maclean's conception of an "objective system" con-
sisting of a range of gualified specialists who would undertake
research for both party teams and private members, and a
"partisan system" composed of generalists orientated toward
party objectiv.".44
H de S C tr4aclean, "ftle General Assenlcly LiJcrarlr, Neur Zealand", ix
Proceedinqs of the Semrd Conference of Australia! qgl]tgnqllglT,
: NS:lrI Parlianentarl ,
ffin, nbenricei in the General Assenrlcly Li-bra4r", p.199.
Maclean, "Centralised Library Inforrnation Senrices", P.99. Conr
pare also tlle vier^is of the Director of the Covernnent Researclt
ifrtit, David Lloyd, "Taxpayer F\Jnded Support Senrices for }Enbers
of Parlianent at State ana f'eaeral Lerrel in Ai:stralia", lulineo'
1980. An advocate of an informatlon senzice centred utrnn the
parliarnentary library and igdeperdent of the Party researcJ: ,Tit"
is M ,: I"linogue MP: "Farlianrentartz Reforms", Address to the StOke
Branctr of Nerp zealand National Party, 17 Novenber 1976, p.9. See
also his other visus about the availability of infornation il
"Inforrnation arrd Pcrrver: Parlianrentarry Reform and tle eiSt to l(now",
r" St"FG"-G-i". teAi-potili"J irr Ui- Ze"futta (Sydrrey:-George Allen
& Urnvin, 1978), PP.78-85.
43.
44.
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The main decisions have been taken. The increasing demands
made by members will generate further resources and a proper
research-based information system may yet evolve. In the short-
term it would appear to be necessary to determine systematically
the needs of members and parliamentary persont"I'45
Resources
An overview of the responses to the demands on the
institution can be derived by examining the resources aI-
located to it over time. The main expenditures on the
House of Representatives are those incurred by the Legis-
lative Department and the salaries and allowances of the
members. The Legislative Department vote covers several
facilities and services: Bellafrys, buildings, General
Assembly Library (until 1966) , girounds, Hansard, House of
Representatives, Parliamentary Counsel Office (previously
entitled Law Drafting office), and the ombudsman's office
(since 1962-3) . The expenditures for the period 1952-78
are shown in Table 8.2.
The expenditures on both salaries and allowances and
the Legislative Departrnent have increased one thousand-fold
during the last three decades. Both grew slowly in the 1950s'
at a faster rate in the 1960s, and rapidly during the last
three Parliaments (with inflation accounting for much of the
increase) . The growth sequence otherwise differs for salaries
and allowances rise more rapidly in the first and second
decades, assisted in the latter by a jump in 1965, and then
Cf Anthony Barker and uictrael Rush'
fnforrnation (I-ordon: C€orge Allen g
Ihe }Erber of Parliament ard His
Urwin, 1974) .45.
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TABLE 8.2 Expenditure on Parliament 1952-78
Year trded
31 Dhrch
Irtenbersr Salaries
ard Allowancesa
Leqislative
oefu,rtrnentD
($ooo) I oo.f 1952
lbtal Eryerdih:re
on Parlianent
($ooo) * 
-lt#"u' ($ooo) *,"f#i'
l-952
1953
19 54
19 55
19 s6
L957
19 58
19 59
1960
19 61
L962
1953
L964
196 s
L966
]-967
19 68
L969
19 70
L97 L
t972
r97 3
L97 4
l.975
L97 6
L977
1978
134
r73
169
r72
198
208
210
2LL
240
249
276
28r
280
350
374
37r
375
426
434
581
633
593
r0 2l
10 34
114 I
r220
L47 3
(100)
(r2e)
(126)
(12e)
(r48)
(1ss)
(1s7)
(rs7)
(17e)
(186)
(206)
(2r0)
( 20e)
(26L)
(27e)
(277 )
(280)
( 318)
(324)
(434)
(472)
( s17)
( 751)
(7 52t
(8s7)
( 91r)
( r099 )
366
397
427
432
491
493
561
529
539
568
602
638
626
729
793
162
891
890
968
120 8
L47 3
L628
2068
2323
2835
37 5B
4627
(r00)
( roB)
(116)
(1r8)
(r34)
( 13s)
( 1s3)
(r4s)
(L47)
( lss)
(r64)
(174)
( r71)
(re9)
(2L71
(208)
(243)
(243)
(265).
(330)
(402)
(445)
(s6s)
(634)
(77 5)
(1026)
(r254)
500
569
595
605
589
700
77L
740
779
816
878
919
906
1079
11 57
113 3
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1 3r5
1403
1789
2L05
232r
30 89
3357
3984
497 I
6 100
(100)
(rl4)
(11e)
( 12r)
( 138)
(140)
(1s4)
( 148)
( 1s6)
( 163)
(176)
(r84)
( 181)
(2l-6)
(233)
(227)
( 2s3)
( 263)
( 281)
( 3s8)
(421)
(4641
(618)
( 671)
(7 e71
( ee6)
(L220)
a. Includes anrruities to a fonrer Corrcrnor-General, forner Prfue Ministers
arxl forner widcrus of Prine t'ti:ri"to= f::om 1965 to 1978' fhe sr'rn usrnlly
inrrcIved several tlrousard dollars -
b. Includes Gnbudsrnan's office from 1963. T!:e Ceneral Assenbly Li-brary
becane part of the National LiJrrarl of New zealald in 1956; o<penditure
on the liJrrarry is jncluded up to 1965.
Source: Estimates, A.J.H.R.,L952 to 1978'
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later jurnps in 1971 and L974, while the Legislative Departmentrs
allocation does not receive a substantial increment until L97L,
after which its growth rate is sufficiently high (particularly
during the last Parliament in which expenditure doubles) to pass
that of members' remuneration. It is not therefore until the
1970s that proper attention is finally given to both the needs
of Parliament and its Personnel.
Previously it has been found that "between 1939 and 1971
the expenditure on government operations (excluding transfer
payments and subsidies) increased more than twice as fast as
the expenditure on parliament".46 A comparison of total
parliamentary expenditure and central government expenditure4T
indicates that over the Lg52-77 period Parliament has almost
kept pace with the latter (a growth of 996 compared with 1154
on the base-year of Lg52) . Expenditure on Parliament formed
the same proportion of central government expenditure (.34
per cent) in Lg52 as Ln ]-977 (atthough variations had occurred
in the intervening years) .
Conclusions
ivtembers of parliament have become professionalised in two
senses of the conc"pt.48 It is no longer possible for members,
in Weber's terms, to contemplate an avocation rather than a
vocation of politics. While some members have had alternative
means and have retaj.ned occupational interests, t'he demands of
46.
47.
Subrnission of R H Brookes, J L Roberts and A D bbinson to It]yal
@nmission on Parlianentarry Salaries and Allowances L973, p.2.
Iltre data used for central govelrrlent o<penditure were those for
crrrrent o<penditure on groods and senrices. Ttris infortnation was
sr-pplied by ttre Statistics Departnent.
Kje11 A Eliassen and l{rgens N Pedersen "Professionalization of
f,foislatures: Long-Term drange in Political Recru:itnent iI Denrnark
and Nonuay", Con#ra*ve Studies il society and gistorY, 20 (April
1978), pp.290=f
48.
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parliamentary duties have usualty obliged them to live on
their parliamentary salary. The growth in the workload of members
in the post-war period and the increasing use of recess time has
meant that members have few opportunities to attend to other
occupations. Their remuneration has come in the post-war
period, to reflect this rea1itY.
A second interpretation of professionalisation is "that
the legj-slatj-ve role has tended to converge over time with
the role of the professional, i.e. the generalized role of
members of the liberal professions' most notably that' of
lawyers u .49 The greater emphasis now given to legislation
in the House and in select committees may attract more lawyers
to the House. The composition of the House is likely to in-
clude increasing numbers of professionals for candj-dates
already nominated for the I9B1 general election show an en-
dorsement by the parties of persons with such backgrourrd".50
Professionalisation has also proceeded to some extent
at the leve] of the parliamentary staff who service members '
The potential exists for expanding both the partisan and non-
partisan resources of the institution, but this is not a
question which the members are able to settle themselves '
With the replacement of Royal Commissions by the Higher
Salaries Commj-ssion, a Memberst Service Committee has existed
for the purposes of considering services and facilities other
than those within the ambit of the House and Library Committees '
However, the Prime Minister is responsible for the Legislative
p.290.
e><anple Colin Janres, "Labourrs Erergirtg 'Nerr Breed' class
Uatiornl BusinessReview, May 51980, p.9.
49.
50.
ibid.,
See for
of E1",
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Department and it is ultirnately the Government which determines
the Ieve1 of services. As staff ceilings exist for the public
service, it is unlikely that further staff will be appointed
in the immediate future. In the longer term the prospects
for further institutional change may depend on pressures from
one particul-ar source, the newer members.
TABLE 8.3 Parliamentary Service of MPs in July 1980
Labour National Socia1 Credit Total?gE
Prior to 1960 I2.5 ( 5) 3-9 ( 2)
1960-1969 37.5 (1s) 31.4 (16)
1970 or later 50.0 (20) 64 -7 ( 3:1 100 '0 (I)
7.6 ( 7"
33.7 ( 31
s8.7 ( s4:
100.0 (40) 100.0 (sr) loo.o (1) 100 '0 (92;
In I9BO the House is dominated by members elected in the
previous decadet 59 per cent of members entered the House after
1970 (Tab]e 8.3). Only seven members remain with experience of
the House in the earlier part of the post-war period. The newer
members have expectations unaffected by the conditi-ons under
which MPs have operated in the past, and which frequently ex-
ceed the leveI of services and facilities which they have en-
countered in the 1970s. Their role in influencing the development
of the infrastructure wilt therefore be significant.
Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS
This study has focused more on changing than stable
features of Parliament. By taking the time-span of the
post-war years for examining Parliament it has been possible
to place the pattern of its activities in a clearer
perspective. There have been some important developments in
its modes of operating during this periodt in fact it can be
argued that there has been a minor transformation in many
aspects of parliamentary }ife. It has also been apparent
that the maintenance of existing forms has been the purpose
of many (if not most) of the procedural adjustments.
These adjustments appear to be significant when viewed
in the context of an historical review. The responses to
demand.s on the institution appear to be less substantial
when assessed in relation to normative expectations of
parliament today. while many of the proposals advocated in
the past have been adopted in some form, the continuing
agitation for reform of Parliament is a clear indication
that the changes have been insufficient to satisfy many of
the critics. This final chapter reviews institutional
changes covered in this study and discusses directions reform
might take in the future.
Continuity and Change
Broadly speaking there have been three types of
development in the post-war period, only one of which'
organisational and procedural change, has been exclusively
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within the control of Parliament. The workload depends to a
considerable extent on inputs from the political system while
the membership of Parliament is affected by other factors'
The parliamentary work of members has changed in two
respects. The quantitative changes to their workload need
only be recalled at this point by some examples: sessions
have become longer, the business of the House has increased
in volume and conmittees meet more frequently. The content
of partiamentary business has also varied. Apart from the
prominence now accorded to question time the most important
development has been Lhe more conspicuous part which
legislation has come to play in parliamentary work. Approach-
ing half the House's time is now devoted to legislation, and
the consideration of bills occupies most of the time of
select committees and accounts for a majority of their
reports.
The i-nflux of new members at recent elections and the
backgrounds and expectations they have brought to the House'
have produced something of a renaissance in the role of the
private member. This impression needs to be gualified by
specifying the forms of behaviour involved. Several Standing
Orders Committees gave more attention to the private member'
and new procedures provided means of channelling the energies
of backbenchers. The opportunities provided by question time,
notices of motion and private members' bills have been
increasingly utilised, and members have become more reliant on
the administrative resources which have been added during the
past decade. One recent indication of the roles of new
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members is the fact that the most important and controversial
legislation of the 1979 session, the Nationaf- Development
BiIl, originated $rith two M.P.'s in their first year in
Parliament.
I,lembers have been outspoken on issues which did not
accord with the positions of their party and in a number of
instances have challenged the party leadership. Parliament-
centred rather than party-centred behaviour has sometimes
been apparent in members' actions inside and outside the House'
The permanent defections from the parties have, however'
stemmed from issues concerning members' careers. where
policy differences are at stake members have normally expressed
their views but not engaged in other overt forms of behaviour'
While members are more inclined to vote independently
of their fell-ows on free votes, they are still not, as a rule'
prepared to stand against their party in voting divisions in
the House. The parliamentary party continues to provide the
only means for political advancement and if members entertain
hopes for promotion to leadership positions, the range of
tolerated behaviour (if broader now) sets limits to their
Iactt ons.
The responses to the increasing demands on Parliament
have taken various forms. They have frequently involved
hffrey Pa.Iner obsenes that "nottrilg so destrcle the
ildeperrlence of tlre Nerp Zealand Hcuse of Fepr:esentafitps"
a" tie *pectation that "ncst [erbers asp1r9 to be in
1.
cabinet." Ilnbridled Power? An tion of Netc
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adjustments to procedures in order to alleviate pressures
on parliamentary time. Change also resulted from
precedents set in particular contexts which were later
extended to become the general practice. Not all problems
were amenable to resolution simply by altering the Standing
Orders; in some cases procedural amendments were neither
desirable nor practical.
The deliberations of Standing Orders Corunittees did not
produce decisions on some questions. It was not usually
possible to ascertain the extent of non-decision making'
but options rejected or deferred were Sometimes stated or
could be detected.. In the pattern of responses to the
demands on the institution such conclusions can be as
important as the decisions leading to change for under-
standing the nature of the parliamentary system.
A range of committees and individuals were involved in
the process, but the participants and pivotal actors varied
over time. Inter-party committees were responsible for some
innovations, and public servants played a role in some cases.
New practices were sometimes introduced first by the
majority party, but formal changes were normally recommended
by an agency of the House. Senior members of both Parties
exerted the major influence on decisions for they dominated
all the Standing Orders Committees. Ultimately the approval
of the majority party (or the minister resPonsible for the
Legislative Department in the case of parliamentary resources)
was necessary for any proposal to be implemented.
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Thefinaldecisionswereusuallyarrivedatbya
consensual process involving members of both parties.
As a general rule, major decisions touching the
insti[ution or procedures of Parliament are not
imposed by the irajority paftY' 
-Th"y are usually5l'-partis-an decisions ieicnea af,ter much discussion
and often bY waY of comPromise'z
The differences which remained might be aired by individual
members in the debates on Standing Orders but they usually
involved minor points (with the notable exception of the
debate on the LgTg report, parts of which were dissented from
by members of the Opposition). It is not surprising
therefore that incremental changes designed to consolidate
the existing forms were prevalent in the outcomes of the
reviews.
The chapter on legislation concentrated mainly on one
dimension of the legislative process because of the attention
given to legislation in other recent publications. The
impact of the House on public bills was mainly confined to
amendments by the Government of its own bills; the minority
party had so divested its opposition role of formal acts that
relatively few amendments were proposed. This undoubtedly
reflected the lack of substance in much of the legislation
which passed through the House. But for the desire to maintain
the supremacy of the House, the committee of the whole could
have been dispensed with for many bills in favour of select
committees.
The development of the committee system in the post-war
Sir Jolrn }hrshall, "Introduction", irt
Tle Reform of Parlianrsrt (!€Ilirgton:
, 1978) , P'7'
Si.:r John lhrshall (ed),
Nelv Zealand Institute2.
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period can be regarded largely as a means of relieving the
workload of the House. But changes to the structure, and
the devolving of powers to particular comrnittees, has
produced a more effective mechanism for undertaking
parliamentary functions. There have been two important
departures from earlier procedures. First, two committees
have been granted powers to initiate investigations of their
own and the restrictions on their meetings (and those on the
Local Bills Committee) have been relaxed' For different
reasons the potential 6f the Public Expenditure Committee
and the statutes Revision committee has not been achieved.
Secondly, the decision to refer all legislation to committees
(with the exception of specified categories) has confirrned
the emphasis now given to public bilIs in their work and
provided recognition of the select committee stage in the
legislative process.
while a progression can be seen in the changes to the
committee system, the roles of most committees remain
circumscribed. They do not have the powers to undertake any
form of business on their own initiatives. The committee
system's coverage of policy spheres is far from complete and
it is not orientated towards scrutiny of government depart-
ments. Committees continue therefore to offer one of the
more promising areas for further institutional development'
Notwithstanding the extensive changes which have
occurred, the emphasis has been on continuity' The
parliamentary framework has not been threatened by procedural
adjustments or the provision of extra resources. Indeed, the
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adaptability of the institution has been demonstrated. The
organisational changes have been mainly concerned with
consolidating the existing system. The streamlining of
procedures and other time-saving devices have been designed
to improve the ability of the institution to cope with its
workload.
Some innovations vtere either unsuccessful or under-
utilised. In both cases the main reason was the concern
of members with pursuing Party differences in the House.
consequentty, occasions for private members to press the
claims of individuals, corununj.ties and groups or for
detailed scrutiny of government administration were inclined
to be used for partisan debate, while those which were less
productive for this purpose were neglected. It has also not
been possible to contain inter-party conflict within the
formal rules of the House, particularly when conventions
which complement such rules, have been ignored.
The magnitude of the reforms was not sufficient to
produce structural changes. While comPrehensive or radical
reform was not contemplated, incremental adjustments have
not led to structural change over time. The basic forms
continue as before within a framework determined by the
relationships between the two parties and the subservience
of Parliament to the executive.
Attitudes to Parliament
The
attitudes
contrast
Labour and National parties have differed in their
towards Parliament for many years although the
in some of their views is possibly more pronounced
27L
today. These attitudes have been influenced by the
institutional status of the parties as either the Government
or the Opposition.
TheLabourParty,dstheoppositionformostofthe
post-war period, can be expected to have found fault with
the management of Parliament more frequently than the party
in power. But there has been considerable continuity in the
typesofchangesadvocatedbytheParty.TheLeaderofthe
opposition argued in 1968 that "the standing of Parliament
is at a low ebb"; the cause of its lack of status and'
ineffectiveness was attributed to "the abrogation of
parriamentrs authority by cabinet".3 The length of the
recess and, the issues which arose when Parliament was not
meeting prompted support for longer sittings and the division
of the parliamentary year into two main sessions, the first
to begin early in the year. Also reconrmended were committees
to review Lhe operations of departments and the opening of
committee meetings to the public a"d press'4
The Labour Party experimented with early sessions
after it became the Government in L972. Open meetings
became an accepted feature of the committee system. The
party also at.tempted to implement a major change to the size
of the House. In Lg75 the select committee on the Electoral
Act recommended (by a majority decision) a House of LzL
N J Kirk, troruards Nationhood (Palnerston l{,orttr: }{et|' zealandBooks,196ffi
4. ibid, 1p.34-5. see also le }br&re1er's vievrs, The Evenjng Fost'@tz, L964, p.tl.
3.
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members, but failed to secure the requisite
required by the entrenched provisions of the
75 per cent vote
.5act.
Labour|slgTSelectionmanifestoreaffirmsits
commitment to these principles and to the general goals of
strengthening''Parliament' s control over government action'',
and regaining respect for Parlj-ament by restoring order and
decency. Apart from promising a Freedom of Information Act,
thepartycontinuestosupportopencommitteemeetingsanda
House of I2I members "so that members of Parlianent are able
to specialise and give more detailed study to laws they are
debating.'.Theformwhichthesessionshouldtakehasnow
been redefined as "three days a week, three weeks a montht
up to a maximum of 10 months a year." sittings after
midnight would be prohibited. A number of the party's
recoflrmendations were incorporated in a private members'
Reform of Parliament Bill LgTg which inter alia provided
for "a framework for a modern calendar in the parliamentary
C,year.tt -
As the party in power for most of the post-war period,
National has controlled Parliament during a period when the
volume of its business has increased enormously' The party
5.
6.
sir John t4arshatl obsenes that, r:nlike tle "r:nanimity wittr wh-ich tne
Etectoral Act 1956 was acoepted and paSSedr' 'rl1o Serior:s efforb was
rnade to r:each a corrsensus" -on anen&rents to ttre electoral lacs'
Corr.q,:ttly they were changed by ttre Nattq.l Par*y $ftIen itb."*6 tte lorerinnrrt. "In[rcdictj.on", Fform of Parlianentt P'10'
N.Z.P.D. , 425 (Septernber 6, Lg79), p.279L. ftle Leader of the
ffitiott, ur n irring, has also adrrccated ttre autormtic opir:ation
oi'acts atier 40 years ald regrulations afEer 20 1ears, and the
aS4nintnerrt of a -specja] seleit csnnittee to e><amine systernatically
tirE r,ork of all gp\ternrlEnt departrrents. lltre Errerring Post'
febn:ar1' 14, 1978, P.2.
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has supported procedural change for all but one Standing
Orders Committee were convened while it was the majority
party. But the impact of the reforms has been diminished
because they have been introduced incrementally over the
last twenty years, while in the same period the role of the
executive under the National Party has continued to expand.T
Under the leadership of Ivlr Muldoon the party has
favoured a strong executive approach which appears to regard
Parliament as a hindrance to actions by cabinet. It is
consistent with this view that Parliament should revert to
the "traditionalr' Iate session allowing the Government to
act without distractions for the first half of the year.
During that period select committees meet and ministers and
their departments prepare legistation.S Orr." Parliament is
convened the session is not prolonged by lengthy adjournments.
The party believes improvements in the effectiveness
of Parliament can be achieved by making better use of the
time available. Linited time debates have been suggested by
the Rt Hon R D Muldoon as "the key to a schedule of work
that would enable us to work more effectively inside the
Chamber and outside it. One hour of hard debate is worth
three hours of repetitive argument. "9
The National Party did not include proposals for
reforming Parliament in its I978 election manifesto. It
7. Flor eanpLe, L979 has been descri-bed as "a land-nrark par in tne
relentleis advance of state pc[veril because of the legrislation
passed. CoU:l Janes, "TfE S-tate shall be Mightier ttlan tle Strcrdr"
llational eusiness revies", @tober L7, L979, p.2.
N.Z.P.D. , 428 (Decernber 13' 1979), p.4813.
N.Z.P.D. , 428 (necen0cer 14, L979) ' p.4838'
8.
9.
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would appear to be committed to the status quo (bearing
in mind that a few significant changes were introduced
following the adoption of the recommendations of the L979
Standing Orders Committee) and gradualism in its approach
to reform (for example increases in the size of the House) '
Apart from the party positions on parliamentary reform'
a number of members have expressed their own preferences.
National members typically have not moved beyond their party's
stance, and have articulated proposals such as the imposj'tion
of a time limit on fixed debates or a change to the size of the
quorum necessary for meetings of the Hoo""'I0 The main
exceptions have been Marilyn waring and Michael Minogue who
have spoken frequently on the guestion of parliamentary
reform, and to some extent have acquired the image of
parliament-centred M.P.rs. similarly a number of Labour
members have actively advocated reforms, but the most
extensive catalogue of reconmendations was produced by a
Labour member prior to his entry into Par1iament.ll A review
of some of the suggestions of incumbents, former members and
other observers wi.ll serve to illustrate the limits of the
parties' positions on reform.
Political argument is central to parliamentary processes
in New zealand, but few dimensions of the institution remain
unaffected by adversary politics. One means of mitigating the
influence of the parties is by designating non-partisan
10. \Z.P.D., aZS (Septsrbex 6, 1'9791 , pp'2795 and 2798'
11. Ceoffrey Palner, tlrbridled pov.er? An l*tsSPretation=o-f-Ngw
Zealand's Constit
' ' 
428 (cecsrber 13'
L979), trP.48I9-21.
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parliamentary positions. Dr Finlay has argued that the main
problems in relation to the manipulation of procedures and
the abuse of Standing Orders relate to the weakness of the
speaker, and that a reassessment of the office is the primary
step in approaching the "mounting criticism of the condition
of parliament."L2 However, sinee oram suggested extending
the speaker's term of office to six years and electing
another member to his seat, specific proposals do not aPPear
to have been forthcoming from members with the notable
exception of Palmer, who favours an independent Speaker chosen
on a free vote for a five year t"t*. 13 Sir Roy Jack would
appear to be correct in his view that it is unlikely that
any step "to build or rel-nforce the independence and
impartiality of the Speaker" will occur "for some time to
come. " 
14
A second sphere is the chairmanship of select
committees of the House. While Opposition members may chair
minor sub-committees of the Public Expenditure Cornmittee,
they have not been permitted, as in other Commonwealth
L2. Dr A M FinlaY, speech to $le
Oonference, South Ar-r.stralian
A.ssociation, I Febn:ar1 1977.
"Par1i-anrentaqr reform in Ner.l(October, 1979) , PP.2L2'3-
Frorrrteenttr Ar.rstralasi^an Regional
Branch, Connprxrvealth Parlian€rttaqr
Oroted in lGittt Jaclcson
Zealand", Tkte Parlianentarian' IJ
13. N.Z.P.D., 314 (1957), pp.333l-4; Ceoffrey Palner, tln!'Tidled
Fr, pp.64 and 169. PaLrer r"ejects tte S99iil Cr€dit Pa:ty's_-prop#Tfor the appoinftent of na nemnber of ttre tigh ju+ciar1"
ls -Speaker on the gror4ds that parlianentary eq>erience is
necessarlz,
IIcn Sir Roy Jack "A Speaker looks at Parli-anent", iJl l'Iarshall,
Reform of parlianent, p.84. l{eht Zealand Sgrakers have rpt been
@fice, to nor.rrt a canpa.ign for rovilg tle
-"tjt"= oi tfte gnsition npre tsrsarrcls ttre British node1, nrch as that
presently b"inA urdertaken in Australia. IJnLike l{ew Zealand
Spe"LerJSir eiffy Sneddon, Speaker of ttre Australian llouse of
nepresentati'ues, has prreviously been a Leader of the
Qposition.
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parliaments, to chair select committees. One suggestion is
that opposition members should chair a few, possibly the
less important committe"".15
The committee system has featured prominently in lists
of reforms for Parliament. According to one view "any
effective reform of Parliament to meet today's needs" is
"...intimatelyboundupwithgreatereffectiveuseof
't(
parliamentary committees."to Among the suggestions for
select committees are powers to initiate inquiries and
appointspecialisedstaff,developmentofcontinuityinthe
memberships of committees and the specialisation of members'
and the transference of work from plenary meetings of the
House to committees.IT Some of these proposals could
produce a diminution of the emphasis on ritualistic
confrontation in the House and a strengthening of committeesl
independence. But, ds walkland has pointed out in Britain,
such reforms may be incompatible with a political structure
based on an executive-dominated legislature orgfanised on an
adversary b"sis.18
w K Jackson, ',A Political sCientist l-ooks at Parlianent" jJt
uarshall, Reform of Parlianent, P.24; Palner, Iirbridled Pcner,
p.169.
Keith Jacksonr "Ilexir Zea-lapd Parliafientarlf Conmittees: reality
and Reform", ihe Parlianentarian' LIX (aprif 1978) , P'99'
palrer, IXrbrid,led Fo\toer, p.169; Feter Aifier' "sCandinavian
Parlianents: U6frffi-; ieot Z""f"nd?", in J Steptpn lloadley (ed) '
Inrcrcwjnq Neru Zeal-andts Denocraqg (Alrcldand: I'ilew Zeaf and
E )' PP'34-5' Jaci<son'
"Parlianentarl Reform", p.215. Cf also tfre roles envisaged fortle nerur Director of neieirctr of the Err.rblic Accornts ard Epend-
itr:reFvier.lc"'*itt""oft}reVictoriarrParliarrent:prcfessional
sr44nrb into the design ald condr:ct of stuclies and investigations'
thl-selection and confrri-ssioning of ccnsultants' liaison wittl
prruri. agencies, and the derrclc[xrent of ttre data base tfie
ccnmittee will require for its !ork.
S A vla]kland, uThe Politics of Parliafienta4t Fform" 'F"rfi"ttetttatf' affairs' )o(lx (Spr5nq L976), PF'193-5'
15.
16.
L7.
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Arangeofotherquestionshavereceivedvarying
degrees of attention. Mr t'linogue has campaigned against the
lack of executive accountability to Parliament and the
Iimitations on information available to members. His early
advocacy of freedom of information legislation as a means
for improving Paru-ament's investigatory role has been
influential in the public debate on the issue. Although the
main parliamentary advocate of redressing the balance
between the executive and the legislature' it is by no means
certain that Minogue's objective could be attained through
the proposars he advocate=-19
The term of parliament rates an occasional mention'20
In-service training for M.P.rs, earlier suggested by Alan
Robinson, has been taken up by one member of Par1iame,,t.21
But it has only been academics (and minority parties) who
have been prepared to contemplate a different electoral
system as a means of improving the performance of political
institutions.22
unless these views of parliamentarians and academics
19.
20.
2L.
See MinogXle, "Inforrnation a5d Forruer: Parlianerrtaqz Reform a1d
the nidr[ to I(trovy", in Steptnn Levi;re (ed) , Politics in t{el^r
z""hd (Q&rey: ceorp eiren and unwin, ig'76)};657
For exafiple, sir Jo]rn l4arstr,atl, "Introdtrction", j;r lvlarshall'
Fform of Parlianent, 1p.11-12. Cf R H Brookes, J L ll]berts andiffinir-of Parliarsrt", in l,Iarshall, Fform of
ParUanrent, pp. 116-120.
waring, "revitalisation of cabjlet, Parlianent and ParEies", in
J Stdiren ncadley (ed) rnprovjng Nel^r=?ealalgl:, DenocracY (Auckland:
t'Ienr Zealard Fbundation for Peace Sttdies, LgTg),1ffi O
Robinssr "Parlianenta4/ Denpcracf i-n lb^t zealartd: Sone Fossilrle
F\rtr::e OerrcIcpnents", h t'tarshaf, Reform of Paru.anpnt, pp.100-l'
see for exalple Nigel bbertsr"trrc6nrtj-onal Fp-resentation:
Lessons frpm gUroaA", ir Hoadley, prp.73-81, &d Jackson'
"ParlianentarY reform", P.2L5 -
22.
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are accepted by the party leadership they are unlikely to
receive serious consideration. The Leader of the National
Party has stated that he believes it is impossible to reform
Parliament "because of the nature of the institution."23
Nevertheless, these opinions, particularly those of members,
have performed the valuable role of focusing attention on
the need for reviewing the functioning of Parliament. The
Governmentrs decision in L979 to drop its proposal for a
"fiscal regulator" in the face of backbench opposition
within its own party indicates that members' views can be
influential on the question of Parliament's status.24
Prospects
Further procedural changes are inevitable for the
demands on Parliament cannot be expected to abate and there
is considerable scope for adjustments within the existing
framework. The prospects for major reforms remain fair.
The Labour Party is committed to a limited range of
changes that would nevertheless enhance the institution.
While it is not unusual for out-of-office innovators to
become attached to the status guo once they attain power,
influential and senior members of the Labour caucus appear
to be convinced of the necessity for reform. Innovations
from t,his source are dependent on the party regaining power
Quoted in ltircgue, "Inforrnation and Pov€r", p.85.
The p:otrnsed fiscal regnrJ.ator tould have alloved the Cabjnet to
reduce inone ta:< rates vlten Parlianent was rot jn s,ession,
thenelcy violating tte tr:adition that suctr decislons sftoufd be
nnde ry the House.
23.
24.
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(and, in the case of its proposal for a larger House'
attracting the support of the National Party) '
Under the present National regime, the process of
change can be expected to proceed incrementally. While more
than half National's members were first elected to Parliament
during the last five years, the caucus system, bY providing
opportunities for them to become involved in policy making'
serves to channel interests which might otherwise become
centred on Parliament-
Neitherpartyappearstohaveconceivedofreform
within a general review which has inter-linked changes to
parliament t.o its relationships to government and the
political system. Nor have they entertained significant
departures from the parliamentary framework or accepted the
necessity for moderating the partisan character of some
dimensionsoftheinstitution.Thetwo-partysystemhas
beentakenforgrantedasapermanentfeatureofthe
institution, although it has become doubtful that the main
parties will be able to regain their exclusive representation
in Parliament.
To achieve a proper balance between the needs of the
executive and a legislature with the independent capacity to
scrutinise effectively its actions, involves reforms which
the main parties are not yet prepared to contemplate. To do
so would require a re-definition of the traditional
conception of the British parliamentary model'
280.
APPENDIX
Note on Methodology
A number of problems were encountered in using the
recordsoftheHouseofRepresentatives.APartfromlack
of information (for example on the proceedings of the
committee of the whole House) the main difficulty was ob-
tainingaccurateinformation.Whilethestandardofthe
records was normally high, a lack of consistency between
different summaries was not unusual '
Forexample,itispossibletoobt'ainthreedifferent
figuresforpublicbillspassedfromthedetailsinthe
schedule of Business and schedule of Public Bills of the
Journal for rg77. while useful new categories of information
for bills were introduced into the schedule of Business in
Lg73, they have not always been consistently applied (for
example with private members' bills) '
The information on select committee reports had to
be compiled from several sources because none was complete'
The list of reports contained in the annual summary, the
schedule of Business, was found to be misleading on a number
of occasions. The starting point was the committee reports
containedintheAppendices,theonlysourcewhichconsis-
tently recorded reports on petitions ' This data was cross-
checked against the schedule of Business, which also included
reports on Selection (Private eills) and Privileges, and
occasionally produced a report omitted from the Appendices '
Athirdstepwastocheckthecollecteddataagainstthe
28r.
Schedule of Committees (which normally only included informa-
tion about reports on bills and other matters, but not
petitions) . If necessary the schedules for items of business,
for example Petitions or Private Bills, would be examined.
If doubt still existed the final authority was the contents
of the Journals detailing each report made by a corunittee to
the House.
All reports of substance relating to business whether
public, non-public or House matters were included in Tables
-l 
.2-7 .5. Two types of report made to the House were excluded
reports on decisions to allow the news media to be present
during hearings of committees, and reports recording appre-
ciation for services. Until the General Assenrlcly Library
was absorbed by the National Library the report by its
chief Librarian was recorded by the Library committee as a
report to Parliament and is so listed in the records (but
not included in the Appendices). For that reason they are
included but under the miscellaneous category in Tabfes
1 .2-7 .5.
A report does not necessarily equal a single item of
business, a bill or a petition. It is quite common for
separate petitions on the same subject to be considered
together and to become the subject of a single report' A
majority of the petition reports concerned a single petition'
Most reports on bills concerned a single bill, but some are
referred to more than one committee. The best examples are
loca1 bills, which are referred to Lands and Agriculture as
well as Local Bil1s. Occasionalty a local or public bill
282.
is the subject of a second rePort'
analysis in ChaPter 7, all rePorts
the exception of those noted above)
For
made
were
the purPoses
b the House
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of the
(with
I
I
I
283.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Appendices to the Journals of.the House of Representatives'
@ Government Printer.
Journals of the House of nepressntgtives. Wellington:
New Zealand Official Year Book. V{ellington: Government
New Zealand P@es. wellington: Government
-;fiEer.Scholefield, G- H. New Zealand parliqmentary Record ]-840-1949'
Wellington: Cover
Standing Orders of the gouse of Representativ
n: Government Prrnter'
Secondary Sources
Books
Baaklini, A. I. and Heaphey, J. J., eds. CompaTativg.Legislative
Reforms and Innovations. Albany: State Universrty or New
Bassett, M. The Thi-rd Labour Government. Dunmore Press, I976'
Blondel, J. Comparative Legislatures. Englewood CIiffs:
Prentice-Hall , L973.
cleveland, L. and Robinson, A. D., edS. Readingg_in New ZealandGovernment. Wellington: Reed Education, L972'
crick, B. The Reform of Parliament. rev. 2nd ed. London:
weidenfe
Di- Palma, G. Surviving Without Governl4g: The I!a!!eir Partiesin Parli.*e 977 '
Dollimore, H. N. The Parliament of New zealand and Parfiament
House. rev. ed. Wellington: vernment Printer,
Firth, R. Elements of Social Organization. 3rd ed. London:Watts, 1961.
284.
Griffith,
London:
Hawker' G.
SYdneY:
Herman' V.
HiIl, L. B.
J. A. G. Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills'GeorgeeAUnwinrl
N. The Parliament of '
Government Printer,
T976.Parliaments of the World. London: l{acMillan'
The lvlodel Ombudsman: Institutionalizing.New ?ealan{lE
Democratic ffiersey: Princeton UniversitY Press
Hinckley, B. Stability and Change in Congress' New York: Harper
& Row' I97L.
Hoadley, J. s., ed. rmproving New Zg?Iq+d's Pglrgcracy' Wellington:
New Zealand Foundation for Peace StudLes ' LY t> '
Huntington, s. P. Political order in changing societies' NewHaven: Yaie uni
Jackson, w. K. The New Zealand Legislative council: A SIrJ*Y-ofthe Establish '
Dii
Jackson, K. New Zealand: Politics of change. wellington: Reed
Education,
Jennings, sir w. I. Parliament. 2nd ed. cambridge: cambridgeUniversitY Press, 1-957 .
Jewell, M. E. and Patterson, S. C' rlre r':gi:fet*Yi=lrocess in
the United States. Zna ea. Uew Yo
Kelson, R. N. The Frivate Member of Parliament and the Formation
of Public Po iii-
Kirk, N. Towards Nationhood. Palmerston North: New zealandBooksr-
Kornberg, A., and Mishler, W' Influence in Parliament: Canada'
Durham: ouke University press, 1F6l
Lees, J. D., and Shaw, M. Committee? in-!99i-s19!gres: A FomparativeAnalysis. Durham: Duke Universl-ty Press ' L> t > '
Levine, S., ed. Politics in New Zealand: A Reader' Sydney: Allen
& Unwin, 1978.
Lipson,L.ThePolitiqsofncualiltatrtew?ea1?nd-19-Adventuresin
rymocracy.
March, R. The Myth of Parliament. scarborough: Prentice-Hall'
L974.
Marshall, Sir J., ed. The Reform of Parliament: Papers Presentedin l*'lemory 04 Dr- 3,1an- Bo
285.
Unpublished Papers and Theses
Alley, R. M. "Committees of the House". Paper presented in
Sem.inar, Can Parliament Survive Without Reform, VictoriaUniversity of Wellington, 1971.
Campbell, A. F. "The Speakership of the N.Z.
resentatives 1854-19L2". M.A. University
1952.
Cottrell, S. P. "Parliament and Conscience".
of Canterbury, L974.
Harrison, R. J. "Organisation and Procedure in the New ZealandParliament". Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1964-
Littlejohn, C. P. "Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand".
LLl4, Victoria University of Wellington, L969 -
ivlarshall, Rt Hon J. R. "The Individual and Government: the
RoIe of Parliamentary Committees". Paper presented in
Pubtic Lecture Seriei, Faculty of Law, Victoria University
of Wellington, 1-973.
Robinson, A. "Continuing Politica1 Change: the New Zealand Case"paper presented at Eighth World Congress of the International
Political Science Association, lvlunich , L970 -
Stewart, R. C. W. "The Parliamentary Research Officer: Apersonal Assessment'r. LLM, Victoria University of Wellington,
r976.
von Tunzelmann, A. "Members of the New Zealand House of Repre-
sentatives: A Study of Conditions 1854-1978". IvIPP researchpaper, Victoria University of Wellington, I979-
Weeks, K. M. "Political Party Personnel in New Zealand". 14.A.Victoria University of Wellington, 196I.
Wood, G. A. "The Political Structure of New Zealand, 1858 to1851". Ph.D. University of Otago, 1965.
Articles
Algie, R. M. "A Critical Examination ofParliament". New Zealand Journal of
House of Rep-
of Canterbury,
M.A. University
the Functioning of
Public Administration,
8 (Ivlarch , L946) , J.4-2I.
Alley, R. IU. "Parliamentary Parties in Office: Government-
Blckbench Relationsrr. Politics in New Zealand: A Reader
Edited by S Levine. Sy
AIIey, R. M. and Robinson, A' D. "A Mechanism for Enlargingthe House of Representatives". PoliticaL science, 23(October, I97L), 2-8.
286.
Blondel, J. et al "Legislative Behaviour: Some Steps Towards
a Cross-tiatfnal lvleasurement". Government and Opposition,
5 (Winter, Lg69-70) , 67-85
Campbell, P. "New Zealand Ministers, 1935-57"Science, 10 (September, 1958), 65'72.
Damgaard, E. "SLructural Adjustments of the Danish Parliamentin the Twentieth Century". Comparative.Legislative R9forms
and rnnovations. Edited by E-T-TEEkIinf and J J Heaphey.
@university of New York, L977.
Davidson, R. II. and Oleszek, W. J. "Adaption and Consolidation:Structural Innovation in the U.S. House of Representatives".
Legislative Studies Quarterly,l (February, L976) | 37-65'
Dollimore, H. N. "New Zealand 'Washing-up' Bills". The Table:the Journal of the Society of Clerks-at-the-House in Common-
Finlay, IIon lvl. "A I'ormer Minister Looks at Parliament". Editedby Sir John Marshall, 4" Reform of Parliament. Wellington:New Zealand rnstitute , 1978 -
HalI, T. D. H. "Publj.c Administratj-on and
in New Zealand". Journal of the Societ
Hil1, L. B. "Parl j-amentary
Change in New Zealand".
L974) , 337-46.
PoIiticaI
ParliamentarY Procedure
of Clerks-at-the-
Reality and
, 94-101.
The ParIia-
Table in Empire Parliaments,X
Harrison, R. J. "Government-Parliament". An EncycloPqdia of
New Zealand, Vo1. I. Edited by A H uclintoEE. wellington:
Government Printer, 1966.
Hedlund, R. D. and Hamm, K. E. "Institutional Development and
Legislatj-ve Effectiveness: Rule Changes in the Wisconsin
Aslemb1y".
Edited by A ffi J Heaphey, AlbanY: stateUniversity of New York, L977.
Petitions, the Ombudsman and PoliticalPolitieat Studies, XXII (september'
Jack, Hon Sir R. "A Speaker Looks at Parliament". The Reform ofparliament. Edited Ly sir John l"larshall. We11in96nffi-
%eTilA- Institute of Public Administration, 1978.
Jackson, K. "Cabinet and the Prime l4inister". Politics in NewZea1and:AReader.Ed.itedbySLevine.Sydne@in,
r978.
Jackson, K.
Reform".
Jackson, K.
mentarian,
"New Zealand Parliamentary Committees:
The Parliamentarian, LIx (April, L978)
"Parliamentary Reform in New Zealand" -Lx (October, L979), 210-15.
Jackson, W. K. "A Political Scientist
The Reform of Parliament. Edited by
Looks at Par1iament".Sir John lIarshall.
PubIic Administration,Wellington:
1978.
Neht zealanA-Institute of
281.
l{ezey, M. L. comparative Legislatures. Durham: Duke univers5'ty
Press , L979.
Milne,R.S.PoliticalPartiesi4xexJealand.London:oxford
UniversitY
Ivtitchell, A. Government. by B-aTty: Farliament and Politics in NewZealand. C
Mitchell, A. Politics and People in New zealand' christchurch:
whitconbe a@
I"lorrell, w. P. The Provincial syslem-in New Zealand L852-76'
Christchurch : Whitcombe
Muldoon, R. D. The Rise and FaIl of a Young Turk' wellington:
Reed, 1974.
OliverrW.H.TheStorvofNewZealand'London:Faberand
Faber, 1960.
Palmer, G. Unbridled Power? A Zeal-andrsConstitutiorr and Govelqm
Robinson, A. Notes on New zealand Politicq. wellington: victoria
UniversitY
RobsonrJ.L.NewZealand:TheDeveloPmentofitsLawsandConstitution
Rose, R. The Problem of Party Government. London: MacMillan,
L97 4.
Scott,K.J.TheNewZealandColelilution'London:Oxford
UniversitY
Sinclair, K. A History of New Zealand' 2nd ed' London:
Penguin, 1970.
lVaIkland,
Centur
Stewart, J. B. The Canadiel-Hguse of--9gmmons:
Re f orm . Montrea 1 : 14s 61-1 1 -que ens un ivEI ty
Procedure and
ress, LYll.
Wellington: DePartment of
London: Oxford UniversitY
A. (ed) The Housq of Conmonf in=tle Twentieth
Essavs by ament Grou
Oxford: Claren PTeSS,
The Commons in the 70's' Glasgow:Walkland, S. A. and RYle' Ivl.
Fontana/Collins, L977 .
Webb, L. Government in New Zealand'
Internal Af
Wheare, K. C. Legislatures' 2nd ed'
Press 
' 
1968 .
Kelson, R. N. "Voting in the New Zealand House of1947-54". Readings in New Zealand Government.
Cleveland a ngton:- Reed
L97 2.
Kember, J. L. "Foreign Policy and the Legislature:
James, C. Various articles in
1978-1980.
Logeman, M. L. "Committee
New Zealand Politics: A
288.
the National Business Review
Representatives ,
Editbd by L.
Education,
the Select
Zealand: A
Structure and Parliamentary Function" .
Reader, Edited by S. Levine- Melbourne:
Committee on Foreiqn Affairs". Politics in New
Reader. Edited by S. Levine. Sy-ney : Allen & Unwin , L9'18 -
Kjel1, A. E. and Pedersen, M. N. "ProfessiOnalization of
- Legislatures: Long-term Change j-n Political Recruitment
in Denmark and Norway". @paratiys_studies in society
and History,20 (April, L978) .
Kornberg, A. "Parliament in Canadian Society". Legislat9resin Developmenta! Perspective. Edited.by A. Kornberg and
ffi Dui-ham:- DUIe university' 1970.
Cheshire , L975.
Maclean, H. de S. C. "The General Assembly Library, New Zealand".proceedingrs of the Second Conference of Australian Parliamentary
mmff""=liErilans@mentary Yt
Maclean, H. de S. C. "Research Assistance to Parliamentarians;
Individual- and Party Research Aides or Centralised Library
of Parliamentary Librarians, I5t
Queen sI anAT arf-i anent a r v r,TEr a ry
-L 7 th 
"Tune ,
=e78.
Maclean, H. de S.(ttew Zealand) "
C. "services in the General Assernbly Library
. The Australian Library Journal.24 (June,
1975), ]-96-20r.
D. "Parliamentary 'Control' of Public Expenditure".by S. Levine.in New Zealand: A Reader, Edited
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, L978.
Marquet, L. B. "New Zealand: the Effects of Prorogation andOissolution on Parliamentary Business and the Legislature
Amendment Act 1977". rhe flble: the Journal of thg-fgglety.
of Clerk"-ul-t["-Housew
May, T. "Parliarnentary Discipline in New Zealand, 1955-63".
-i.eadings in New Zealand Government. Edited by L. Cleveland
ffin.--we-flrntton: Reed Education, L97 2 .
Minogue, M. J. "fnformation and Power: Parliamentary Reform
ana the Right to Know". Politics in New Zealand:-4 Reader.
Edited by S. Levine. SydneY
I"lcRobie , A.Politics
l{inogue, M. J. "Parliamentary Democracy Today",
Law Journal, 2L (November 1976), 485-9. The New Zealand
289.
I\,Iitche11, A.
Journal of
"Caucus: the
Commonwealth
New Zealand Parliamentary Parties" '
PoIitical Studies, VI (March, 1968)
Ivlitchell, A. ,,Membership of the New zealand Parliament"'Political Science, I3 (March, 1'961) ' 3L-49'
Mulgan, R. G. ',The Need for t"lore Graduate MPS: A Sceptical
----fi;t;". poriticir icience, zg ('ruty, L977) ' 66-7L'
Nordmeyer, A. H. ,,A Critical Examination of the Functioning ofParliament,,. New Zeal.,,d Jo,,'nal of Public Administration,
8 (l"larch , L946) , 3-13.
Polsby, N. W. "Institutionalization of the U'S' House ofRepresent.tirr"=i.--amgrican-pofiticaf Science neview' 62(March, 1968) , 144-I68 '
The Parliamentarian. Various unsig'ed contrf!::i:i:- :?^:??tl:i-
-ffi;;N;.;;'c;;;iiiutionaIandPo1iticaI',and.
"The sleaklr and the C1erk", 1968-1980 '
Roberts, J. "Society and its Politics"' Thirteen Facets. Editedby I: wards. wefiington: Government Pri:
schlesing€rr J. A. "Political careers and Party Leadership"'politicaf f,eaJersfrip in- industriafized Societies' Edited byffig"r. ttet vorr
Smith, J. M. "statutes Revision: the Lawye{"-' Committee"'politics in New Zeal-and:-a neader. Edited by s. Levine'i
von Tunzelmann, A. F. ,,The Public Expenditure Committee andParliamentary--controlofPublicExpenditgr"]'.Victoria
University of $tellington Law Review' l0 (rebruad' T97-) 'Tq:{F. _
von Tunzelmann, A. F- "Control of Expenditure and the New
Zealand public Expenditure-Committle". The Parliamentarian'LIX (October, !978) , 22L'230 '
Walker, H. J. "A Government Backbencher"'
15 iseptember, 1963) , 40-47'
walkland, s. A. ,,The PoliticS Of Parliamentary Reform"'parriamentaiy aiiiirs, zs (Spring , L976) ' I90-200 '
waring, M. ,,power and the New Zealand MP: selected lt[yths Aboutparliamentary DemocrEcy'r--"poliligE_in New zealan4-: A Reader'
Edited bY S. Levine. SYanet
waring, M- ,,Revitalisation of cabinet, Parliament, and Parties" '
Improving New Zealand's 
-oemocracy 
' 
Edited by J ' 
' 
S ' Itoadley 'for Peace St"dies' L979' 43-57
wiley, F. ,'Legislative select comrnittees " . Political science '21 (December, l-959) , 3-17 '
Political Science,
